The British Air Power Delusion 1906-1941

328 pages

Dr James WE Smith, King’s College London

The British Air Power Delusion 1906–1941 by Neil Datson critically examines the origins and implications of Britain’s decision to establish the world’s first independent air force, the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918. Datson argues that by creating the RAF, rather than enhancing military effectiveness, it inadvertently, if not on purpose, weakened the British Army and Royal Navy by fragmenting their integrated air capabilities.

The book contends that for World War I, both the Army and Navy had developed their own air arms – the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) – each tailored to specific service operational needs. The primary argument, with considerable supporting evidence, is that the establishment of the RAF removed these resources from the other services, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for coordinated defence air strategy. The presumption that by forcing another service, would not distract but enhance military air power strategy and doctrine compared to retaining separate air branches is a key contention. Instead, without the RAF, airpower may have forced the army and RN closer together could be a key take away from this. Arguably, that land-based air forces were an inevitable price to pay, one that Britain certainly did pay for with the misconfiguration of both the RAF and RN entering the Second World War is remarkable. A notable example cited by the author is that at a 1940 conference where a naval officer requested RAF fighters to defend warships against German invasion forces, the RAF representative declined, stating its role was solely the defence of Britain, not ships. An irony, when Operation SEALION – Nazis Germany’s invasion of Britain – has been thoroughly disproved, an unrealistic plan cancelled on first thought, ultimately becoming nothing more than a prop for those who cannot find better arguments to justify additional expenditure on the RAF in the decades that followed. For contemporary arguments, this returns to the point of tactical doctrinal thinking versus strategic, where anyone with half a brain would understand that the elimination of shipping from getting to Britain in the Second World War would have resulted in the prompt capitulation of Britain and the end of Europe. An unpleasant ‘alternative timeline’, to pinch a saying from science fiction.

In short, Datson critiques Winston Churchill’s belief that air power could function as a strategic weapon independent of land and sea operations. He suggests that this misconception contributed to strategic missteps that hastened the decline of the British Empire if not Britain itself. I suspect more case studies, and analysis would have only strengthened the authors arguments, or slightly extending this argument through to 1945, where it can then marry up with post-1945 scholarship and explored alongside perspectives from the light blue cadre.

As was said in 1918 from some naval aviators in the Admiralty building, “long live the RNAS, the White Ensign, the one and only flag of British military aviation on the sea.”

This book should be praised for its thorough research and thought-provoking analysis, offering a refreshing perspective on British defence policy and strategy. Yet, what I find most important is that the scholar has been willing to tackle a topic that many avoid for fear – academics and military alike – of being called ‘interservice rivalry bashers’. This is just an excuse by those who do not want to have an honest discussion about defence, something certainly lacking in Britain today. Anyone who really cares about defence, shouldn’t be afraid of fundamental questions like “how many armed forces?”, “What should be the configuration of the military” and ultimately understanding unique British national strategy is more important than sentimental tosh towards services and the sticker logo on aircraft – particularly if they do not best fit that strategy. I’d challenge any academic, civil servant or service personnel to argue that the colour of a uniform is more important than national defence strategy (email is on). I suspect silence would be the answer because even the most misguided air power theorist, land force obsessive, or hardcore navalist would struggle to provide evidence to the contrary. Some perspectives have been blind or even purposefully argued over the RAF’s importance that you’d have thought the navy, merchant fleets and army did nothing in wartime. A damning indictment that military history in the post-war ‘revisionist’ era often became ideologically driven, perhaps little has changed.

Remember defence is not a museum, we need to study experience and analyse it to guide us in the future, works such as this remind us of paths taken, that in hindsight offered solutions relevant to then that may or may not be useful in the future. Well done Mr Datson on a well-crafted, accessible and timely contribution.