Australia’s Naval Alliances: Lessons of History
267 pages
Dr James Bosbotinis
This is a valuable and timely book, given the prevailing circumstances surrounding questions over not just the US commitment to NATO but international order more broadly, and that 2026 marks the 125th anniversary of the establishment of the Commonwealth Naval Forces that subsequently became the Royal Australian Navy in 1911. In this book, the author sets out to examine the evolving debates over the roles of the Royal Australian Navy, in particular with regard to its contribution to the wider British Empire, the alliance with Britain including the latter’s reliability, the shift to alliance with the US in the Second World War, and finally the AUKUS pact. The author, John Seymour, comes from a legal background, retiring as a Reader-in-Law at the Australian National University, Canberra, and has published widely on various aspects of Australian law, before developing a deep interest in naval history. As he notes in his Preface, “the lesson to be learned from the story told in this book is that any alliance will inevitably confront unexpected head-winds.”
Across 10 chapters, Seymour discusses the evolution of the Australia-UK alliance, focusing on the period from the First World War, the inter-war period and to the Second World War; the Jellicoe Mission is discussed in particular detail. Seymour ably discusses the competing interests and priorities for Canberra, for example, balancing purely national interests and requirements with those of contributing to a wider Imperial posture, and Britain’s evolving position as its relative power declined following the First World War, together with the rise of Japan, and questions over whether Britain could credibly defend its interests and the Empire in East Asia. Ultimately, the events of December 1941 and early 1942 would demonstrate that “Australia could no longer rely on the RN for protection”, and thus had to turn to the US. The final chapter brings the discussion up to date and critically considers AUKUS, including whether the US and UK can be relied upon to deliver their respective components of the pact. Namely, “Long-term commitment of the kind reflected in membership of AUKUS might prove unwise in view of the fears that have been expressed about the volatility of the United States”, and on the “capacity of British industry to design, build and deliver eight AUKUS class nuclear-powered submarines.” Seymour concludes by stating “the pivot [to the US] left unanswered the persistent doubts about the priorities to be pursued by the navy of a ‘middle power’”; again, this is a most timely question with distinct relevance beyond Canberra.
Australia’s Naval Alliances provides a well-written, highly engaging analysis of Australia’s naval relationship with the UK in the first half of the 20th century, and AUKUS. The author writes in a concise and precise manner, although the first paragraph on page 189 on the Japanese naval raid into the Indian Ocean in late March/early April 1942 could be clearer, as it does somewhat suggest that HMS Cornwall and Dorsetshire were sunk on 30 March. For the sake of completeness, an additional chapter examining the development of the naval aspects of the Australia-US alliance following the Second World War, encompassing, for example, the Royal Australian Navy’s role and contribution to the Korean and Vietnam Wars and 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the continued Australia-UK relationship would have been welcome. This book will be particularly valuable to those interested in Australian naval history, British maritime strategy in the first half of the 20thcentury and imperial relations, and contemporary AUKUS debates. Seymour’ analysis, in the context of Britain’s position through the interwar period, of the pressures of balancing commitments and resources and with it, the implications for alliance credibility, is also timely. All in all, Australia’s Naval Alliances is highly recommended.
