A Naval History of the Middle East 500-2020
270 pages
Prof Andrew Lambert
Kings College London
The Middle East, a term coined by Alfred T Mahan at the end of the 19th century, just as the major powers launched a major re-arrangement of ownership and access, was always a maritime theatre. Trade goods travelling between Asia and Europe had to disembark and proceed by land, via key commercial cities of regional trade, Damascus, Alexandria and Aleppo, strategic prizes that justified costly navies, and many wars. After a substantial overview of regional activity the chapters, some original, some transplanted from other formats, examine the operational instructions of the well-organised and effective Byzantine fleet – many of them derived from classical texts. Byzantine decline created openings for the Italian maritime powers in the Crusades, which stretched far beyond the Venetian seizure of Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade. The Italians provided most of the Crusader’s naval power and were so effective that the Mamluk rulers of Egypt, as the third essay observes, demolished the port cities of the Palestinian coast, shifting populations to new inland towns that could be defended by armies, not ships. The next two essays deal with 18th century Persian and 19th century Egyptian attempts to create navies to secure trade and shape empires. In both cases essentially European projects, reliant on foreign expertise, hardly outlived the unusually sea-minded rulers who shaped them. In Egypt Mohammed Ali built 10 ships of the line, and purchased pioneer steam warships, but the project faltered after the loss of Palestine in 1840, when the fleet was trapped in Alexandria’s shallow harbour by the need to take out the guns before sailing. Two carefully chosen British ships blockaded the fleet: HMS Asia had been the flagship at the destruction of an Egyptian fleet at Navarino in 1827, while the formerly French HMS Implacable warned Egypt not to look for French support. An interesting chapter on Greek piracy in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 demonstrates that irregular methods were unsuccessful and damaged the cause they served.
The inter-war regeneration of the Turkish fleet emphasises the competition for defence orders, which were spread across several states, and Ankara’s refusal to enter the war until one side had secured command of the sea. The lessons of 1914-18 had been understood. Royal Navy officers were retained to train the rising fleet, despite the presence of American personnel. The creation of an Abu Dhabi navy between 1966 and 1976 offers insight into regional tensions. British influence declined in step with the withdrawal of local assets and commitments, while British personnel were replaced by Pakistanis – to avoid the appearance of being under Western control. The final chapter examines the Israeli Navy’s evolution, emphasising rapid learning, particularly focussed on enemy competence and capabilities, effective weapon and sensor development/ acquisition, and the professionalism of the service in the full spectrum of operations, from combat to blockades that cut the supply of weapons to hostile forces in Palestine and Lebanon. An extended bibliography offers a wide range of useful readings on the regime across time.
This collection demonstrates that navies can influence the region, situation on land, but their reach has usually been restricted by large local armies, difficult terrain, harsh climates and the limited number of major ports. These tended to be controlled by powerful land powers, who controlled the trade with Asia, a prize shared between Egypt, Byzantium and the Italian sea states, before the Ottoman Empire acquired a monopoly by seizing Syria and Egypt. Ultimately, as Alexander the Great demonstrated by building a causeway to capture Tyre, major land powers could command local seas. In 1869 the Suez Canal turned a maritime dead end into the main axis of global trade, which obliged Britian to secure Cyprus and Aden as the strategic gatekeepers. The rise of regional hydrocarbon powers and a series of wars involving Israel have kept the region at the forefront of global interest. It is not clear how the latest conflict will end, but the Middle East will remain a major challenge for global sea power, and history might help us anticipate the ebb and flow of regional conflict.
