The Cambridge History of Strategy: Volume One: From Antiquity to the American War of Independence & Volume Two: From the Napoleonic Wars to the Present

Dr James WE Smith

King’s College London

The Cambridge History of Strategy Series comes in two volumes spanning the beginning of recorded history through to the contemporary period. It’s no coincidence the editors have chosen to divide these volumes as they have. The first volume ends where scholarship on strategy started to take form as it is more widely known today, such as through prominent scholars and historians Clausewitz, Jomini and Corbett. What the editors have attempted to do, and do so well, is capture essays by a notable set of wonderful scholars who have demonstrated the evolution of the theory, art and practice of strategy and how it has run as a thread through warfare and global events as they have unfolded. The key word throughout this to consider is ‘insight’ rather than the awful term ‘lessons learnt’. These volumes are designed to make the reader think which is what makes it stand out from the crowd because it is a different product to other books with the title ‘strategy’ in them.

Volume I of The Cambridge History of Strategy presents a comprehensive history of strategic practice from the dawn of recorded history to the late 18th century, covering a global perspective. Drawing on two and a half millennia of material evidence, an international team of leading experts explores how strategy was devised, implemented, and supported by various tools, spanning regions from ancient Greece and China to the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, as well as the American Revolutionary War. The work delves into key themes such as decision-making and strategy development, the causes and objectives of wars, and the instruments of strategy in both conflict and peacetime. It also examines the organisation of armed forces and the distinct and shared methods of warfare across different civilisations and eras. A comparative conclusion addresses how political objectives were historically aligned with military means in various parts of the world, questioning whether certain elements of strategic practice are universal.

Volume II of The Cambridge History of Strategy explores the practice of strategy from 1800 to the present day. Scholars investigate how leaders of states, empires, and non-state actors (such as guerrilla groups, rebels, and terrorists) have sought to implement strategy in the modern era. With a focus on the practical application of strategy, this volume aims to understand the real-world dynamics of conflict, where strategic ideas are tested against reactive and adaptive opponents. Through its case studies and analysis, the volume encourages a re-evaluation of prevailing views in the field of strategic studies. As the case studies reveal, strategy can also be a rare, deliberate, pre-planned, and controlled process. Instead, it is often shaped by a combination of circumstance and opportunity—both structural and individual—resulting in a perspective that sees strategy as less than perfect but also a warning signal that the best theory, which should be rooted in the analysis of experience, and the planning that should formulate from it, can be undermined by matters like politics and human nature. For Britain, the execution of the First World War is the obvious example.

One could argue these volumes neatly juxtapose both editions of Makers of Modern Strategy which were published in 1986 and 2023, but Cambridge has sided more with the historical school methodology than the mix of schools and styles found in Makers. Importantly the editors have shown their quality by seeking out the right authors for papers to cover the historical expanse of strategy and its many parts. For the naval community and those interested in national strategy making and what should flow from it, the example: maritime strategy and naval power are addressed in volume two, with Corbett taking centre stage––whereas he was ignored due to the subtle tell-tale ‘land-think’ and Prussian leanings that dominate Modern Makers.

As accessible as these volumes are, with many of the authors writing with accessibility in mind this isn’t a title for the passing fancy of strategy or the history of it practically or intellectually, but something more serious, something that requires quiet pondering aligned with a vast amount of time and a good cup of tea or coffee. It is an effective and important contribution, but both its cost, size and quality remind it’s a serious set of books, for both volumes are required to grasp the themes it discusses, and the points made. The book is useful for students, military and professionals alike but it’s a book for those who already know they want to read it.