Blitzkrieg and the Russian Art of War
348 pages
Dr James Bosbotinis
This is an important and timely book, both in terms of its examination of Russian thinking but also how Russia and wider issues of defence and war are seen in the West. As the author, Andrew Monaghan, a highly regarded expert on Russian grand strategy, explains, Blitzkrieg and the Russian Art of War seeks to “explore patterns in Moscow’s strategic thinking about and experience of war to see what we might learn about Russian intent and practice, the better to address challenges today and tomorrow.” While the focus of the book is very much on Russian thought, the author makes the valuable observation that ‘The impact of what became an open-ended war against terror and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan had such a deep impact on Western understandings of ‘war’ that by the early 2010s it was no longer easy to distinguish between war and peace…”. Moreover, Monaghan suggests, with regard to the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, that “This experience has shifted the emphasis of defence away from combat and towards security and deterrence”, and “fostered a ‘political and societal disengagement from the idea of victory’.” This is in distinct contrast to Russian thinking.
Following a broadly chronological approach, the author charts the development of Russian and Soviet strategic thinking from the end of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution through Stalin’s totalitarianism and the ‘Great Fatherland War’, ‘Winning a War in the Nuclear Age’, the decline and collapse of, and transition from the Soviet Union to Russian Federation. The latter part of ‘War in the Information Age’ and the final chapter, ‘A Twenty-First Century Blitzkrieg’ will be of particular interest as they encompass Putin’s rise to power and the development of contemporary Russian military thinking. As Monaghan highlights, the Russian debates in the 2010s “emphasised a ‘Cold War 2.0’ and the struggle for resources, even whether World War III was unavoidable, and called for mobilisation preparation’; further, entering the 2020s, “Of particular concern was the active role of the US and NATO in causing increasing strategic instability and the growing potential for a global strike, a ‘twenty-first-century blitzkrieg’.”
The final five or so pages of ‘A Twenty-First Century Blitzkrieg’ address the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including a brief discussion of a 2021 book, co-authored by Yuri Baluyevsky, Viktor Esin, Andrei Kokoshin and Aleksander Shliakhturov, on the subject of escalation. The conclusion, ‘Russian Way(s) in War’ ably brings together the discussion across the preceding chapters, and of particular relevance to the NR, observes that “the Russian economy is ever more dependent on the sea”, and that the “maritime emphasis…will shape the regeneration of Russia’s armed forces looking ahead.” In his concluding remarks, Monaghan suggests that “Moscow is seeking to position Russia for a long contest…the leadership is to all intents and purposes converting Russia into a commodity champion and military-patriotic fortress…resilience at home, with deployable power across a global horizon.” A note on terms and translations is included, which explains why the author refers to the ‘Great Fatherland’, as opposed to ‘Patriotic’, War.
Blitzkrieg and the Russian Art of War provides an ably written, highly detailed and sophisticated analysis of the development of Russian military thought over more than a century, highlighting enduring themes and debates. It should be read by all those with an interest in Russian grand strategy and is most highly recommended.
