Early Pacific Raids 1942: The American Carriers Strike Back & South China Sea 1945: Task Force 38’s Bold Carrier Rampage in Formosa, Luzon, and Indochina

Both 96 pages

Dr James Bosbotinis

As will be well-known to members, carrier airpower was central to US victory in the Pacific in the Second World War. Early Pacific Raids 1942 and South China Sea 1945 vividly illustrate the contribution the US Navy’s carriers made to achieving victory against Japan, and the development of carrier airpower during the course of the war. In March 1942, as Lane Herder describes, the first twin carrier raid by the US involved each carrier launching 52 aircraft; in comparison, as Lardas highlights by the end of 1944, the US had 956 aircraft aboard the eight fleet and six light carriers of its Fast Carrier Force.

In Early Pacific Raids 1942, Brian Lane Herder, who has written widely on particularly naval subjects, details how the US looked to strike back against Japan, following its attack on Pearl Harbor, and wider offensive across the Pacific. As the author explains, “…the US Navy’s new commander-in-chief Admiral Ernest J. King vowed to hit back at Japan’s rapidly expanding Pacific empire immediately. The resulting American naval raids were the first-ever combat actions of US aircraft carriers…”. Across 96 pages, the author sets out the ‘Origins of the Campaign’, that is, the carrier raids, followed by a chronology, discussion of the opposing commanders, forces and plans, and the campaign itself. Lane Herder concludes with analysis of the ‘Aftermath’, ‘The Battlefields Today’, and provides a short, select bibliography.

Early Pacific Raids 1942 ably discusses the challenges confronting the US Navy at the outset of the Pacific War in late December 1941/early 1942, and its options for responding. The bulk of the book is dedicated to US carrier actions from January to March 1942, with the author highlighting with regard to a February raid on Rabaul, that “Taken to its logical conclusion, the February 20 raid signaled [sic] that Japan’s entire ‘outer defensive sphere’ Pacific strategy that emphasized counterattacking along interior lines was fatally flawed…the resulting implications for Japan’s entire Pacific war strategy were ominous indeed”. The failure of that strategy is dramatically shown in South China Sea 1945.

In this book, Mark Lardas focuses on the January 1945 10-day sweep conducted by Task Force 38, the carriers of Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, against Japanese forces across the South China Sea. As the author explains, “TF38 had launched other strategic carrier raids against Japanese possessions…Raiding the South China Sea took things to a higher level…Halsey proposed having TF38 operate for an extended period in a sea surrounded by enemy-held land, unsupported by any other Allied forces”. By this stage of the war, and especially following the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, Japan’s ability to challenge the US Navy was substantially reduced. The Kido Butai, Japan’s carrier task force which had struck Pearl Harbor, had as the author explains, been “reduced to serving as a decoy during the battle of Leyte”, and whilst Japan had started the war with “some of the best pilots in the world, along with superior aircraft”, by 1945, Imperial Japanese Navy and Army pilots were going into combat with 250 and 150 hours flight time respectively. Against the far better trained pilots of the US Navy, the “result was a massacre”, and “TF38 could strike at will with little fear of a Japanese counterstrike’. Or, as the author colourfully describes, “Divided command, lack of resources, inferior doctrine, and geography all hindered Japanese preparations and capabilities. They were facing a typhoon of steel, but were unprepared for more than a gale”.

Similar in approach to Early Pacific Raids 1942, South China Sea 1945 provides an introductory strategic overview and chronology, discusses the respective capabilities of the US and Japanese forces involved, sets out campaign objectives and covers in detail, the campaign itself, with a concluding analysis. A select bibliography is also provided. Both books are well-illustrated and feature useful maps and diagrams. Both books are well-written and highly engaging, with only a few minor typos and errors in places, which could have been identified through improved editing, but ultimately do not detract from the quality of the books. Both books will appeal to all those with an interest in the history of the Pacific War, and especially those keen on carrier airpower. Either individually or together, both books are recommended: as this reviewer found, reading the two together provides a useful study into the development and employment of US carrier airpower both through the course of the war in the Pacific, and with a view to the future.