Arms for Russia & The Naval War in the Arctic, 1941-1945

584 pages

RAdm R G Melly

This is the third book by Andrew Boyd, with his earlier two books The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters and British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century being much acclaimed. A former submariner, his interest in maritime warfare has led to the award of a DPhil from the University of Buckingham. In a wide-ranging narrative, the author seeks to challenge the normal assumption, encouraged by the Soviets during the Cold War, that the Allied efforts in supplying goods to Russia were discretionary rather than critical to their war effort.

The first sections of the book provide an analysis of the readiness for the Royal Navy to undertake operations in the Arctic. Building on the experience gained of defensive and offensive operations in the Mediterranean, earlier in the war, the key enablers for successful convoy protection are also identified: escort carriers; radar; SIGINT; and HF/DF. It also shines a spotlight on the impressive technological efforts to generate additional ships, aircraft and equipment for the navy, initially addressing the pre-War underinvestment before greatly increasing the resources available to address war time losses and to expand the fleet.

The book then goes on to describe the actual conduct of the convoys and the associated naval operations, with particularly gripping descriptions of the PQ17 and PQ18 convoys, the destruction of the Scharnhorst and the ultimately successful attempts to remove the threat represented by the Tirpitz.  The final convoys, with the increased resources available and the German efforts blunted, were fought through with favourable outcomes and with significant quantities of materiel delivered.

Whilst most of the stores transferred to Russia, during the war, came across the Pacific, in the early months the Arctic route was the one most utilised. Whilst there were constraints both in providing the quantities agreed and in handling the goods at Murmansk and Archangel, the Russians preferred the Arctic route, as the goods received were nearer to where they were needed, and the Allies considered it to be faster and less demanding of shipping. Nevertheless, the astonishing effort that went into protecting the convoys, almost entirely by the Royal Navy, is ably demonstrated.

Considerable attention is also paid to the politics behind the provision of arms to Russia, with the disagreements between the three main parties, Russia, Great Britain and America, explored in detail.  Indeed, there were considerable reservations over the diversion of scarce resources and, at times, the high cost in lives and shipping.  Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that the support provided was sufficient to bind Russia into the wider strategy for defeating Germany, comprising containment and wear down, albeit initially the aim was to keep Russia in the war. The complexity of the planning for each of the convoys and the huge scale of the resources committed are a testimony to the size and capability of the Royal Navy at that time, a factor well recognised by the Germans. However, the disaster of PQ17, along with disagreement over how best to take the war to Germany, shows that mistrust between allies is nothing new!

This book, with its aim to challenge previous conceptions, provides a thoroughly researched and most detailed analysis of the Arctic supply route, drawing on sources from Russia, America, the UK and Germany. At nearly 600 pages, with only a few B&W images and illustrations, it is not for the faint-hearted; however, I contend that it is well worth the effort! The narrative is both well-written and informative, and the truly impressive footnotes and bibliography are a testament to the academic level of research that has gone into the production of a convincing hypothesis and a gripping read, by an impressive author.