Battle of the Arctic: The Maritime Epic of World War Two

816 pages

Rear Admiral Guy Liardet

Sorting out the Sebag-Montefiores, it is Simon who is famous for his many histories including books about Stalin, Catherine the Great and, notably, Jerusalem: The Biography. He can also be seen walking about a sunlit Vienna in his Panama hat, explaining the serial catastrophes that afflicted the Hapsburgs. But this is his brother Hugh who again is a much-published historian having written about the Somme and Dunkirk as well as what this readership will remember best, the Enigma story with its Appendices about decryption techniques that required close reader attention (‘banburismus’; ‘turingery’; ‘scritchmus’, etc.).

This Arctic story weighs in at 816 pages and is a narrative about a well-known campaign that is made unusual by an emphasis on the experiences of merchant seafarers in the appalling Arctic climate. Gerard de Groot in his review for the Times newspaper on Saturday, 8 November, says “It will nevertheless appeal to naval history aficionados who don’t mind being pummelled by relentless horror.” Its strength lies in the large number of testimonies that the author has managed to collect from survivors, either oral or written. The effects of frostbite are fully described and there is a careful tally of casualties from each sinking or damage. A depressing account of conditions in the Murmansk hospital with its complete lack of hygiene, pain killers and even clean bandages also establishes the Russian cure for gangrene; ‘cut it off’. Another vignette describes the severe punishments issued to Russian women convicted of selling on gifts such as soap and food from Allied sailors, despite their desperate needs.

Verbal testimony is used as far as possible in the detailed reconstruction of the decision-making at higher level. The tragic story of the scattering of Convoy PQ17 gets five chapters and Admiral Pound’s decision is again examined for what he knew and when. There is an amelioration of blame expressed here in an extensive Note; much of the intelligence was equivocal about Tirpitz’s position and intentions, confused as the Germans were by a faulty report that there was a battleship in the convoy escort.  Nevertheless, what ensued was a disaster with 21 defenceless merchantmen sunk by aircraft or U-boats. I recall that Admiral O’Brien, afterwards CinC Western Fleet and then first lieutenant of the destroyer leader Offa, said, “I still today have a personal sense of shame which is renewed annually…I hate 4th July, the Navy’s day of shame and mine.”

Anti-submarine specialists will be intrigued by Captain Johnny Walker’s remarks about an inability to gain asdic contact even at short range due to ‘a layer of water’ below which detection was impossible. Can anyone cast a light on this? ‘Cold’ sure, but certainly ‘mixed’. I recall a Lt Cdr Magnus Work RNR (DSC and two bars) driving Bamborough Castle who detected a disappearing radar contact close inshore in shallow water where the submarine was “unable to evade below the prevalent deep cold-water layer” and sank it with two Squid salvoes.

 Each major action such as the Battle of the Barents Sea, PQ17, Tirpitz’s Arctic sorties, the sinking of the Scharnhorst gets a carefully compiled map of tracks. There was no enemy activity up to Convoy QP8 when Tirpitz was unsuccessfully attacked by Victorious’ aircraft and a couple of ships were sunk by German destroyers. With the investment of Norway things got much worse and there was debate about the weakening of our efforts elsewhere due to the Arctic effort, particularly in the Far East and North Africa. PQ18 saw the first deployment of an escort carrier; subsequent convoys often featured two.  I have a source (Convoys to Russia 1941-1945 by Ruegg and Hague, World Ship Society Publications) which tabulates the loss of 31 U-boats with eight sunk by Swordfish alone and four more by Swordfish in company with escorts. (Quite an addition to Bismarck and Taranto!). Grumman Wildcat fighters and Sea Hurricanescorrected the aircraft imbalance.  Montefiore counts 87 merchant ship losses while my source names 104. Montefiore’s 18 warships lost is tabulated as 20 with two cruisers (Edinburgh and Trinidad), seven destroyers (one Russian), three sloops, one frigate, three corvettes and four minesweepers. Only 829 of some 2,773 Allied seamen killed were from merchant ship crews.

In his Conclusion, Montefiore discusses whether it was all worth it.  There was a typical Russian attitude of disrespect for the Allied efforts born of an understandable need to claim that it was their forces that had saved the country, a resentment that the second front was not opened earlier and a desire to show that the communist system was superior to western democracy.  However, despite a lack of hard information, the opinion of most historians both the revisionist in Russia and in the West, is that certainly the convoys were important to survival during the first 18 months of the German invasion but after 1942 diminished as a proportion of the aid sent to Russia via all routes. Zhukov, Mikoyan and Khrushchev are quoted as saying that foreign aid played an important part in their country’s victory.

This is a well recommended and necessary salute to the fates of Allied sailors during the Arctic campaign.  If you can bear the repetitive suffering, well worth reading.