Balancing Strategy: Sea Power, Neutrality, and Prize Law in the Seven Years’ War
288 pages
Andrew Livsey, PhD student, Kings College London
Few books are both cited in papers written for the UK Ministry of Defence for a very current problem, and also give a groundbreaking explanation of the working of 18th century maritime law while shedding new light on a global contest. Anna Brinkman achieves precisely this with her new work Balancing Strategy.
In part Brinkman’s book is a detailed examination of a particular part of 18th century maritime and legal history. She tells the story of two Spanish and two Netherlands ships coming before the court of prize appeal in London during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) using official records in London and Mexico, as well as the personal papers of the major British participants to draw back the veil on their discussions, and British newspapers of the time and other sources to gauge how the decisions were received. In essence the British government was trying to ensure that British privateers could destroy French maritime commerce, and so weaken the overall French war effort, without bringing the neutral Netherlands and Spain into the war against Britain, and all the time needing to assuage domestic interests.
Part of the consequence was a development of international maritime law, driven by the court having to decide whether each ship and its cargo had been captured legally. Earl Hardwicke, a lawyer and politician, did much to manage the balance between effective attack on the French and keeping the neutrals appeased, in part through developing his ‘Rule of the War of 1756’, that commerce which was prohibited to a neutral during peacetime was prohibited during wartime. As each state in peacetime largely restricted trade with its colonies to its own national ships, this obstructed the French attempt to maintain trade with their colonies using Netherlands and Spanish ships. The idea remained influential in the developing and contested body of international maritime law until the 1856 Treaty of Paris outlawed privateering. Of course, it was not just the British determining international maritime law. Instead, as Brinkman explains, the neutrals were also seeking to influence its development.
Overall, the British approach to international maritime law in the Seven Years’ War succeeded. British privateers largely destroyed French trade, while the neutrals were assuaged by the British prize courts being broadly fair, which meant that they could continue to achieve some trade. The result was that despite some frustration the Netherlands remained neutral throughout, and though the Spanish were eventually antagonised into war they held off until 1762 which was simply too late. By that stage French naval power had been broken at the battles of Lagos and Quiberon Bay, the British had largely conquered Canada and the destruction of French trade had helped to force the French state to default on its debts. All the Spanish managed to achieve was to lose Florida, exchanging it in the concluding peace treaty in exchange for the return of Havana and other possessions which had rapidly fallen to the now dominant British forces.
Besides the excellent archival research, what elevates this book above the norm is the way that Brinkman relates her specific points to more general issues of sea power. As she reminds us, the British maritime strategist Julian Corbett pointed out that an increasing command of the sea can increase the likelihood of neutral powers becoming enemies, and astute management is consequently required. Corbett was writing as a historian of the Seven Years’ War himself, but his warning made just before the First World War was prescient, for in that conflict both the UK and Germany had to manage the views of neutrals as each tried to starve the other into submission. That the UK managed the process better played a significant part in the US joining the Allies in 1917, while the British starvation of Germany was a major reason for that nation’s collapse. Indeed, the First World War is a major example of the effectiveness of sea power: of the eight major participants the four that lost contact with the sea and thus the ability to import goods collapsed (the German, Austria-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires), while the four that maintained it survived (the UK, France, Italy and the USA).
The need for balance in the application of sea power and the parallel struggle over the development of international maritime law have much significance today. The G7 and friends are trying to support Ukraine by making sanctions against Russia more effective. This would be aided by a greater ability to stop and search transiting merchant ships. At the same time, however, the G7 must avoid exasperating neutrals such as India. To complicate matters further, they must also avoid actions which lead to a flight of shipping to management outside the G7, or increase state authority at sea in a way that would aid the Chinese attempts to increase control over the West Philippines Sea or partly legitimise a Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Fine judgements are required, hence the reference in a paper written for the current Ministry of Defence.
In sum, therefore, this is an excellent book on several levels. Brinkman has used archives in two continents and brought the resulting materiel together masterfully, both as a piece of history and to contribute to a wider discussion about international maritime law and sea power. The frustration, and this is no fault of Brinkman’s, is the book price of £85 which would need more than a passing interest to merit a purchase. If you are serious about understanding such matters, this book is still one to put on your list. Fortunately, I can balance the bad news of the cost with some good news: Brinkman is moving to BRNC Dartmouth where her expertise and engaging approach will help the strategy department there enthuse the cadets joining the service.
