21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era, Revised & Expanded
240 pages
Dr James WE Smith, King’s College London
It is not often, at least in military history and strategic studies, that an author or editor returns to a publication to update, revise and expand it. This can be a triple-edged sword, with good and bad sides to this, with reality somewhere between. This is why it warrants attention when the (US) Naval Institute Press authorised and published an updated version of 21stCentury Mahan by established American naval historian and USN officer Benjamin Armstrong. 21st Century Mahan collects American naval historian, USN officer and naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840-1914) essays into one accessible and tightly crafted book to illustrate why Mahan’s naval strategic concepts remain relevant to contemporary times and not just to an American audience––although some of Mahan’s work applicability to island nations warrants further discussion. That aside, it achieves this by presenting Mahan’s essays in their original form and making them accessible through Armstrong’s complimenting commentary. The book is easily accessible to a range of readers and relevant to young students or serving military personnel. It allows the reader to quickly dip in and out of Mahan’s work without trawling through archives, larger books or libraries. However, reading Mahan’s full publications on naval history and strategy before or after this text is highly recommended.
Often, studies of strategic and applied history thinkers are divided into those who appeal to historians and those whose aim is to appeal to those more focused on studying international relations and political science. Few editors and authors successfully cover both audiences well by providing a useful foundation for either. This is where Armstrong shines, particularly as he understands the vital task of making works such as Mahan accessible and readable to varied audiences. This is no easy task in an era of short attention spans of civilian students and military officers and where ease of digital resources (and manipulation of them), along with the coming onslaught of artificial intelligence whose impact on the field of history may be far-reaching. Furthermore, providing the necessary foundation to being able to discuss, debate and address topics of international challenges in the 21st century is a challenge which this book makes considerable inroads with, considering the meaning and intent of historians like Mahan are often twisted to suit the theories of the fields of political science and international relations that frequently result in any decent historian spitting out their tea or coffee in disgust. It is a fine line to walk and one that Armstrong navigates with ease, making Mahan more accessible than ever. At the same time, he takes due care of the original material and writes with respect towards Mahan, who, as a USN officer and applied history scholar has earned that respect.
Returning to the start of this review, one is left thinking that Armstrong is holding back or that this is a prelude to something more splendid, superior, and long-overdue. By limiting himself to commentary, it niches the book into the role of being at the start rather than offering a conclusion to an argument or a point. Readers must be mindful of this, particularly as it will leave them longing for more about Mahan and his work, along with the feeling that Armstrong has more to say about Mahan at a time when others have also published their views on Mahan, his impact, influence and his work. There is, however, another tone in this book: that seemingly, in the 21st century, the fact that work of minds such as Mahan are having to be reproduced opens a mine of questions: has the debate on naval strategy and maritime strategy stagnated? What old ideas are relevant, and others must be put to pasture with respect and dignity? Or why do individuals, political establishments, organisations and the military services need to be consistently educated about sea power and strategy? Mahan offers some guidance on this, and Armstrong elegantly makes points worth considering, but they need to be followed up in future publications on Mahan. At the same time, they must offer fresh perspectives rather than repeating analysis on his work per what has gone before.
This is a fantastic starting point for those interested in strategic theory and the minds of the best applied military historians. Both applied history students and those interested in strategic studies should seriously consider adding this title to their collection but be mindful that this is one of the starting points to learn about Mahan’s work. Still, it does not have the objective of having the final word and in that lays its strength.
