Grenada 1983: American Resurgence Towards the End of the Cold War

96 pages

Alexander Howlett

The October 25th 1983 US liberation of Grenada has been a shadowy subject in the late Cold War literature, and the quintessential battle narratives often present a confusion of telescopic scale and simultaneous events. This quick Osprey history provides a realistic and quantitative portrayal of the combat action during the initial days of the invasion.

Matthew Frakes, historian of US foreign relations and assistant professor at Ohio State University, who has previously published on the national security dimensions of the Global War on Terror, believes that the Grenada invasion was a watershed moment in the Cold War. “The Grenada campaign fell at the most dangerous moment in the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis,” he writes and quotes Grenadian Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, “It is in Grenada that the fall of communism began.” Frakes quotes US Secretary of State George Schultz that Grenada was “a shot heard round the world.”

Frakes’ interest, and the book’s subject, is foremost the events of campaign’s major combats. The bibliography includes Edgar Raines’ official US Army logistical study, Mark Adkin’s first-hand war study, and Philip Kukielski’s recent (2019) campaign history. The bulk of the narrative is focused on the initial Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) missions, from the perspectives of the Rangers, SEALs, Delta Force and the 160th Aviation Battalion. The organised reactions of the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) are also described. The intensity of battle between the PRA, Cubans, and the United States forces, and the resulting casualty figures, will likely surprise some readers.

There are certain compressions of detail inevitable in a short title such as this, in particular with regard to the operation’s planning – for example, it is stated on pg. 22 that the original JSOC night H-Hour of 02:00 hrs was modified to 05:00 hrs as a result of “logistical problems” when more precisely the reason had to do with night training capability between the non-JSOC force elements, namely the Marines and 82nd Airborne.

Frakes writes that, “the RMC [Revolutionary Military Council] was surprisingly well informed about American intentions,” but we don’t learn that Havana had tipped off its erstwhile ally. The statement that the Ranger’s significant, and no doubt dangerous airdrop was, “the largest American parachute drop into a combat zone since World War II” is an exaggeration that ignores Operation TOMAHAWK, March 1951.

Although USS Caron did not fire naval gunfire support missions on the night of the 25th (pg. 60-2), it did fire illumination shells into St. George’s, and Frakes states the artillery support during the Calivigny mission included “the full weight of [VAdm Metcalf’s] arsenal: Army artillery from Point Salines, Navy surface guns and Corsair jets, and an Air Force Spectre gunship…” (pg. 82) – while it is true the bombardment was intensive, the Navy in the event fired only a single shell, as pointed out by Edgar Raines.

Having nitpicked some details, it is worth emphasising that Frakes makes several important points: notably that the PRA, as a result of the unpopularity of the regime, had only been able to mobilise half of its strength and an even smaller proportion of the militia. Nevertheless, with their Soviet, Cuban and Eastern Bloc training and advisors, the island was defended as best it could be under the circumstances. The PRA leadership concentrated the island’s 18 ZU-23 twin autocannons and 12 quad-barrel 12.7mm machineguns with their militiawomen crews at the strategic command and control locations, the airstrips and colonial forts, setting up ambushes and checkpoints along the key roads.

Frakes relates President Reagan’s dramatic Augusta golf weekend, and the executive decisions at the White House that authorised Operation URGENT FURY in the pressure cooker environment created by the Bierut barracks bombing that had killed 241 American Marines and 58 French peacekeepers.

In the event, on 25th October 1983 the USMC landed by helicopters from USS Gaum and seized Grenada’s eastern airstrip at Grenville (Pearls), and then later conducted an amphibious landing with M60 tanks to secure the Grenadian capitol of St. George’s, after which they were relieved by the 82nd Airborne. JSOC conducted its largest mission to date until Torah Borah at the end of 2001, with the mysterious SOF units, including Rangers, SEALs and Delta Force, facing an opportunity to prove themselves.

There are a number of subjects mentioned only in passing: the complicated but essential issue of communications, the important role played by news and independent journalists on the island, the US medical situation on Grenada, the POW situation, the airflow buildup and delays, the weather – heat exhaustion crippling unacclimatized troops and nearly generating a water crisis – or later heavy rains that slowed advances and obscured naval air support. The unfortunate friendly fire incidents, such as a deadly naval airstrike mis-target on the 27th, and the long pacification stand-down with transition to nation building are of necessity recounted with haste.

Frakes’ descriptions of the deployments and action are, however, punchy and accurate, with an immediacy that highlights the many instances of heroism, friction and the fog of war that define the Grenada campaign. The illustrations and photographs, as one would expect from an Osprey publication, are high-quality and diverse, drawn from the historiography and online archival sources. Mike Leahy’s Francis Dodd-like combat drawings feature prominently.

The order of battle (pg. 19) is an important reference and especially useful as it includes both Grenadian and Cuban orbats, although it is incomplete, missing for example USS Saipan, which was added to the operation after the inception, along with the specifics of the naval aviation units involved which are recorded in the USNI’s Proceedings but not represented here. The campaign maps (pgs. 20, 31, 36, 44-5, 70, 80) are new and full page, and contain helpful chronologies. There is a complete index and select bibliography, being based indeed on the most recent subject specialist historiography.

Frakes has produced a helpful campaign history certain to improve general awareness of Operation URGENT FURY while also providing specialists and wargamers alike the vital maps, timelines and order of battle required to recreate the campaign, all with enough historical verisimilitude to make for a compelling read.