Allied Convoys to Northern Russia, 1941-1945: Politics, Strategy and Tactics

256 pages

Brian Trim

As this was my third book to review on Arctic Convoys in the last two years, I was rather looking forward to its promised strategic perspective. There seems to have been much written on tactical and operational matters, but little on the strategic rationale and context for these operations. The blurb says as much and promises a higher-level consideration. To a degree, the book achieves this. There is little here on convoy tactics or the impacts of arctic weather on those afloat. There is much on the difficult politics and diplomacy, where leadership seems to have fallen mostly to Britain.

My chief criticism, however, is the over-presentation of primary sources. I sense there is something of a trend emerging to ‘bulk’ a book by incorporating large tracts of source material. It does not improve the reading experience, in my view. A representative sample, touching on the difficulties of gaining access to Soviet Russia: “The committee agreed the final draft and instructed the secretary to submit it to the Foreign Office for dispatch to the British Ambassador, Moscow, at the same time acquainting the Foreign Office that the chiefs of staff reserved the right to….” In several instances, the author presents Churchill’s draft of a message to Stalin, followed by Roosevelt’s comments on that draft, then the final version, and occasionally Stalin’s response. Perhaps I am overly sensitive to this due to my day job in the Secretariat, but the result is some distance away from a ‘good read’. The general absence of analysis, of a developed argument, seriously diminishes the impact of the book.

I was also disappointed that the book did not consistently connect the Arctic Convoy operations to the wider strategic framework. I submit that it would be easier to understand the dynamics amongst Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin by considering their exchanges in the context of what they knew at the time – after all, the result was not a foregone conclusion. It would also help to understand some of the constraints arising from competing priorities. To be fair, Smith does explore this to aspects of TORCH and OVERLORD.

Finally, Smith’s work is heavily grounded in UK sources. There is little evidence of having conducted analogous research in the US, or in Russia. So, the book leaves us with a very close look at British records of government decision making, 1941-45, filtered for references to Arctic Convoys. Analysis and Conclusions have been – quite literally – saved for an Appendix.

For those conducting research on the topic, this book is a useful route to saving some weeks of work at Kew. With regret, I cannot recommend it more widely.