US Navy Pacific Fleet 1941: America’s Mighty Last Battleship Fleet & U.S. Battleships 1939-1945

Prof Andrew Lambert

Kings College, London

This is a book for those who need to think about possible future conflicts: it emphasises the mismatch between US Navy expectations in 1941 and the war that followed. Far from being fixated on a battleship showdown, American pre-war planning was sophisticated and multi-layered. Mark Lardas’ fresh perspective examines how the Pacific Fleet prepared for the looming conflict, in strategic, operational and tactical planning. He provides ample evidence that the Americans were developing the carrier force as an alternative, alongside major programmes for fleet trains and mobile bases. While the 1918 era battleships had been rebuilt with improved power plants, new heavy guns, with increased elevation, and increased anti-aircraft firepower, they remained slow and consumed massive amounts of fuel. If battleship action was seen as the ultimate capstone of any conflict, the roles of carrier and submarines were expanding, if only to slow down the significantly faster Japanese battleline. The latest aircraft and submarines had enhanced weapon loads and longer endurance, while the Navy’s land-based multi-engine aviation and flying boats, serviced by their specialist support ships added range to reconnaissance and strike missions. Planners correctly anticipated battles developing around the mid-Pacific American island bases, deploying the fleet to Wake or Midway to draw out the enemy. Husband Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was an aggressive commander looking to defeat the enemy’s main force at sea. However, his fleet, weakened by detaching ships to the Atlantic theatre in May 1941, was inferior to the Japanese Navy in Fleet carriers. Kimmel tested plans to set up a battlefleet action around American islands off Wake Island in October. While that option was foreclosed by Pearl Harbour, the shift to carrier centric operations in the same locations was almost seamless. Lardas concludes the switch from battleships to carriers, and Kimmel to Nimitz, created a more effective Pacific Fleet from pre-war assets. The slow US battleships, maximum formation speed around 18 knots, would have been easy targets for Japanese carrier aviators. Critically Japan had no plans to sortie the main battlefleet towards Wake Island… basic logistics and the spread of tasks it had to execute around the Indo-Pacific region made such an operation impossible. The book ends with a useful guide to the relevant literature.

Ingo Bauernfeind’s ship focussed assessment of the wartime American battleships, including the unfinished South Dakota and Lexington classes of 1920, and the Montana’s of the 1940s, is supported by a rich haul of compelling images, many in colour. An image of the old USS Mississippi firing a Terrier AA missile (the ancestor of SM-2) in 1954, and a cover shot of the USS New Jersey firing all nine 16-inch guns, on both broadsides, are particularly striking. This handy guide to the evolution of American design and doctrine suggests that the pre-1922 battleships, slow, solid, and powerfully armed, were conceived to defend the United States. The post 1936 units added speed, to work with carriers, dominate the Pacific and, if necessary, stretch across the Atlantic, the Iowa-class designed for 33 knots, to counter Japanese battlecruisers, while the Alaska class battlecruisers would counter Japanese heavy cruisers. All four of the Iowa-class have survived, along with four other museum battleships. There are a few minor errors, in 1941 Hitler declared war on the USA, not the other way round, while the Lusitania was a British liner, not American.