A Bloody Business: Convoy PQ17

240 pages

Rear Admiral Guy Liardet

The title is derived from the loudhailer message delivered to Commodore J C K Dowding, the convoy commodore, by Commander Jack Broome in Keppel; “Sorry to leave you like this. Goodbye and good luck. It looks like a bloody business.” The USN’s notable Captain Daniel Gallery described PQ17 as a “shameful page in naval history.” Admiral Kuznetsov in his memoirs said, “I reported the tragic case of Convoy PQ17 to J V Stalin. He was displeased with the behaviour of the British naval command. ‘Was it necessary to abandon the convoy?’ I replied that as far as I knew there were no serious reasons for that.” In my recent review for these pages of Hugh Sebag-Montefiore’s Battle of the Arctic, I recalled that Admiral O’Brien, first lieutenant of the destroyer leader Offa and afterwards CinC Western Fleet, said, “I still today have a personal sense of shame which is renewed annually…I hate 4th July, the Navy’s day of shame and mine.”

I am full of admiration for this polished and thorough account of a much-written-about topic. John Henshaw’s brief biography is of a sailor and oarsman but quotes no other academic works. Preface and Background chapters comprehensively cover the strategies of the warring nations; the seasonal Arctic environment; some statistics; the belief that after the breaking of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Soviet Russia would be a useless ally liable to collapse; the fundamental choice ‘Germany First’ made by the Americans after Pearl Harbor and other issues.

The crux of the tragic PQ17 story is of course the decision to scatter the convoy. PQ17 was making good progress having beaten off air attacks with few losses. ‘Close cover’ was being provided by the heavy cruisers London, Norfolk, the American Tuscaloosa and Wichita with two destroyers. Clearly no match for Tirpitz, Scheer, Hipper and Lutzow, but falsely and fortuitously U457 mistook the bulk of London and reported a battleship with this escort force, also the presence of enemy aircraft – probably one of Wichita’s Curtiss Seagull float planes but raising the fear of the carrier Victorious. Both sides would have recalled the fate of the sister ship Bismarck, the British the gunnery that blew up Hood and drove off Prince of Wales, the Germans the flukey but fatal attack by a few obsolete carrier-borne aircraft.

Bletchley intercepted the German plan to attack the ‘next convoy’, the text shown here in full. Also, inter alia the text of a long Admiralty signal dated 27 June micro-managing the contingencies and importantly how the Admiralty will exercise control, with the possibility that the convoy’s course might be reversed. Admiral Pound had told the Home Fleet Admiral Tovey by telephone at Scapa that he was thinking of scattering the convoy if Tirpitz went after it. Tovey was horrified – it would be ‘sheer bloody murder’ – and wanted to turn the convoy round to the protection of the ‘distant’ covering force, the battleships Duke of York, the USS Washington (main armament 9 x 16inch guns), the carrier Victorious, cruisersCumberland and Nigeria with eleven destroyers.

Henshaw’s key chapter 7 entitled ‘Admiral Pound and the Operational Intelligence Centre’ explains the dilemma facing the First Sea Lord. Described is Pound’s health, his eventually fatal brain tumour, his autocratic character as a ‘master of detail’, his past career and the strain of difficult decisions, the naval disasters from Mers-el-Kebir in 1940 onwards and the string of personalities from Churchill to the Anglophobic US Admiral King that he had to deal with.

Kriegsmarine signals were not decoded in real time but Paymaster Lt-Cdr Norman Denning, the recognised top intelligence analyst, knew that when the enemy put to sea it preserved radio silence while being instructed by shore-based broadcast. Also, a destroyer sweep would have been ordered, their signals observed and their operations reported by our submarines.  None of this had happened. It was known that the Germans did not know the whereabouts of the Home Fleet and this led to the reasonable belief that the Germans would not risk its ships without this knowledge. When Pound visited the OIC, he was told that Tirpitz and Hipper had joined with Scheer at Altenfiord but had not proceeded in the direction of PQ17.  Denning and his superior Captain Jock Clayton and Professor Hindley of Bletchley Park were convinced that the German ships had not sailed. The First Sea Lord wanted positive evidence; all that was on offer was negative intelligence. At a staff meeting at 2000 to review the situation his advisers were opposed to a dispersal, but Pound called for a signal pad and wrote the order for dispersal.

Ever afterwards Denning regretted that he had not been more forceful, but in the structured, hierarchical Royal Navy of the time, it was simply not done to venture strong and contrary opinions to its most senior officer. What else could have been done? There was clearly the option to turn round back towards Iceland and perhaps lure Tirpitz on to the Home Fleet as shown in the Admiralty signal discussed above. This debacle lost 22 of the final 33 merchantmen to air and submarine attacks, a casualty rate probably as bad as an actual engagement with Tirpitz. 

Henshaw continues with a detailed account of what happened to every ship and the politics of an ‘aftermath’ including the next strongly escorted PQ18, the first to contain a game-changing escort carrier. Amid many photographs, his book is embellished with exquisite line drawings of every warship and aircraft mentioned as well as many merchant ship types. The statistics for American shipbuilding are astonishing. He is very critical of the Russian efforts in support of the Arctic convoy campaign; “replete with the failures of the Soviets to comply with what had been agreed”; the failure to provide support for survivors; the appalling Murmansk hospital; the inadequate and never improved cargo handling arrangements; the almost complete lack of military support; a record of calculated ingratitude.

Commander Broome’s well-known libel action is described. Appendices cover the dimensions, performance and armament of every ship and aircraft, endnotes, glossary and index.

This is an admirable book which, although it covers such a well-known naval disaster, describes with unusual clarity the command and control issues which were so important to the outcome. Highly recommended. You will enjoy reading it.