Operation Catapult: Winston Churchill and the British Attack on the French Navy at Mers-El-Kebir

320 pages

Capt Jeremy Stocker RNR

The rapid collapse of France in May and June 1940, followed by partial German occupation, brought about a complete reset of Britain’s relations with its erstwhile ally. Other than the evacuation of British (and French) troops at Dunkirk, there was little the UK could do to further influence events in metropolitan France. Appeals to fight on were disregarded and Britain faced the prospect of prosecuting the war alone.

France’s colonial empire and its Fleet were another matter. The future of France’s ships in particular became the defining issue in post-Dunkirk Anglo-French relations. As Bill Whiteside makes clear in this enjoyable read, Hitler and Churchill had the same objective – to prevent the powerful French fleet falling into the other’s hands.

The sub-title to this book is misleading; the key individual in this sorry tale is arguably not Churchill, but the French naval Commander-in-Chief (and later de-facto Prime Minister) Admiral François Darlan. The terms of the Armistice with Germany, which left about half of France self-governing (the ‘Vichy’ regime), required French ships to sail to French ports and remain under French control. Darlan was determined to fulfil this condition, for fear of what it would mean for France if its Navy did not fully implement the terms of the Armistice. Churchill, for his part, could not trust the Germans to keep their word and not, at some point, seize control of the French ships. French naval commanders remained loyal and obedient to Darlan.

Most of the French fleet was already outside France. Some lesser ships were in UK ports but the capital ships, including the incomplete battleships Richelieu and Jean Bart had escaped to various French and British ports in North Africa. In each case, local negotiations between British and French commanders tried to find outcomes that would satisfy each’s essential requirements. In Alexandria, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham had a good personal relationship with his French opposite number Vice-Admiral René-Émile Godfroy. French ships were demilitarised in the harbour (they could hardly have fought their way out of Alexandria).

In the French colonial ports, it was a different matter. The largest part of the French fleet was at Mers-El-Kebir near Oran in Algeria, including the battleships Bretagne, Provence, Strasbourg and Dunkerque. Vice-Admiral James Somerville was sent with Hood, Resolution, Valiant and Ark Royal to persuade the French Admiral Gensoul to secure his ships against German control – by sailing to British, West Indian or American ports, demilitarising them in French North African ports, or scuttling them. Gensoul remained adamantly true to Darlan’s orders and refused all of the options put to him. On Churchill’s orders on 4 July Somerville’s force opened fire. Only the Strasbourg escaped to Toulon.

That left Richelieu in Dakar and Jean Bart in Casablanca. Richelieu was disabled by air attack from Hermes on 8 July. Later repaired in New York the ship eventually joined Somerville’s Eastern Fleet and saw action against Japan. The less complete and by now static Jean Bart fired on US ships during Operation TORCH but saw no further action. Both ships served in the postwar French Navy.

This story is in equal measure complex, fascinating and tragic. It is well told by Whiteside, who combines rigorous research with an easy narrative style. I’d recommend it as bedside or holiday reading – though perhaps not if you’re going to France.