Sailors, Statesmen and the Implementation of Naval Strategy

216 pages

M. K. Barritt

Captain, RN

How does a naval officer gain a hearing for his expert advice, let alone actually play a role in statecraft? Examination of this question should interest any reader of this review with experience in Whitehall, perhaps especially during the ‘peace dividend’ years of the Conservative government of the 1990s followed by the interventionist policy of Prime Minister Blair. Richard Harding brings the discussion right up to date in his excellent ‘Reflections’ that conclude this volume. Its purpose is to examine the influence that navies have exerted upon strategy-making bodies in a symbiotic relationship where the sailors need political support and the politicians need help to see how naval power contributes to national objectives. The collection of essays, Richard Harding concludes, show that none of the problems confronting the players are new.

His concluding synthesis highlights the only contribution in the volume that illustrates a policy-maker who was ready to hear the voice of naval professionals. It is one of four essays providing an invaluable account of the development of Spanish naval strategy in the 18th century, together with case studies of significant professional and political players in the story of the Spanish Navy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Agustin Guimera shows how the respect of the powerful, reforming, secretary of state, Floridablanca, for the naval commander Antonio Valdez, ensured the maintenance of sovereignty over Spain’s world-wide possessions during the War of American Independence, and saw the Spanish Navy reach its maximum size and greatest effectiveness in 1795.

In his introduction, Richard Harding urges the need to move beyond studies that focus on the performance of leaders and to take greater account of other political priorities and influences. He points out how the contributions from France show how social and cultural factors limited the penetration of naval expertise into decision-making. In his analysis of the position in the 18th century, Olivier Chaline suggests that contemporary theoretical works were focussed on tactics, the realm of the seamen in charge of operations of the fleet, whilst little was written on strategy, the realm of the statesmen. The Secretary of the Navy was generally a minor player, especially if he was not a Minister of State, and there are few signs of practical knowledge in the King’s Council.

In his own contribution, Richard Harding turns the microscope on the political leaders in Great Britain during the war of 1739-48, to discern how much bearing professional knowledge had on naval strategic leadership. He looks beyond the familiar narrative that the period was of undistinguished leadership, yet gave important experience to the successful leaders in the Seven Years’ War. He examines leadership as a social process, and points to the influences, such as public perception of the role of the Royal Navy, that constrained policy choices. When considering the loss of naval input to the Cabinet, due weight has to be given to George II’s concern for Hanover, the long-standing argument over the best response to French presence in Flanders, and the impact of the Jacobite rebellion of ’45. It was the advent of a new king with no attachment to Hanover, and the series of naval victories that captured public support, that heralded in an appreciation of the decisive impact of British sea power on Europe that held good until over-turned in the first decade of the 20th century.

One disappointment in this book is the lack of a detailed examination of the dramatic end of that appreciation in the lead up to Britain’s engagement in the continental battles of World War One. There are allusions in the editorial apparatus, but sadly Andrew Lambert’s welcome synthesis of his studies of the role and influence of Julian Corbett stops with the statement that “he had educated statesmen, admirals, and soldiers on the eve of total war – that they failed to listen cannot be blamed on the author”. The clear enunciation of Corbett’s re-evaluation of strategy in The Campaign of Trafalgar is nonetheless a highlight of this volume. The essay also addresses education of higher naval leaders, and this is the theme of the final fascinating contribution from John Hattendorf. His account of educating admirals for high command in the US Navy from the 18th to 21st centuries, shows the consistent impact of the cultural and political background. The early hostility to the concept of a national naval force contributed to the remarkably long-standing resistance to the introduction of flag ranks – an eye-opener to this reviewer. Openness to wider ideas nationally and internationally, especially on the part of the staff of the Naval War College from its inception in 1885, has, in Professor Hattendorf’s opinion, clearly overall worked to the advantage of the USN.

Professor Harding concludes: “If naval expertise is to be well understood, as it must be by political authority, it needs to be continually researched and reviewed”. This volume makes a contribution. He presents a challenge for our own country and service:

“Even in Britain, where diplomatic and military importance of the navy over 300 years, helped to create a valued institution, the conditions began to change in the mid-twentieth century so that it is now questionable how far British society still sees its defence as founded on a distinctive naval capability”.

He notes that “apart from the Falklands War (1982), navies appear not to have made major contributions to policy decisions” and asserts that “sailors have not been generally as effective as soldiers in influencing the decision-makers”. Staff College examiners might add ‘Discuss.’

This book should provide a stimulus for personal reflection on the dynamics behind implementation of strategy. The wider perspective is valuable with country chapters that are generally well tailored to cover the period, whilst several, notably Alan James’ account of the evolution of French naval leadership in the 16th to 18th century, contain substantial syntheses of modern scholarship. Footnotes throughout point to a positive feast of sources to explore. Layout is clear, but proof-reading has been astonishingly inadequate. The e-book would be a good investment for NR readers.