Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Greatest Disaster
448 pages
Dr James Bosbotinis
Having read several of the author’s previous books on the Pacific campaign, including the detailed studies of the battles of Leyte Gulf and Midway, this reviewer had high expectations before approaching Pearl Harbor. The author, Mark Stille, a former US Navy officer and prolific naval history writer with a particular focus on the Pacific in the Second World War, sets out to provide a detailed, multi-layered account and analysis of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, including dispelling myths around the attack. Stille’s background in naval intelligence is also evident throughout the book, and very much adds to the depth of the analysis.
Across 13 chapters and four appendices, Stille examines the US-Japanese relationship in the early 20th century, the Japanese debate around going to war, the potential options and risks of war with the US, the role of Admiral Yamamoto, the composition of the Japanese Striking Force and US Pacific Fleet respectively, as well as the execution of the raid itself. The author also dedicates chapters to the ‘Forgotten Offensive’ – the submarine component of the Pearl Harbor attack, involving both midget submarines and fleet boats, and the extent to which Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short, commander of the Pacific Fleet and Army forces in Hawaii respectively, were responsible for the disaster on 7 December 1941. The fourth appendix provides an alternative history of the Pearl Harbor raid; Stille does not embark on a flight of fancy, rather he considers the impact of the Striking Force losing the element of surprise and US forces on Hawaii responding in a more timely manner.
The author provides a highly detailed, critical analysis across the levels of war, considering such issues as national policy, the impact of flawed policy and strategic assumptions, command-and-control, leadership, tactical and operational innovation (for example, the Japanese development of large-scale carrier operations with the Kido Butai), and operational planning. Stille also highlights factors such as the impact of Mahanian thinking on the Imperial Japanese Navy (for example, its focus on decisive battle to secure sea control with the enemy fleet as the objective while ignoring infrastructure), and the obsession with “producing a limited number of outstanding pilots instead of a large number of simply above-average aviators.” The author summarises the Japanese planning process thus: “…wildly inaccurate strategic assumptions and lack of planning precision for operational and tactical details.” On the US side, Kimmel and Short also attract much criticism for their “collective intellectual unpreparedness and simple lack of imagination…” as well as “…abysmal use of intelligence that focused on ascertaining Japanese intentions while totally disregarding Japanese capabilities.”
Pearl Harbor provides a well-written, detailed, compelling account and analysis of the Pearl Harbor raid. The author writes with clarity, and the book will be accessible to those who are lay readers with an interest in naval history or that of the Second World War. Moreover, the book will be particularly valuable to the academic or professional seeking a case study in decision-making around going to war, leadership, operational planning and execution. In this regard, Pearl Harbor would be ideal for those either planning to or already attending staff college plus make a fine addition to reading lists. This book is most certainly recommended.
