Operation RO-GO 1943: Japanese Air Power Tackles the Bougainville Landings
96 pages
Dr James Bosbotinis
By the latter part of 1943, Japanese forces in the southwest Pacific, concentrated around New Guinea and the Solomons, were on the defensive, and facing the growing combat power of the United States and its allies. Moreover, Japan had suffered extensive losses through the gruelling battles and grinding attrition of the war thus far; this was especially the case with regard to aircrew. As the author explains, Operation RO-GO was conceived by Japan as an air offensive targeting Allied forces in New Guinea and the Solomons in order to slow the Allied advance. However, due to Allied air attacks against Rabaul and an amphibious landing on Bougainville, Japanese forces had to shift rapidly to the defensive. In this respect, as the author states, a study of Operation RO-GO “gives a unique insight into an IJN [Imperial Japanese Navy] increasingly on the back foot, a conservative and traditional military in the process of being overwhelmed both by technology and logistics. Inflexible IJN doctrine saw Rabaul’s efforts repeatedly fail against an encroachment it could neither repel nor, in some cases, comprehend.”
The author, Michael John Claringbould, formerly an Australian Foreign Service Officer, and fluent in Japanese, has written a detailed yet engaging and concise account of Operation RO-GO, drawing on Japanese primary sources. This, for example, has resulted in the clarification of Allied and Japanese combat losses. The book follows the well-established Osprey approach: an ‘Introduction’, followed by a chronology, ‘Attacker’s Capabilities’, ‘Defender’s Capabilities’, ‘Campaign Objectives’, ‘The Campaign’, ‘Aftermath and Analysis’, with a useful guide to further reading also provided. The latter details the various Japanese sources consulted by the author. The text is accompanied by an excellent selection of maps, diagrams, illustrations and photographs.
The book provides a well-written and interesting account of Operation RO-GO, and the myriad challenges confronting it, including – common to both sides – the weather. It also highlights the toll the war was taking on Japanese forces, exemplified by the fact that 173 aircraft of the First Carrier Division, that is, the air-groups of the Zuikaku, Shokaku and Zuiho, were ‘borrowed’ and operated ashore (and as detailed in the book, suffered heavy losses): in contrast, the US Navy deployed five carriers for strikes against Rabaul, involving 274 aircraft. The 11 November 1943 carrier strike on Rabaul was also notable, as Claringbould highlights, it saw the “first carrier-based combat sortie for the Corsair, contradicting the popular narrative that the British achieved this goal.” Operation RO-GO 1943 is well-written, with very few minor typos, and will appeal to particularly those with an interest in operations in the Pacific during the Second World War, and the employment of land-based and carrier airpower. It also highlights the importance of robust logistics, training systems, and wider supply chains as critical to operational success, with Japanese experience demonstrating the consequences of failure.