Devil’s Fire, Southern Cross: The Conclusion of the Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign October 1943-February 1944

496 pages

Dr James Bosbotinis

Devil’s Fire, Southern Cross completes the four-volume series by the author providing an account of the Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign from 1942 through to early 1944. This reviewer has previously reviewed the second and third volumes, Blazing Star, Setting Sun (covering the period November 1942-March 1943) and Dark Waters, Starry Skies(covering March-October 1943) respectively. Both of those books were recommended. The author, Jeffrey Cox, a litigation attorney and independent military historian, with a particular interest in the Pacific War, writes in an engaging manner that will appeal to the lay reader and provide value to the academic or professional researcher. Cox occasionally injects humorous asides into his writing, which may, depending on one’s perspective be either entertaining or grating. For example, writing with regard to the B-24 Liberator and the B-17 Flying Fortress, he suggests the latter “could lose all four engines, both wings, the vertical stabilizer, the hull, the hydraulics, the radio, the air conditioning, the cigarette lighter, and the lower lumbar support, and still return safely.” The B-17 certainly did enjoy a reputation for being able to absorb damage!

As with the previous volumes, Devil’s Fire, Southern Cross follows a broadly chronological approach, with the author providing a richly detailed narrative of the progression of the Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, including strategic factors, operational matters, and tactical developments. A particular point that Cox stresses is Japan’s focus on ‘decisive battle’, which he vividly describes on p.33: “…the Imperial Japanese Navy was held back, if not shackled by its devotion to the Decisive Battle. Every tactical, operational, or strategic problem was not viewed on its own merits, but in the context of bringing about that Decisive Battle – at least as the Japanese thought of that Decisive Battle. And the Imperial Japanese Navy thought that Decisive Battle would be fought in the Central Pacific, with battleships and cruisers. Especially battleships.” As the author discusses through the book, this fixation on a Central Pacific ‘decisive battle’ would have significant implications for Japan’s approach to operations in Guadalcanal and the Solomons. As with the previous volumes, Cox discusses the importance of factors such as intelligence, leadership, training, doctrine, innovation, the impact of airpower, and mirror imaging, especially in terms of senior Japanese officers applying their own logic to potential Allied courses of action. The final chapter, ‘Anticlimax’, warrants particular mention as it provides a valuable discussion of the development of US Pacific strategy, the roles and personalities of Admiral Ernest King and General Douglas MacArthur, and the balancing between the Southwest Pacific campaign versus the Central Pacific campaign.

Devil’s Fire, Southern Cross provides a well-written, highly engaging, detailed account of the final months of the Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign. It will certainly appeal to those with an interest in the Pacific War or naval history in general. The text is accompanied by maps and a photographic plate. All in all, Devil’s Fire, Southern Cross is recommended.