Nuclear Deterrence

Sir, – First may I say how good it is to be able to read new material between print editions courtesy of the revamped NR website. This definitely promotes continuous flow of thought such as that arising from Admiral Blackham’s article ‘The Strategic Choices for Defence’ (1 April) republished from City Forum and Commander Green’s letter ‘Putin’s Empty Ukraine Threat’ (8 April) [both in this edition! – Ed]. I would like to contribute (again) to the debate on this vitally important topic.

Admiral Blackham was kind enough to write a Foreword to my publication Why Trident? (2020) in which he expressed his long held view that for nuclear deterrence to be credible as a last resort when all other means have been exhausted then ‘all other means’ must be credible too. He feared then that there was a growing imbalance between nuclear and conventional force. In this article he goes much further and directly questions whether the cost of the nuclear deterrent has now reached a point at which it is recognisably detracting from our conventional forces and has therefore made UK deterrence, in the broadest sense, ‘incredible’. I strongly support his call for serious debate as to whether both are now also likely to incur action damage and loss.

It is often argued by those defending Trident that if it were to be abandoned, the money allocated to defence would be commensurately reduced, quoting a Treasury statement of 1982. But, autre temps, autre moeurs. If the Government were to make a clear but different defence strategy, it would be for the Government as a whole (not the Treasury) to decide on the level of resources to be allocated to this strategy. To suggest otherwise is to give Treasury officials power of veto over the Cabinet which is clearly constitutional nonsense. I would also question whether CDS and Heads of Services are really so faint hearted as not to argue their case if they so wished observing that the House of Commons briefing paper No. 7353 of 16 July 2016 states quite unequivocally (pp. 6, 20, 21 & 53) that Trident is part and parcel of the MoD core equipment budget. The concept and implementation of nuclear deterrence is not engraved in tablets of stone. No policy, Trident included, should be immune from criticism and reconsideration.

Admiral Blackham also raises a number of other important and relevant questions directly affecting this topic. One of these is the question of First Use of nuclear weapons. It is here that Commander Green and Admiral Blackham’s observations complement each other. Besides any moral or legal consideration, why would any state, whatever the provocation, deliberately resort to First Use thereby provoking an exchange that would not only annihilate both sides’ civil populations but also render their opposing territories totally uninhabitable for decades, if not centuries, to come?

Neither the US or UK Government policies exclude First Use and both have sought to normalise tactical nuclear weapons with language referring to ‘low yield’ or ‘dial-able’ warheads. This lowers public perception of them as WMDs and subliminally encourages acceptance of their role as tactical weapons of war within a concept of limited nuclear war (a definite misnomer in terms) for which, interestingly, no civil defence measures are considered necessary as in former Cold War days. If this is because the public need not fear nuclear war, then why Trident? Or does Government think civil defence is a pointless exercise? This is head in the non-existent bunker not joined-up thinking. First Use is not lawful or morally acceptable and is self-destructive for no gain.

Admiral Blackham also postulates that the US is quite capable of fulfilling NATO’s 2nd strike nuclear capability; thereby leaving the UK more usefully to redirect its massive expenditure on Trident to restoring its conventional forces. So long as the concept of nuclear deterrence exists by the threat of a 2nd nuclear strike against a nuclear strike then this is a sensible suggestion for NATO burden sharing. Critics might argue that we should not be dependent on the US lest it reverts to an isolationist (from Europe) policy. I would argue that, if this is something to fear, then NATO should be much more fearful of not being able to field adequate conventional forces to resist Putin or a lookalike’s attack in the absence of the US which is currently providing roughly the same as all other nations combined in its support of Ukraine. His suggestion of redirecting the Dreadnought project to SSN or SSGN roles is entirely feasible.

I conclude with one final thought. Surely the overall message arising from Ukraine, in which all-out nuclear war (whether by accident or mistaken design) continues to be a real and significant threat despite NATO’s vast nuclear armoury, is that a much more aggressive approach needs to be taken towards total nuclear disarmament lest the opinion of the ROW that the nuclear weapon powers have no will or ambition to get rid of them is proved to be correct.