Italian Battle Fleet, 1940-1943: ‘La Squadra’, The Pride of the Regia Marina

80 pages

Andy Field

The sixth in Osprey’s most recent, ‘Fleet’ series, this is exactly what I’d have expected: interesting and informative text, well-illustrated and, unusually, discussing the Italian battle fleet from an Italian standpoint, which I felt made the book interesting to read. Not being an expert on the Regia Marina, I was open to learning something new, but I did wonder if, in taking such a stance, (which I welcome), Enrico Cernuschi was placing greater weight on some sources than others. Or was this my English bias?

Enrico Cernuschi’s book certainly made me think. In layout, it follows what appears to be the usual format for the series, with sections covering The Fleet’s Purpose, Fleet Fighting Power, How The Fleet Operated, and Combat and Analysis.

I suppose that the central question behind the book is whether the Regia Marina was ‘a sugar cake navy’, as many British commentators claimed, and which Enrico Cernuschi wants to debunk. In his Analysis at the end of the book, he concludes that the Italian fleet, conceived to fight the French fleet as well as control the Ionian Sea and the Straits of Sicily, managed to achieve this until 1943, despite being an ill-balanced navy, lacking aircraft carriers, which Mussolini and the Regia Aeronautica refused, until 1941, when the conversion of the liner Roma to the aircraft carrier, Aquila, was authorised. Even then the Regia Aeronautica claimed it had no suitable aircraft for her. The Italian battlefleet also lacked effective radar or night fighting doctrine. Despite this, he believes that Italian strategy was subtle, and multilateral, led by political and economic motives, (wasn’t every nation’s?) and that Italy lost the war due to her dire economic situation. Certainly, from the navy’s perspective, oil, or rather the lack of it, was a major problem.

According to Enrico Cernuschi, Italian strengths included armour, range finding, and gunnery and the author cites Admiral Iachino, who he does describe as “…..a brilliant destroyer man and a torpedo and optics expert, not primarily a gunnery expert…..”, when he critically compares the Royal Navy’s gunnery as ineffective, and too closely concentrated, whereas the Italian gunnery, with a greater spread of salvoes, had a bigger ‘danger area’, a better chance of hitting the target. To support this, he gives examples of damage to British ships inflicted during the action off Calabria, in July 1940. This battle was apparently regarded by the Italians as a strategic and tactical success, and he supports his assertions of damage with photographs of HMS Warspite. I thought the photos just weren’t clear enough to be properly interpreted, though this is a publisher’s problem, not an author’s. I did consult my copy of Greene & Massignari’s The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943 (a book I was personally surprised wasn’t in the bibliography) and couldn’t find any references there that confirmed this interpretation though. Other battles, including the Battles of Sirte, are mentioned, but Taranto seems to be only briefly mentioned and Matapan appears absent. Or at least, if it’s there, I missed it. The operations of X MAS flotilla’s successful and unsuccessful, underwater attacks are also covered, briefly.

Intelligence and deception were also Italian strengths, and British cyphers had been broken before the war, so that between June 1940 and September 1943, Italians apparently read 36,262 British naval signals, 4,011 Vichy French ones and several hundred US, Free French, Greek, Russian and Turkish signals.

Enrico Cernuschi concludes with some interesting information that may have wargamers, a part of Osprey’s core audience, setting out their games for an interesting “what-if”. Namely,  the plans to send the modern, Italian, warships to join the Eastern Fleet, which were thwarted by the Allies refusal of Italy’s insistence of having her 1922 borders guaranteed. By the time the Italian government agreed to drop this, July 1945, it was too late to have the ships refitted in the USA and sent eastwards.

Overall, I think this is a book worth reading, as it certainly gives a different, and in some ways, more upbeat, view of the Italian navy, although perhaps it should be read with a slightly sceptical mind. I did enjoy it though, and it made me think. I would certainly recommend it to members of The Naval Review.