Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower

232 pages

Prof Geoffrey Till

Full Disclosure. When I first looked at this book, I spotted lots of generally approving citations of my own Seapowerbook, some reprocessed versions of its illustrations and even a reference to it as “the key text”. Obviously, therefore, the author of Near and Far Waters was a scholar of taste, discernment and great insight. This inclined me in the book’s favour. Reading further, I became less certain of this, as I began to wonder what the book was actually about and why alarm bells were beginning to ring. But reading further still, all became clear. Professor Flint, a clear expert on geopolitics, has a rather different take on what geopolitics actually is, that differs from what I tend to think. His is a much wider concept of the term which incorporates not just a geographic approach to strategy but also the economic patterns of behaviour that he considers to be associated both with that approach and with the establishment and employment of military power at and from the sea.

This much wider understanding of geopolitics (which sometimes almost seems to elide with the even broader concept of ‘power politics’) is, undoubtedly an interesting line of thought. It has two advantages. Firstly, it consciously links economic activity – clearly a major driver of international policy – with its geographic and military/seapower consequences. For instance, he identifies two groups of countries as either primary or subsidiary economic entities and then shows that the former in their search for markets and resources naturally move in on the second group, making use of the seapower resources they have already accumulated.

This means they have to leave their starting focus on their near waters for local self-defence to what the Chinese call the ‘far seas’ where those necessary markets and resources are to be found. To do this they have to re-shape the structure, nature and core functions of their navies for more global purposes. This ‘stepping out’ as the Chinese call it can also result in enhanced competition and even conflict with other primary powers who have done, are doing or will be doing the same thing. This leads on to his examining the way in which declining primary powers give way to rising ones. There’s nothing that is particularly new in any of the elements of this argument but it is a neat, simple and satisfying way of packaging it altogether.

For evidence, he makes extensive and detailed use of both Dutch and British imperial history to argue that that was what they were doing as they competed between themselves to take over from the Portuguese and Spanish, but who were in their turn overshadowed by the Americans. There’s some suggestion, also, that that is what the Chinese will be doing.

This illustrates a less obvious point about the book, and the second advantage of the approach. Flint’s ambition is not just to make use of historical and contemporary practice to illustrate theory. Despite his historical credentials, his is effectively the approach of the social scientist. The ultimate aim of the book, therefore, is to produce a theory that helps us understand the practice and maybe better understand today’s events as they unfold.  Hence the book tacitly invites its readers to use the generated theory it generates to gain better insights into Chinese policy and behaviour and how best to react to them.

They might run into two problems here. First it is not universally agreed that the economic imperative takes precedence over security in President Xi’s China; some in fact would argue the precise reverse. At the very least, then, further questions arise. What is the main motivation behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for example, if a mix, what’s the priority- and so on?   Second, a good deal of the economic tensions between China and the West that have developed are about China’s access to the domestic markets of other primary powers rather than access to those of the subordinate ones that populate the Global South, which is what the thesis of this book encourages us to expect. No matter, clearly these are things to think about.  Raising but not necessarily answering questions isn’t necessarily a bad thing.

A last point on Near and Far Waters and the establishment of theory. There’s a particularly interesting chapter on islands – or rather the fascinating but undoubtedly niche topic of ‘islandness’. How does being an island shape economic and miliary policy and development, and to what extent does that explain the differing fortunes of Japan and the UK? And what use have primary powers made of islands in their quest for resources, markets and power? Lots of interesting observations here too.

So what’s the conclusion? Well, frankly, Professor Flint admits there isn’t one, because geopolitics of this kind is a continuing and perhaps never-ending process. Running as a kind of leitmotiv throughout the book, however, is the sobering thought that historically this kind of approach to the conduct of international relations has often led to conflict and war – and it is far from inconceivable that it might well do so again. But perhaps greater clarity about what has so often happened in the past – and why – might help the efforts of peace-builders to avoid it in the future. Perhaps there’s something to be said for thinking of China following a common pattern of international behaviour, rather than simply being labelled as an enemy

Bottom line – what’s the verdict on the book? Written in an informal and accessible way, with lots of bon mots, it is undoubtedly reader-friendly and the argument is clear and connected. Its conclusions make sense and often raise stimulating points to think about. But it is on the specialist side, and it doesn’t aim to provide non-specialists with a set of easy answers so they can move on to something else. If you are interested in the geo-politics, and particularly in its angle on theories about seapower, yes, certainly recommended. If not, I am not so sure.