The Royal Navy in the Cold War Years, 1966-1990: Retreat and Revival
728 pages
Dr James WE Smith, King’s College London
The Royal Navy in the Cold War Years, 1966-1990: Retreat and Revival, is authored by Edward Hampshire, who is no stranger to the topic of the Royal Navy after the Second World War. He approaches this topic from a position of strength and skill that few others are in a position to do. The title itself sets out a continuation of his thesis from his previous works that seeks to clarify the often-tumultuous analysis of the history of the Royal Navy after 1945. This book emphasises personnel policy, support for the fleet and equipment procurement. In that regard, few other scholars could have the skill or access to resources to be able to look at these specific questions, which, as he points out, have been sidelined into secondary roles. I suspect there is somewhat more of an issue, that there is simply a declining number of scholars who can ask these questions, than the issue being sidelined or even a more profound issue, which I will remark on later. With that in mind, his book leans towards a technocratic view of the Royal Navy––Hampshire’s strength––as he delves into the “nuts, bolts and spending of pennies” of issues, providing the evidence to support his points using the very best of sources.
This book clearly aims to pay homage to Eric Grove’s Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War Two, which was published nearly 40 years ago in 1987. Therefore, it’s clear that an update, refresh and expansion of this theme was overdue; better late than never one might say. However, paying homage is one thing, for scholars must be mindful that it’s a waste of research to spend too much time arguing matters of previous publications when there are more important tasks to do, such as providing arguments based on new materials and evidence as well as existing ones. Hampshire navigates this issue well, for his title is not a direct replacement of Grove’s text; instead, it provides essential ‘meat on the bone’ to the topic at a time that a reboot of our understanding and analysis of the Royal Navy after 1945 is not only long overdue but very much needed. But in this homage is perhaps an issue that it could be argued that Hampshire has chosen to generally ‘play it safe’ in his view and analysis of these matters by keeping counsel with existing texts and advisors who are less likely to escape the clutches of what has been a primary issue of understanding of the Royal Navy after World War Two: a technical and procurement debate at the cost at understanding other issues and exploring other questions. If that is what you want, then look no further. It’s not easy to walk the tightrope to talk about the full spread of issues a military service(s) faces over quite an extensive period without making some difficult choices over the material to talk about, something Hampshire navigates with relative elegance. However, one cannot escape the feeling the author probably had to battle with what made it into the book and ended up on the editing room floor. It is not the reader’s place to guess that, but like any text, there are strengths and weaknesses, both dull and fantastic sections of text balanced with well-chosen photos and appendices along with the rare minor issue which does not detract in this case from the whole. The structure and layout of the book is a delight to see nowadays. It is an attempt at a ‘tour-de-force’ on this specific topic, which mostly avoids too much ‘dryness’ considering the depth of the material presented.
By making complex matters of equipment and procurement––and using the authors’ words, “secondary issues” –– accessible to the reader, the book achieves precisely what it sets out to do. However, when it strays into more significant issues and questions, some of the work becomes murky: it lacks the depth otherwise found in the high-quality analysis and debate covering the “secondary issues” the book focuses on. Elsewhere, some questionable remarks appear weakly justified; for example, the concept that Britain had a maritime strategy in the 1980s is an odd choice, one that may be more suited to continental American authors’ view of naval power than a British one. More importantly, the conclusion seems to fail to bring together perhaps the most critical question: why does this matter? One can ponder if this exposes the issue that it is no longer sustainable or acceptable to have interpretations of the Royal Navy after 1945 so heavily technocratically focused or on the secondary issues rather than the big questions. Hampshire touches on these but falls foul of delving deeply into the question that runs as the most pernicious thread of all through post-1945 naval and British defence policy: What about the relationship of seapower and the state? Who cares how many ships the Navy has if the State no longer understands what they are for…Why have scholars focused so much on technical matters? Hampshire tries to tackle and break the mould but it falls relatively flat.
There does appear in scholarship, even with this text, a reluctance to tackle the big, harsh, challenging questions. This is often because such histories are written by current or former civil servants and military officers who rightfully must not openly question Government policy nor breach Official Secrets; in addition, they often side towards a more sentimental, soft, positive, and optimistic view of the naval service than is reality. Sometimes, proximity to the topic is a blessing as much as a hindrance. The title alone of this book may suggest this is an issue in the author’s thought process: some may find it hard to believe the idea of the Royal Navy being in ‘revival’ by 1990 or even after 2001. It also appears an active choice to replace the foolishness that other historians have used to wrongly divide naval history into ‘rise, fall and decline’ as has become common in recent decades. Instead, Hampshire seems intent to replace it with ‘retreat and revival’. This could be unbelievable as well as a genius move. But ‘revival’ will need far stronger arguments to justify it than presented in this work, including going beyond “secondary issues,” and it will need to step into the 21st century before a complete understanding of the time the book covers, and broader issues can be truly grasped. There ultimately could be equally a very nasty fact lurking in his excellent bibliography of which his text is heavily dependent: that scanning the publications of recent decades, understanding of seapower by HM Gov has arguably not improved in the period the book covers or after. Therefore, the argument for a different approach to the status quo of post-1945 naval history (that his book has at least one foot in) arises. If Britain holds the intellectual panache anymore to get out of a hole on these matters is an open question, clearly it has good scholars, such as this, but perhaps it needs a more vibrant dynamic debate. This maybe something Hampshire’s book has as an unintended positive consequence, I have my doubts. That for some of the individuals––politicians, civil servants, business leaders and military officers––and ideas that the author explores with precision and clarity over a period of huge change for the Royal Navy, it’s difficult to agree with Hampshire’s positivity––although he is carefully critical too––to them when one stands back and looks at the broader picture. That aside, as this is not the place to explore the issue further, the big questions should not be so easily discarded or divorced from what Hampshire provides so well in his title.
What Hampshire has achieved is to make public what needed to be. He has smashed apart the nervousness and trepidation over serious impactful writing about the Royal Navy in the latter 20th century. The 1990s and beyond are now calling to scholars. In conclusion, The Royal Navy in the Cold War Years, 1966-1990: Retreat and Revival, is an achievement and considerable contribution to the fields of naval history and military history, a very notable one, one beyond just its content and context. To that end, this book should become a discussion point for students and military personnel when considering the past, present and future or for those wise enough to try and garner some much-needed wisdom of what to and what not to do, out of the people, problems and decisions that Hampshire has covered so accessibly in his latest book.
