The Royal and Russian Navies: Cooperation, Competition and Confrontation

264 pages

Prof Geoffrey Till

Full disclosure. I was consulted by the editors of this book and was also involved in the vodka sodden early days of the ‘RUKUS’ process as the Russian, US and UK navies came together in mutual curiosity as the Cold War was winding down and new more friendly, or at least more understanding relationships beckoned. I have particular memories of one of the editors, a RUKUS translator from Beaconsfield, the MOD’s language school. I hugely admired the way in which he stuck amiably and professionally alongside the Russians at their most outrageous in style, substance and vodka, earned their trust and enabled real exchanges of competitive opinion. For all these reasons, I was a bit hesitant about reviewing a book that I also wrote a blurb for. But the Book Reviews Editor said it would be OK, so here goes.

The RUKUS talks, and this retrospective account of them, were inspired by the fact that the Russians and their navy were not going to go away when the Wall came down. Before it did, this was a time of opportunity when we might be able to strike up a new relationship with the Russians in a better and more cooperative world. Of course, there would be problems and misperceptions on both sides, but perhaps we could talk them through and come up with a new relationship for the future.  Perhaps we could set out some kind of maritime pathway to a reconciliation that would be in the interests of both sides.

In the aftermath of Putin’s vicious and unprincipled assault on Ukraine and the consequent uncertainty about how we are going to live with Russia afterwards, this brief flowering of cooperation between the Royal and Russian navies might now seem impossibly naïve, But the story of it is still relevant because at the very least in a post Ukraine world we don’t want the relationship to be worse than it needs to be.

Although the book is effectively structured and takes us through the succeeding phases of a flowering hope for friendship, through growing concerns and ending in confrontation, this is not a standard academic account. Instead, the chronological and analytical narrative is enlightened by a series of personal accounts’ which add the crucial human element to the story. And it was a very human story with lots of very memorable personal experiences for all concerned. The book shows how what started as a series of informal gatherings held in the three countries between some influential retired officers from the three navies and a few academics gradually evolved into formal sessions between currently serving officers involving ship visits, simulations and exercises at sea. The French came on board as well, turning it into FRUKUS.

Gradually the process ran into the sand as inter-state relations deteriorated, but it never completely died. Indeed, the two navies even signed a military-technical cooperation agreement just before the Russians invaded Ukraine in 2014. But with that everything stopped.

The book ends with some valuable speculation about why the might-have-been never was and, as such, joins the growing literature of academic attempts at trying to analyse why it all went wrong. There seem to have been a number of reasons although the relative importance of each will probably always remain controversial. On both sides there were those who couldn’t easily change the stereotypes of each other that they had developed over their Cold War lifetimes. There was a degree of counter-productive triumphalism, mainly in America – the end of history and all that. I can vividly remember one non-RUKUS gathering in Washington where an agitated senior Russian banged on the table to make the point that Russia should be treated instead as a great power going through a crisis. Another problem was the, again mainly American, rush to urge unbridled liberal democracy on a country that hadn’t in all its history ever demonstrated the slightest inclination that way and probably never will. The manner in which successive US administrations ignored warnings from their own people about the dangers of going too fast and too soon in this direction is only now beginning slowly to be disinterred from the State Department’s classified Dissent channel. This so-called ‘shock therapy’ turned out to be a classic case of mirror-imaging.

Undoubtedly there were scores of unscrupulous business types – the future oligarchs- only too willing to make a quick rouble by ruthlessly exploiting the chaos that resulted and gouging a privileged position for themselves in decision-making circles. And let’s be clear, they weren’t all Russian. One of the most controversial issues of course and probably the most important is the extent and speed of NATO expansion. M.E. Sarotte in her book Not One Inch More meticulously accounts the sad story of the deal that Putin thought he had but which in fact the State Department had never made. Absolutely nothing excuses the brutal Russian attack on Ukraine, but one must admit that the ultimate fault is not entirely on one side. 

The Russian and Royal Navies is a quite exceptional book, a true unprejudiced historical record of a unique moment in time from the pragmatic and professional viewpoint of the people actually engaged in it. Navies both reflect and affect the countries they defend and the strategic environment within which they operate. The book also illustrates both these points exactly. Better still for something so important, it is written in an engaging reader-friendly style and painlessly leaves us with much to ponder that is especially appropriate for these tumultuous times. Unsurprisingly, therefore I commend this book without reservation. But don’t just take my word for it. Get hold of a copy and read it!