The Falklands Factor: The Battle That Changed the Shape of Ships

376 pages

RAdm R G Melly

“Could a much larger vessel benefit from the lift generated by its own ‘captive wave’ to overcome the restraints of prohibitive wave drag?” asked David Giles. “Yes, I believe it could” responded Commander Peter Thornycroft, famed for his design of the semi-planing Nelson launches. This brief exchange over dinner, in September 1973, was the start of a remarkable collaboration between the interlocuters – and a defining moment in David Giles’ life. In this book, the author details the struggle, and the associated litigation, relating to his efforts, on both sides of the Atlantic, to have his controversial ideas on hull design recognised.

Giles’ fascination in nautical matters was learned from his father, himself a talented boat designer.  A short spell in the Royal Navy for his National Service, during which he served in HM Submarine Trenchant, was followed by three years at Oxford and then a short but strangely pertinent career, given the direction his life took, in the aeronautical industry.

By the time of his meeting with Thornycroft, he was ready to return to his nautical roots, inspired by his knowledge of technological advances and of wing theory. In 1975, Giles and Thornycroft decided to pool resources to advance their large vessel activities, forming Thornycroft, Giles & Associates Ltd (TGA). The initial effort went into designing an enlarged version of the successful Azteca-class vessels (150 ton), of which 31 were under construction for the Mexican Navy; the result was the successful Osprey design (350 ton) with a semi-planing hull form, of which some 30 variants were subsequently bought by the Danish Navy and other countries. However, it was in 1979, at an inspection of the first Danish Osprey (Havørnen) by British dignitaries alongside HMS Belfast in London, that the scepticism of the establishment being apparent, and the resistance to the concept of a large semi-planing hulled vessel (dismissively dubbed ‘the short, fat ship’) hardened.

In 1981, dismayed by the lack of progress in the UK, and buoyed by President Reagan’s ambitious plans for an enlarged fleet, Giles took his ideas to America.  On his return to the UK, all was to change. It became apparent that British Shipbuilders had conspired, without permission, to use Osprey copyrighted designs in their submission for the Hong Kong patrol craft contract. There followed a protracted, six-year, bruising struggle through the legal system before redress was finally achieved in the Courts. Meanwhile, the TGA’s S90 design had been in brutal competition with YARD’s proposal to meet the T23 Statement of Requirements; the contract was ultimately awarded to YARD, but the grounds on which the S90 design was dismissed were fiercely disputed.

A Committee, chaired by Admiral Lord Hill-Norton, had recommended that an inquiry be established to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the S90 hull form for the purposes of meeting the staff requirement for an anti-submarine frigate. This inquiry, undertaken by Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, concluded that there were no advantages in the novel hull form championed by Thornycroft and Giles, despite some allegedly clear shortcomings in its deliberations.

In 1988, disillusioned with the UK defence establishment, Giles set up shop in the USA. It did not start well, with an initially enthusiastic NAVSEA rejecting the semi-planing proposition, having consulted the British defence establishment. However, in a subsequent Patent Court case, the Judge found in favour of Giles’ team, concluding that the Littoral Combat Ship, Freedom-class, design (capable of speeds up to 50 knots) benefited from the ‘lift’, covered by Giles’ US patent.

This is a well-written book with a compelling narrative style, backed up by 15 technical, legal, and commercial Appendices, along with a most helpful Dramatis Personae. Notwithstanding the book’s title, there is only passing reference to the Falklands War, and no evidence is presented that a ‘short fat ship’ would have fared any better than had traditional warship designs. However, whilst the final decision regarding the T23’s hull was a matter for the MoD, the perceived failure fairly to validate the author’s claims regarding the S90 hull form is an almost inexplicable blot on the MoD’s reputation.

It is not the task of the reviewer to judge the pros and cons of a book’s propositions. Whether or not you agree with the central thesis that semi-planing hulls confer significant advantages in larger designed ships, this is nevertheless a gripping account of the apparent deceit and skulduggery of unaccountable senior Government officials. Indeed, it is a story of remarkable persistence in the face of bureaucratic obstinacy.  Some of Giles’ detractors have produced their own memoirs, and, in this book, Giles is seeking to set the record straight. As the late Queen observed: “Recollections may vary!”