Tokyo 1944-45: The Destruction of Imperial Japan’s Capital
96 pages
Dr James Bosbotinis
Apart from the Doolittle Raid of April 1942, Tokyo did not come under attack until the latter stages of the war in the Pacific, with the US Army Air Force commencing B-29 Superfortress raids on the city and its metropolitan area, in November 1944. In this book, the author, Mark Lardas, a prolific writer on particularly naval and airpower history, sets out to provide a detailed history of the US campaign against Tokyo. This follows the familiar Osprey approach of providing a scene-setting introduction (in this case, an account of the Doolittle Raid), the respective capabilities of the attackers and defenders, campaign objectives, an account of the campaign itself, and a concluding ‘Aftermath and Analysis’. A selection of sources for those interested in reading further on the campaign is also included.
This cursory glance over the book’s outline does not however, do justice to its contents. Lardas has crafted an excellent account of the US campaign against Tokyo, with his analysis drawing out several key themes. For Japan, the flaws in its doctrine, its focus on the offense and commensurate neglect of developing appropriate defensive measures, as well as the highly damaging effects of inter-service rivalry stand out. The latter included unnecessary duplication, as described by Lardas, “Each service had its own aircraft of both types, even when that made no sense” (page 22), and “The Imperial Army and Navy maintained their own chain of coastal [radar] stations. It duplicated effort and wasted scarce resources, but neither service trusted the other.” Japanese civil defence efforts were similarly blighted by bureaucracy, and administrative rivalries.
For the US, whilst the Army Air Force saw the “strategic bombing of Japan as an opportunity to realize the dream air power supporters had advocated for over 20 years: to demonstrate air power alone could defeat an industrialized nation. That armies and navies were obsolete…”, the ability to prosecute the strategic air campaign itself was to a significant extent, enabled by the US Navy. Without the seizure of the Marianas, for example, B-29 raids on Japan would have been dependent on bases in China, which were much more vulnerable to Japanese attack and logistically difficult. Lardas highlights the logistics effort required to support the B-29 campaign, adding with regard to the munitions for the bombers, “All of it had to be shipped from the US Pacific coast and across the Pacific Ocean to reach the Marianas.” The author also details the actions of the US Navy’s Fast Carrier Force, Task Force 58, against Japan, particularly in February 1945, and the employment of the B-29 in mining Japanese waters, Operation STARVATION.
As Lardas explains, the strategic air campaign and naval operations against Japan had a devastating effect on Tokyo’s ability to wage war. The combination of, for example, the US Navy’s submarine campaign, Task Force 38’s January 1945 raid into the South China Sea, and Operation STARVATION, together with the B-29 fire raids meant “While blockade helped bring down Japan, the destruction of Tokyo’s industrial section was just as crucial. A starved-out Japan may have been less willing to surrender than a Japan starved and bombed out.”
This book provides an excellent and highly engaging account of the campaign, how it evolved, its early difficulties, and its ultimately devastating impact. There are a few minor typos, including misnaming the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki as ‘Little Boy’, rather than ‘Fat Man’ – the former was dropped on Hiroshima. The book also includes excellent photographs, diagrams, and maps. Tokyo 1944-45 provides an excellent campaign history, highlights key issues such as the problems caused by interservice rivalries, the importance of civil defence, logistics, and the synergies between air and maritime power. It is recommended.
