Kriegsmarine North Sea Command 1939-1942: Germany’s Coastal Naval Campaign

80 pages

Chris O’Flaherty

As a primer regarding the fighting equipment, structure, roles and command organisation of the Kriegsmarine in the early part of the Second World Ward, this book fits the requirement perfectly.

The central feature of the book is the description of the geographic responsibilities, organisational structure and key personalities in the North Sea and Channel regions of Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM), focussed on the Marinegruppenkommando (MGK) sectors and their subordinates.

At the outbreak of war MGK operated as two separate sectors, West and North, divided by a line from Hull to Den Helder. As German-controlled territory (and coastline) extended during the early war years, a combination of operational necessity and commanders’ personalities drove the rapid expansion of, especially, MGK West. However, command rivalries with the Flottenchef (Fleet Command), a lack of coordination with the Luftwaffe’s maritime operations planners, and the lack of a coherent strategy between command sectors, ship-types, submarine operations, intelligence, and supporting arms all combined to reduce overall German naval effectiveness.

This thread of examining areas of operational inefficiency extends to some of the equipment supplied to the North Sea Kriegsmarine, with the background section on German torpedo development reminding us that not all German developments conform to the stereotype of high-quality German engineering. For example, due to a lack of diligent testing the early versions of the ‘MZ’ magnetic fuse were often found to be faulty, particularly in northern latitudes. Additionally, both G7a (steam powered) and G7e (electric) torpedoes were known since 1936 as often running up to 2 metres too deep, and it was not until 1942 that a U-boat crew identified the problem (a design flaw that leaked air into the balance chamber housing the hydrostatic valve controlling depth). These snippets of background, among some other gems, are just two exemplars of the underpinning inefficiencies that beset many German North Sea naval exploits.

Notwithstanding, there were a suite of individual successes. These include relatively effective harassment of the UK’s East Coast convoys and repeated sinkings by the German mining plan off the UK coast.

More spectacular victories seemed to occur when the Kriegsmarine was ordered to cooperate closely with the Army (for example, supporting land assaults into the Low Countries and France), highlighting that mandated inter-service cooperation was generally absent when not imposed. But by 1942 a prolonged sequence of operational mis-steps was exposing the fault lines in German command. Operation SEELÖWE (the invasion of Britain) had been cancelled, and their North Sea navy was left broadly bereft of strategic inclusion. It is here that the book stops… leaving the reader rather hanging (although we do know the eventual outcome).

Analysing a recurring theme of command and control problems taking too long to be addressed, Paterson’s research can be seen as outlining the multitude of issues that may face a navy faced with rapid expansion both in size and operating area. In this respect, this book could be used as a basic foundation of such study, especially within a context of current growth in European defence spending and a resumption of UK planning for transition to war. Such lessons from the past are ignored at our peril.

Whilst occasional over-simplification (of often complex individual subjects) can denude from the book’s impact, this should not take away from the utility of this volume as a welcome primer on the background and early war structures Germany’s Second World War North Sea fleet, and as a foundation for learning lessons still of relevance today. A useful read.