Russian Faith, Honour, & Courage Displayed in a Faithfull Narrative of the Russian Expedition by Sea (1769 & 1770)
Prof Andrew Lambert,
Kings College London
Best known for publishing original sources in the field of exploration and travel, maritime and terrestrial, the Hakluyt Society has published material generated by the Royal Navy. This text is unusual as it concerns the Russian naval service of a British Captain, in the middle of a successful British career. John Elphinstone (1722-1785) was recruited by Russian Empress Catherine II (the Great), along with two of his sons, and other British personnel in 1769, for service in the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774. Russia attacked overland through the Balkans, with some success, while a squadron from the Baltic fleet, was sent to cut the Ottoman grain supply from Egypt, attack Istanbul by land and sea, to secure control of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles – a Russian project for at least a millennium. The war concluded with some Russian gains, but Istanbul remains Turkish. The failure of these grand designs left the Russian commanders with much to explain to their autocratic ruler – they thought Elphinstone, an angry, demanding foreigner would be an ideal scapegoat. This was unwise: Elphinstone had retained all the evidence to prove his case, and did not hesitate to threaten publication of incriminating texts if the Russian state did not protect his reputation and pay the promised rewards of his service. This substantial text is the dossier he assembled to establish his case – combining a daily sea journal with contractual and political correspondence. Contemporary Russian maps and charts illustrate the text.
Alongside promoting his case, Elphinstone’s text emphasises the clash of cultures between the two navies: he expected Royal Navy standards of skill, seamanship and subordination, but found corruption, favouritism and incompetence, officers too drunk to take command in battle, and men rendered inert by sustained abuse. Initial high-level support, including that of the Empress, faltered when he exposed Court favourites, and basic failures. Russian ships were dirty, badly maintained, and unhealthy, standards of seamanship were low, officer-man relations were shaped by ignorance, violence, and fatalism. The men were brave and resilient but lacked both skill and initiative. The fleet depended on British refits, supplies, hospitals and transports to reach the Mediterranean and remain active. This account provides a wealth of operational and tactical detail, addresses the limits of contemporary logistics, and the distinctly different standards of two major navies.
Elphinstone would not accept poor performance in a fleet at war. Removing a senior Russian officer from command, disrating him for incompetence and negligence, compromised the patronage links of court factions. Lacking a command of Russian, Elphinstone relied on French translations of Russian texts, and the good will of his interlocutors. While his work was critical to the success of the campaign, Russian leaders claimed credit for the victories, and blamed him for the failure to sail up to Istanbul, or capture Lemnos, a harbour ideally located to support a blockade of the Dardanelles (as it did in 1914-18).
Recalled to St Petersburg and dismissed following a Court conspiracy to cover the failure of a favourite, Elphinstone had the presence of mind, and the evidence to secure an honourable discharge, and his pay. His exit proved convenient for the British state, which was under severe pressure from the Levant Company, and the Ottoman Government to stop supporting Russia. When the Russian regime balked at providing his pay, expenses and prize money Elphinstone threatened to publish the incriminating evidence. While the Russian regime paid up, it was also quick to hire more British officers two decades later, the next time they needed professional naval officers, including one of Elphinstone’s sons. While Elphinstone and his family were convinced Russia had not honoured all of its debts, his most serious complaint was about the conduct of fellow Scot Samuel Greig, “a snake in the grass”, who claimed credit for the key decision of the campaign, the fire ship attack that destroyed the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Chesme, 5-7 July 1770, and briefed against him. Greig curried favour with his hosts, remained in Russian service, and founded a naval dynasty. John Elphinstone was a brave, clever and committed officer, his reputation survived Russian chicanery, returning to active service in the Royal Navy soon after returning home.
The Anglo-Russian editorial team have rescued an obscure manuscript, lately acquired by Princeton University Library for a far wider audience, using British and Russian naval archives, and integrated the edition with existing into British and Russian literatures on the conflict, the two navies and the relationship between the two states.
