Continental Powers and Naval Development: Strategy Coherence, Threat Diffusion and Success at Sea
218 pages
Capt Jeremy Stocker RNR
You shouldn’t be put off this book by its unwieldy sub-title, but you probably will be put off by its ridiculous price (though an e-book is available at a fraction of the cost). It’s part of the long-running Naval Policy and History series edited by Geoff Till of this parish and the author is a member of staff at the US Naval War College in Newport RI.
This reviewer must declare an interest: my own Architects of Continental Seapower, also published and over-priced by Routledge, was reviewed in the NR in 2021 (Vol. 109 No.3). We are fishing in similar waters though, a little gallingly, Chao appears unaware of my earlier work. Otherwise, he uses many of the same sources though, somewhat eccentrically, provides a separate bibliography for each chapter which leads to a good deal of repetition and wasted space.
If I have an overarching criticism of this work, it is that Chao does not explain why substantial land powers might also seek to become sea powers (and thus ‘hybrid’). ‘Strategy Coherence’ is not really addressed until we get to the concluding chapter. What he does do, is set out to answer the question “What…explains a continental great power’s likelihood of succeeding at naval development and becoming a hybrid [ie land and naval] great power?”. So this is more about Ways and Means than it is Ends.
The bulk of Chao’s work is a series of case studies. These include the two I examined, Imperial Germany and Soviet Russia, plus France from the time of Napoleon until today, Imperial Russia from the same time until the 1917 Revolution and, at greater length, China from the beginning of the 19th century. It is this latter section that gives the work its greatest contemporary relevance. The large timeframes limit the depth of analysis possible in the first four cases – France between 1914 and 2025 is covered in a single page. But Chao’s conclusions are fine so far as they go and there are few surprises here.
Chapter 7 on China is, I think, the meat of the book. Chao contrasts China’s long and almost uninterrupted lack of interest in the sea with the rise of its naval power since the mid-1990s, backed by its huge economic expansion. He is surely right to identify not just the numerical increase in China’s naval forces, but also some of the continuing technological and industrial limitations facing the country. Chao could also have discussed the implications of an almost complete lack of combat experience, surely a key metric.
Perhaps most importantly, the author does discuss why the Chinese Government has decided to become a significant naval power, how it will use that capability and its likely implications. This has been done by several other writers, but Chao puts it in the context of his (more superficial) coverage of earlier case studies. He calls it a “Fleet for All Seasons: Near Sea by Default, Far Sea when Desired” which is a good characterisation. Thus, China has gone from being a Continental to a Hybrid power.
Chao and I use ‘Hybrid’ in slightly different ways. I’ve suggested that some powers are inherently Maritime, like Britain and Japan. Some, such as Germany and Russia, are inherently Continental. Others, by virtue of their geostrategic circumstances, are a bit of both – France, India, China. Chao uses Hybrid in a capability sense – a Continental state that acquires a Fleet. These different conceptualisations are fine, provided you know and explain exactly what it is you’re talking about.
The book concludes with a discussion of this ‘hybridisation’ process – the move from Continental to Hybrid military status and briefly examines the relative successes of the five case studies. Chao makes an essential observation – that building a navy without understanding why, or thinking through how it is to be used, is “nonsensical”. I wish he had done more to support this sound conclusion in his case studies, for this is the key strategic point. In a sense, he has reversed the normal strategic order of things, discussing Ways and Means before, belatedly, getting to the Ends.
Chao is good on China but offers little new on France, Russia or Germany. It’s certainly worth consulting in a library if you’re researching the naval developments of land powers. But at this price I cannot recommend that anyone actually purchase it. I shall value my review copy.
