Corregidor 1945: Repossessing the Rock

96 pages

Prof Geoffrey Till

This book follows the standard pattern for Osprey Publishing battle and campaign histories, being a slim, glossy paperback, copiously illustrated and clearly and logically laid out. Consequently, readers can easily compare and contrast the forces on both sides, and watch the chronological development of their struggle. There was, perhaps, a touch more analysis than usual, and certainly some of the more complicated manoeuvres (like the parachute drop) were very well described.

The author starts by making the point that this is a much-neglected subject. It’s almost a forgotten battle, overshadowed by dramatic accounts of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. This is a shame because as an example of the defence and/or conquest of small Pacific islands, the American repossession of Corregidor in 1945 shows many fascinating similarities and dissimilarities with the Americans losing it in 1942, shortly after, of course, the British lost Singapore to the Japanese. Moreover, the general topic of archipelagic defence in the Western Pacific is a hot topic in Washington these days.

Like Singapore for the British, Corregidor was a key point in the American position, since it dominated the approaches to the all-important port of Manila. For that reason, shortly after the First World War fixed defences were constructed on it, although they proved insufficient when the attack came. These included the fortification of an outlying island into what was in effect a ‘concrete battleship’ – even looking rather like one. The ultimate Japanese defender of the position was General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the conqueror of Singapore. He had however ordered its evacuation on the grounds of the island being indefensible. Instead, he wanted to rally the defence on the mainland in the Luzon highlands, hopefully to inflict such losses on the Americans as to help in the later defence of Japan itself. His local theatre commander, Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, however, disobeyed this order intending that the 5,000 or so defenders fight on to the death on Corregidor itself. This resolute defence, contrasted rather strongly with the British in Malaya and Singapore, Churchill, it should be remembered, was concerned about the impression the swift collapse of Singapore might make on world opinion about Britain’s military prowess and will, especially bearing in mind the Americans hung on to a hopeless position in Corregidor for five months. But they of course did not have to worry about nearly two million civilians living nearby.

One irrefutable similarity between the fall of Singapore and the American capture of Corregidor was the extent to which a fast collapse followed a major operational surprise. The British concluded that the final attack on Singapore would come from the North and positioned themselves accordingly. Instead, it came largely from the West and the whole plan fell to pieces. The Japanese assumed that the Americans would conduct an amphibious landing and so occupied the highest point of the island, appropriately labelled ‘the Topside’, waiting in their defences and tunnels for a uphill frontal assault. Instead, the American response was an immense and highly complex parachute assault on Topside itself. The resulted in the killing of the local Corregidor commander and most of his staff, the decapitation of its communication system and a short but vicious battle in which the Japanese defenders suffered since all the Japanese guns and defences pointed the wrong way. Afterwards it was just a question of mopping up isolated and totally uncoordinated groups in other strongpoints on the island.

Another similarity with the fall of Singapore was the extent to which the desperate Japanese defenders of Corregidor were largely disparate groups of generally inexperienced troops, their numbers made up with second line people thrown together at the last minute who found themselves up against some of the finest and battle-hardened units in the Pacific theatre. Typically, the ‘concrete battleship’ was defended by the traumatised survivors of the earlier sinking of the giant battleship the Musashi. It might have seemed appropriate, but it wasn’t effective.

One could go on, but the chief value of Corregidor 1945 is firstly that it tells a tale that deserves to be told and secondly it implicitly raises lots of questions about the conduct of equivalent battles elsewhere. Moreover, some of these questions are very relevant for today. Overall, it is a stimulating read; it makes its readers think. For all these reasons, the book is recommended.