The Political Thought of Xi Jinping

296 pages

Fellow, Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre

Alongside Xi Jinping’s emerging ideology, this book addresses the critical strategic questions of ‘What does China’s leader want?’ and ‘How does he intend to get it?’. The book’s authors are from the University of London’s respected School of Oriental and African Studies. Professor Steve Tsang is a world-class expert on Xi, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and a longstanding contributor to HMG events on China; this review’s author remembers presentations from Tsang over a decade ago during the ‘Golden Era’ of UK-China relations.

This is a book of intense academic rigour, drawing on a vast array of original language sources, and gives compelling insights into how the CCP has changed under Xi and where this may lead. This book would be a challenging introduction to the subject of Xi’s intentions; a more digestible version of the author’s arguments is available on a recent China Power podcast.[1] However, it should be required reading for those on HMG’s post-beginner China capability courses and for those who undertake China’s role in wargames.

“One state, one people, one ideology, one party, one leader”

The book begins with the emergence of Xi’s guiding ideology (chapter one: one ideology). It then details how Xi shifted the CCP from collective leadership into strongman rule (chapters two, three: one party). It moves to explaining how Xi has changed the tacit social contract between the CCP and Chinese people, offering increased national prestige and patriotism for the cost of fewer freedoms, uniformity, and ideological indoctrination (chapters four and six: one people).  Other chapters detail how Xi is reorientating China’s economy to serve the goal of increased security and the steps Xi is taking to ultimately ‘restore’ his perception of China’s imperial-era world leadership: ‘Tianxia’ – ‘all under heaven’ (chapters five and seven: one state).

Striking insights from reading this book include: the ambition of Xi to control what all Chinese people think – those inside China and the diaspora; the audacity of Xi’s pivot of China away from collective leadership and economic pragmatism (which enabled China’s rise), towards strongman rule and diktat – a return to Leninist control and Marxist disregard for private enterprise. The book includes the assessment that Xi will tactically make changes if China’s economy is threatened (and therefore CCP’s compact with the Chinese people), but the course is set for a long confrontation with the US. Making the world safe for authoritarianism, breaking US alliances and replacing the US-led order with general deference towards China are all part of Xi’s plans, but ‘recovering’ Taiwan will be the most important milestone for Xi, which is needed to complete ‘national rejuvenation’ by the middle of this century.

While’s Xi’s changes have somewhat addressed the problems of CCP corruption and indecisiveness, the book argues Xi is seriously increasing other weaknesses.  Promotions in the CCP are based on ideology, not performance. Information reaching the leadership tends towards being what the leader wants to read. Individual initiative and regional policy experimentation are crushed.  These have both economic and military implications; economic dynamism will be less, especially as China ages rapidly and other countries mirror Chinese mercantilism, while the People’s Liberation Army will act rigidly and is not suited towards mission command.

This combination of Xi’s ambition, plus growing Chinese weaknesses, poses a threat if the strategic ‘window of opportunity’ Xi sees to change the world begins to close.  For example, against previous expectations, China’s GDP may not actually overtake the US’.[2] Add this to Xi’s increasing age (he is 70), and this may be the context for an opportunistic decision to attempt to blockade or invade Taiwan.

The book does not address military chances of success, or what might follow Xi – the later has been addressed well elsewhere.[3] But Xi Jinping Thought is unlikely to be maintained by any successor – who Xi is refusing to appoint. The authors assess Xi’s control of the CCP is not (yet) a dictatorial personality cult: if Xi was seen to have failed decisively by a critical mass in the CCP (e.g., over Taiwan), they could try to remove him. But Xi’s control of the CCP makes this extremely difficult and, for the foreseeable future, Xi is in charge.

[1] China Power, ‘The Political Thought of Xi Jinping: A Conversation with Dr. Steve Tsang’, 28 March 2024, https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/chinapower/id1144663360?i=1000650772500

[2] Nikkei Asia: ‘China economy overtaking U.S. is increasingly unlikely: ex-IMF official’, 5 February 2024; https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-economy-overtaking-U.S.-is-increasingly-unlikely-ex-IMF-official

[3] Lowry Institute / CSIS, McGregor/Blanchette:  ‘After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era’, 21 April 2021 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi-future-scenarios-leadership-succession-post-xi-jinping-era