Convoy PQ-17: Disaster in the Arctic & Never to Return: Convoys to Russia in the Second World War
96 pages; 222 pages
Prof Andrew Lambert
These excellent texts remind us of the Royal Navy’s greatest achievement, escorting excruciatingly slow supply convoys to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945, past German occupied northern Norway, under attack by dedicated Luftwaffe maritime strike squadrons, U-boat wolf packs, and facing the constant menace of heavy surface units, including the battleship Tirpitz, pocket battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers.
Arctic Convoys had a close escort of destroyers and smaller craft, backed at a distance by heavy units, carriers, battleships and heavy cruisers from the Home Fleet and US Navy, to deal with a serious surface attack. The constant presence of Tirpitz in the high north from early in 1942 was a constant concern, in case it broke out into the Atlantic, even after the St. Nazaire Raid had wrecked the essential dry dock on March 28th, 1942.
These missions were completed at a heavy cost in human life and lost ships, and not without a singular disaster. The books are complimentary, Konstam’s solid, unsparing and highly engaging assessment of PQ 17 June-July 1942 takes no prisoners. The naval high command failed, an avoidable failure that left ships and men exposed to the fury of the enemy. By contrast Maclean’s award-winning text, first published in Gaelic it might be noted, engages with the human story of destroyer men escorting Convoy JW51B six months later and one ship in particular. HMS Achates, an older unit, had been rebuilt for anti-submarine warfare after losing her bow to a mine, there were several men from the Scottish Islands among the crew. Their recollections and contemporary correspondence highlights the impact of war and weather in the extreme north on men and machines alike. Good use is also made of interviews that Dudley Pope conducted for 73 North, his book about the action, and the published Staff History.
PQ17 took a heavy load of warlike stores to Russia but, as with all the Arctic Convoys, PQ17 had another role. The Admiralty was anxious to draw Tirpitz out of a secure base, over a submarine patrol line, which included submarine ace ‘Baldly’ Hezlet’s boat HMS Trident, equipped with the latest magnetic detonators, and instructions not to fire at any other target. In the event Hitler delayed giving approval for a surface sortie for so long that the Convoy no longer existed when he finally agreed. First Sea Lord Dudley Pound took the fateful decision to disperse the convoy, because he believed a major surface attack was imminent. It was not, as the intelligence strongly suggested. Instead, the scattered merchant ships and small escorts were scattered, making independent voyages towards the White Sea, 23 of 35 merchant ships were sunk by bombers and U-boats, many with their entire crews. The skill, ingenuity and heroism of young reservist officers and sailors is highlighted, but they could only limit the disaster. Despite the losses, Soviet demands prompted PQ18 in September, with a powerful escort including an escort carrier carrying fighters and ASW equipped Swordfish. This time the German air and submarine were badly degraded, and the convoy survived.
JW51B was attacked by a German surface force comprising a pocket battleship, a heavy cruiser and three destroyers. Four British destroyers held off the attackers by feinting torpedo attacks and laying smoke screens – text-book destroyer work – long enough for two British light cruisers to intervene. Sheffield and Jamaica drove off the attackers, badly damaging the German cruiser, and sinking a destroyer. The attackers retired at speed. Despite the bridge being shattered by 8-inch hits, the Captain dead, and in a sinking condition Achates had remained in action throughout, finally sinking as the enemy retreated. The account of conditions aboard as the ship sank is graphic, and harrowing. Infuriated by the defeat Hitler ordered the surface Navy to be disbanded, a process delayed by the inability to repurpose such costly assets. Like so many continental leaders Hitler had no understanding of the ocean, or the impact it has on naval operations…
