Japanese Combined Fleet 1942-43: Guadalcanal to the Solomons Campaign

80 pages

Dr James Bosbotinis

This is the second book in Osprey’s ‘Fleet’ series looking at the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet, the first focused on the period 1941-42 and the attack on Pearl Harbor up to the Battle of Midway. It was reviewed by Geoff Till (NR Vol. 112, No. 3, Summer 2024, pp.473-475) and recommended, and with that in mind, together with this reviewer having read other books by Mark Stille, one was expecting a rewarding read. The author is a retired USN Commander, with a 40-year career in intelligence as well as at the Naval War College, and is a prolific author, in particular on the Pacific War. The author’s breadth and depth of naval knowledge is clearly evident in this book.

At 80 pages, this is necessarily a concise book, yet Stille ably conveys much detail in his account of the role and capabilities of the Combined Fleet, and a case study into its employment through the decisive battle for Guadalcanal and Solomons campaign. Divided into four chapters, ‘The Fleet’s Purpose’, ‘Fleet Fighting Power’, ‘How the Fleet Operated’ and ‘Combat and Analysis’, the author discusses the purpose of the Combined Fleet, its carriers, battleships, heavy and light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, the main types of guns, anti-aircraft artillery, torpedoes and aircraft operated by the fleet, its organisation, doctrine, command, intelligence system, supporting naval shipyards, and fuel constraints.

Japan’s merchant vessel construction is also detailed, which together with naval construction, highlights the scale of the challenge that US industrial power posed to Japan For example, Stille notes that between 1 August 1942 and 30 November 1943, Japanese naval construction included four aircraft carriers, one battleship, three light cruisers , 16 destroyers, 47 submarines and 15 escorts; in contrast, the US “produced 65 carriers of all types, two battleships, 11 heavy and light cruisers, 128 destroyers, 298 escorts, and 55 submarines”; Japanese merchant ship construction in 1943 totalled 769,085 tons, whereas US construction totalled 17 million tons. The implications of Japan’s relative industrial weakness were dramatically highlighted through the attrition suffered in the Guadalcanal and Solomons campaign, which the author analyses effectively as a case study in Japanese maritime power.

Stille emphasises the failures by Admiral Yamamoto to recognise the decisive nature of the campaign, and employ the IJN’s battleships effectively, various intelligence constraints, and much else. Conversely, Stille suggests that the “Solomons campaign was a Japanese success at the strategic level since it took the Americans from February to November 1943 to advance the roughly 400nm from Guadalcanal to Bougainville…Japanese economy of force operations in the Central and Northern Solomons looked like a wise investment”, although the cost to the Japanese at the operational level “was still high.” There is much to commend in this book: it outlines the strategic purpose of the Combined Fleet and its capabilities, how that fleet was employed at the operational level, and its tactical strengths and weaknesses, supported by numerous tables, photos, and maps. In Japanese Combined Fleet 1942-43, the author ably provides a highly detailed analysis in a concise, accessible and engaging manner. This book is highly recommended.