Cultural Influences on the Law of the Sea: History, Legacy and Future Prospects

352 pages

This book is also available in digital format and open access at: https://academic.oup.com/book/59653. It was also previously reviewed in May 2025 by Dr James WE Smith.

Prof Andrew Lambert

War Studies, Kings College London

An understanding of the Law of the Sea, as opposed to the laws that apply to conflicts at sea, has always been an essential element in preparing navies for the full spectrum of operations that they may be called upon to undertake. From enforcing control over territorial waters, to protecting commercial shipping from non-state threats, policing offshore resources in the EEZ, and international standards on pollution, the issues are constant, and consequential. There are international agreements, with UNCLOS II as the central pillar, but the understanding and application of these legal regimes is not universal. National and regional cultures shaped how these laws were created, how they will be applied, and how they may change. Lead editor James Kraska, the Stockton Professor of International Maritime Law at the US Naval War College, and his colleagues emphasise cultural differences across a series of regional studies. The only state to have a stand-alone chapter is the Russian Federation.

Curiously the definition of culture does not include national/regional proclivities to focus on, value and use the sea. From ancient Athens to modern Singapore a handful of states have consciously chosen to prioritise the sea – reflecting and shaping their culture, and legal traditions. The British legal system, which had a major role in developing the Law of the Sea, remained flexible, evolving to address new challenges – while upholding the strategic and economic interests of a unique seapower Great Power. British practice was contested, in court and at sea, leading to conflict with the United States in 1812. While it rejected codified systems it was flexible, happily exploiting an international agreement to enhance strategy -with the abolition of privateering in the 1856 Declaration of Paris.

The regional approach to legal culture delivers some useful distinctions, contrasting West European individualism, seeking an ‘ideal’ solution, based on abstract principles, while East Asian states prefer co-operation, mediation and social justice. The Global South takes a post-imperial view, collaborating to resist anything that tends to sustain western dominance – securing offshore rights, and seeking collaboration. Views on territorial waters, EEZs, fishing rights, deep sea mining, oil and gas and much else need to be agreed – but the actions of major powers, the USA, which did not sign UNCLOS II, Russia and China which did, suggest collective action has its limits.

Discussions of Eastern European views on the Baltic, and those of the Russian Federation more widely, are instructive. Eastern Europe looks to UNCLOS to secure national interests against a reviving regional hegemon, and defeat local rivals. The Russian essay is more revealing than the author may have intended. Russian approaches since Peter the Great have been aggressive, cynical, exclusive and strategic. Russian-led coalitions demanded Britain abandon the legal system it used to conduct effective economic warfare – without success, while maritime economic pressure led to bankruptcy in the Crimean War. In the 1920s a weak Soviet Union favoured collective agreements, once it became a superpower that approach changed. Russia’s exclusive legal claims over the Northern Sea Route, which lies at the heart of Russia maritime culture, are at odds with UNCLOS, while changing conditions will render them moot before too long. Compliance with the international ban on heavy oil fuel in the polar regions has been delayed for purely domestic reasons and, like much Russian activity, renders international co-operation impossible.

In East Asia the PRC is anxious to be seen as a law-abiding citizen of the world, but the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 2016 judgement in favour of the Philippines rejected China’s territorial claims, which were largely based on UNCLOS II. The PRC further undermined the system by rejecting the judgement, and continuing to harass Philippine vessels, while protesting foreign warships transits of the Taiwan Straits. It is no coincidence that all three ‘superpowers’ find the current legal regime problematic: it imposes unwelcome checks and balances on their actions.

Economic warfare has always separated the seapower states from the land powers – big powers rely on military action to win wars, while relatively smaller maritime powers seek asymmetric advantage at and through the sea. Mahan stressed the apocalyptic impact of blockade in 1890 – and his interventions ensured the USA retained the economic weapon for future use. Japan understood what that meant in 1941, backed into a corner by an evolving sanctions regime. The issue remains moot… but it needs to be seen it in the wider strategic context. Would any of the superpowers uphold the existing legal regime if it were disadvantageous to their national interests? I think not.

This is a continental text, largely ignoring how seapowers used sea control and economic pressure to operate as asymmetric balancers in regional and global conflicts across 2,500 years. Kraska’s chapter on North America does not mention Mahan or Corbett, who jointly stressed the importance of the legal regime in Some Neglected Aspects of War in 1907, firmly rebutting the liberal internationalist views advanced at the Second Hague Conference, with strong support from Admiral Fisher. It also misses Julian Corbett’s critical role in removing ‘Absolute Freedom of the Seas’, the second of President Wilson’s 14 Points, from the Versailles Peace process, and turning maritime economic sanctions into the League of Nations primary coercive tool. An educated, trained and experienced Barrister Corbett took maritime law very seriously – because economic pressure was central to a national strategy. He understood that ‘Freedom of the Seas’ in 1914 would have ensured Britain, and France lost the war. The British state lost sight of this critical issue after 1945, treating it as a diplomatic concern, rather than a critical enabler of national strategy. While the need for international agreement is obvious with the oceans facing a complex of inter-connected ecological threats, while sea use continues to expand, both legal and otherwise, sea dependence accelerates, and it remains a critical strategic domain. This is a stimulating read, and a similarly bold examination of maritime strategic culture would be a welcome companion.