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The Review

Volume 111, Number 2, Spring 2023

The Strategic Choices for Defence

By Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham

Message from the Editor

Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham considers the future of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent, and the difficult choices that will have to be made in an environment of increasing threats, tightening budgets, and relentless price-inflation. Originally published 28 February 2023 for CityForum (https://www.cityforum.co.uk/the-strategic- choices-for-defence-by-sir-jeremy-blackham/). A 20 minute read.

As I write in early February 2023, a conventional war of a very destructive, but rather traditional, character is underway in Eastern Europe and, simultaneously or consequentially, we may be at an historic hinge point. It is difficult to draw useful inferences whilst it is still underway; things change from day to day. Moreover, the outcome is very unclear, not least because neither side appears ready to end it at present. That fact itself makes it dangerous because it tends to block strategic thinking; the war becomes about itself and about not losing, rather than about any clear and obviously achievable end. It is unclear that the participants are persuaded by Clausewitz’s maxim that war is continuation of diplomacy by other means, whose purpose is to achieve a ‘better’ situation than existed before it started.

Nevertheless, there is good reason to examine deterrence in the light of the Ukraine War and to consider whether the United Kingdom’s force structure has the right balance between nuclear and conventional forces.

Whilst there are strong and differing views on this subject, I fear that deep, rational, and unemotional thought about it has not always been common. We have settled into the public notion that deterrence for the UK is about the possession of a strategic nuclear capability of ‘last resort’ and not much else. This needs healthy debate, whatever the outcome of that might be.

The Nature of Deterrence

What is deterrence? It is, I suggest, attempting to prevent an opponent doing you harm by persuading him that, even if he does get his blow in first, at whatever level of force, he will either fail to achieve his objective or, even if he has some initial success, the overall cost to him will be disproportionately great – at best a Pyrrhic victory. But I shall also state it as a moral principle – that there is no higher duty placed on statesmen, politicians, diplomats and military officers than to ensure that general nuclear war never occurs. One important contribution to this goal is to deter conflict in the first place. Yet, in February 2022, deterrence palpably failed. It cannot be proven but is at least arguable that a more visible, credible and united NATO political and conventional military front might have given Russia pause, particularly if clearly backed by the strategic nuclear deterrent of the US.

Much of this is self-evident. But we should keep in mind the dictum of a distinguished former MoD Permanent Undersecretary that “Weapons deter by the possibility of their use and
by no other means.” Let us parse that statement, and its consequences for our planning; it means, I suggest, that to effect deterrence, at whatever level, it is necessary to satisfy several minimum conditions, which I shall call The Ten Points:

1) A sufficiency of military capability (including those capabilities covered by the concept of hybrid warfare, such as cyber warfare, both in the military and in the civil and private sectors) able to match the potential threat.¹
2) A strong command and control organisation, including at Cabinet level.
3) A defence industrial base capable of producing, supporting
and replenishing losses of weapons, ammunition, and support facilities during protracted combat.
4) A sufficiency of properly trained personnel, including battle casualty
replacements, at a high level of readiness, visible to both allies and adversaries.
5) Adequate support and urgent repair facilities close to the operational theatre.
6) A sufficiency of appropriate transport to convey 2,
3, 4 and 5 above to the operational theatre.
7) A robust and sufficient intelligence and data handling infrastructure.
8) A logistic system of sufficient sustainability and redundancy.
9) A suitable and relevant concept of operations.
10) A clearly visible political will.

It will, I think, be clear that the Russian leadership did not believe, before the invasion of February 2022, that all the above conditions were satisfied. Moreover, I should be very surprised if any defence expert in the UK believed that they are all in place even now, despite the strong and obviously necessary assistance we are rightly providing to Ukraine. Certainly, we should note the alarming suggestion by a senior US General that the British Army is no longer a “Tier 1” Army and “barely Tier 2.”² This charge was not denied; indeed it has effectively been admitted by James Heappy, the Minister for the Armed Forces, that all is far from well with both our military capability and readiness.³

In discussing deterrence, it is insufficient to think only of nuclear weapons. This is because deterrence is a continuum of which strategic nuclear deterrence is simply the top end. The bottom end is not even necessarily about military effort but rather about a combination of hard and soft power. It might be economic, propaganda-based, cyber-based, or economic aid-based. It will certainly involve both diplomatic and ultimately military effort. The aim of our deterrence posture is to be able to match any prospective threat at our opponent’s entry level and continue to do so as he ascends the escalation ladder.

We need to understand that the things which we do not deter are the most likely to happen. The question of nuclear use only arises if we reach the limit of our conventional deterrent capability before our opponent reaches his. At this point our options seem to be to further escalate into nuclear warfare before our enemy needs to, or to negotiate. No enemy is likely to believe that we might engage in strategic nuclear use before the issue at stake becomes clearly existential since it invites massive retaliation. At this point, deterrence has failed.⁴ Let me therefore state it as a proposition that: “Nuclear deterrence is not credible unless underpinned by credible conventional deterrence.”

This was broadly the position during the Cold War. Both sides had large and capable conventional forces whose capability and readiness ensured that a doctrine of flexible response had substance and, importantly, allowed each action of an opponent to be matched, and the next rung of the escalation ladder to be covered. Consequently, the nuclear threshold was not reached until national survival itself was threatened, it was credible in terms of proportionality, and was the inevitable and predictable
next step. So, a broad range of conventional capability which could survive a first attack and still inflict punishment was critical to the credibility of deterrence as a whole.⁵

The Current Position

It appears that the UK no longer has the necessary capability and readiness in most of the areas, both civil and military, set out in my Ten Points above. It is also clear that the planned new capabilities announced somewhat extravagantly in the 2021 Integrated Review (IR),⁶ before the outbreak of the Ukraine War and the obvious increase in the threat from Russia, are under serious financial and personnel pressure, whilst force levels have already declined below those outlined in that IR. There is also good reason to deduce from the experience in Ukraine that our weapon arsenals are wholly insufficient for large scale modern conventional warfare and that there are gaps too in our defensive capabilities.⁷ In brief – are we really ready for the prolongation of the Ukraine War, with attendant losses, or for another conflict more directly threatening to us?

Of course, a principal reason for this situation is that we have greatly reduced our defence expenditure in the 30 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have a notional target of spending 2% of GDP on defence, less than half of what we spent in the Cold War, and probably less than 2% on a like-for-like basis. That target is not related to what we can afford, but rather to what we choose to afford. Inevitably, this has resulted in much reduced force levels and a smaller defence industry.

It is worth recalling that successive governments of both colours have consistently said that the first duty of government is the defence of the realm, so one might expect that the resultant budget would be sensitive to the urgency of the threat which has, beyond doubt, markedly increased in the last decade and is now almost as great as during the height of the Cold War. Yet, despite some recent welcome increases, defence expenditure is only about 5% of total government spending,⁸ and at least four departments spend more.⁹ Is this consistent? More importantly, does it match, in concert with our Allies, the current threat level?

In January 2023 the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee (IRDC) published a report which showed that they have serious doubts.¹⁰ In particular (in common with many commentators including the present author) they do not believe that the IR of March 2021 was adequate for the current circumstances,¹¹ or provided a suitable template for defence policy in the threat environment in which we find ourselves and which, arguably, was already apparent in 2021. Indeed, there was an air of self-delusion about the IR, so that less than two years later, it is being re-examined, albeit under the same authorship.

The difficulty of long-term planning of defence force structure is that it can take a very long time to effect changes or increases. For example, the Royal Navy, on current projections, cannot recover even its 2021 destroyer and frigate force numbers in less than 10 years on current (possibly optimistic) forecasts. The other services have similar issues.¹² Unfortunately, as the last three defence reviews have shown, almost irreversible force reductions can be made overnight, whilst threat assessments can, as we have seen, change equally swiftly. This demands much more thorough and realistic planning of force structures than has been apparent for a long time and is a factor which needs to be given much greater weight in defence planning.

Equally importantly, it requires a healthy and efficient defence industry with a sufficient and stable stream of work to maintain an effective and skilled work force. An industry which has to survive on a stop/start programme cannot succeed. The IRDC felt strongly that the UK defence industry does not have the resilience necessary to sustain combat readiness.¹³ These are hardly new lessons – the Treasury ‘Ten Year Rule’ of the 1920s and 1930s presented a similar problem – but this lesson is forgotten or ignored. Finally, it is relevant that there has been, over a long period, a steady growth in International Law in the field of nuclear weapons, all of it broadly in pursuit of the obviously highly desirable, but very elusive, goal of total nuclear disarmament. The most recent and most radical instrument in this field is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which came into force in January 2021 and is therefore international law, having been signed so far by 92 states and ratified by 68. No nuclear weapons state, however, has yet signed or ratified the treaty and the US, UK and France have stated that that they do not intend “to sign, ratify or ever become party to it.”¹⁴

After stating that the instrument clearly disregarded the realities of the international security environment, they said accession to it was “incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.” This is unsurprising and may even be true, if unprovable. However, it is not a trivial matter that the countries which have been foremost in calling for states to behave in accordance with international law are prepared to disregard a treaty which is now international law. Arguably this undermines their credibility, although it would not be the first occasion on which nations have rejected inconvenient elements of international law. It does not sit easily with the ‘rules based international order’ which we frequently cite in respect
of other nations’ actions.

Naturally, this point has been registered by several lobbying organisations. Some of these are regularly dismissed as naïve or even hostile. Whilst this may be true in some cases, it is certainly far too dismissive to hold that anyone who disagrees with the UK government’s refusal to accept the TPNW is potentially malign, or even unaware of the risks involved.

Is our defence provision adequate?

Where does all this lead us? Consider first finance. The UK Government has for many years claimed that the nuclear deterrent absorbed only about 3% of the defence budget. If this ever was true, it is not true today. The evidence given to the IRDC showed that out of a planned MoD equipment budget of £230 bn over the next ten years, the Defence Nuclear Organisation absorbed £58 bn (just over 25%), the Army £41 bn, the Navy £38 bn and the RAF £36 bn. The IRDC noted that the IR of 2021 proposed an increase in the UK’s holding of nuclear warheads of around a third, compared with previous plans. They added that since no rationale had been offered for this, it was impossible to make sensible comment on it.¹⁵ Against this background, it is no longer possible to argue that the procurement of a new generation of ballistic nuclear missile submarines, and their warheads, does not, in a limited defence budget, have a deleterious effect on the conventional programme. There have, in addition, been suggestions that a new generation of missile rockets may need to be leased from the US and that new warheads will be required in due course, which would substantially increase the bill.¹⁶ Finally, it is already apparent that the maintenance in operational service of the existing Trident- equipped submarines is causing alarming pressure on personnel, training and finance in both the MoD and in industry. All this inevitably translates into pressure on the conventional programme.

Let us briefly consider the conventional force levels of the three services promised by the IR. Already, the force structures shown in that publication for 2021 have shrunk below the levels promised. In addition, the very ambitious increase in certain force levels promised by the IR have in several cases either been delayed or threatened with cancellation, despite the much- heightened conventional threat we now face. Our defence support and industrial base has shrunk despite promises in the IR that, for instance, warship building is a key capability.¹⁷ Moreover, it is clear that the IR’s proposals to station UK forces in small ‘penny packets’ globally offer a dangerous hostage to fortune and would further reduce our capability and readiness in Europe, should more Russian adventurism occur.

In addition, UK ammunition stocks, as well as numbers of heavy equipments, have been greatly depleted by manufacturing problems, reluctance to build up war stocks, and by loans and gifts to Ukraine; it is reasonable to assume that there will be combat losses, and that there will be a considerable shortfall in the UK’s conventional inventory, fighting capability and sustainability unless urgent work is undertaken to replace items so far expended.¹⁸ There is, as yet, little sign of this. Indeed, in current economic conditions, there will surely be further pressure on the existing Defence budget and therefore on force levels, capability and readiness. The IRDC regards addressing this as an urgent priority.¹⁹

This leads to the conclusion that it is likely to become extremely difficult and probably unaffordable within current provision, to maintain a sufficient deterrent capability in all three of the conventional, hybrid and nuclear capabilities, and that, without very significant additional financial, industrial, recruiting and training efforts, it is very likely to become necessary to choose between these things. Certainly, the IDRC seems to think so:

“The Committee believes that all aspects of public spending should be scrutinised by Parliament and that the Government is too often reluctant to admit the scale of expenditure by citing security concerns. We call on the Government to consider allowing Parliamentary Committees responsible for scrutiny of the UK’s defence policy to access (on a confidential basis) information about how funds are allocated and spent on, for example, the nuclear deterrent. The announcement that both the Integrated Review and
the Defence Command Paper will be updated provides an opportunity for the Government to outline clearly how it plans to translate the aspirational language into practice. The Government has to outline what it wants to prioritise and which hard choices it is willing to make to fulfil those aspirations. The Integrated Review did not provide such priorities. Therefore, the Defence Command Paper lacked the required focus.”²⁰

What are the choices to be faced?

Where do these choices lie? It is the burden of this paper, and appears to be an implied conclusion of the IRDC report, that the most important choice lies between our strategic nuclear and our declining conventional capabilities. Both are very expensive, technologically very demanding, and require a sufficient force structure, a sufficient quantity of highly trained personnel, high levels of engineering support and logistics, and adequate war stocks, all of which are in short supply,²¹ in addition to high operational availability if they are to act as an effective deterrent to potential enemies. We should bear in mind that the most recent IMF forecasts²² for the United Kingdom economy are discouraging and the prospects of any significant increase in the spending power of the Defence Budget seem slim. This bodes ill for the defence industrial base and our ability to sustain military operations.

Of course, the United Kingdom is a member of a large and politically effective Alliance, NATO. The key question therefore is which choice is of most value to the Alliance and the defence of European NATO. This Alliance is heavily dependent on the United States contribution, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, both tactical and more particularly strategic, where about 98% of NATO’s capability is in US hands. It is a critical assumption that the United States’ strategic nuclear guarantee will always be a last resort for all NATO nations. The principal role of European NATO states must then be, as I have suggested above, the provision of a credible, capable, interoperable, ready conventional deterrent. It has long been a complaint of the US government that Europe’s conventional forces are seriously inadequate.

Largely for historical reasons, two European nations, the UK and France, have maintained (with some difficulty in the UK’s case) very small, independent strategic nuclear forces. In the UK at least, the independence is somewhat nuanced, given that the UK has a continuing heavy dependence for key elements of their capability on the USA. Nevertheless, these are forces capable of inflicting at least some serious damage on an adversary if they survive a first strike. It is impossible, for this author at least, to imagine any circumstances in which the UK would contemplate first use of strategic nuclear weapons, given the likely consequences, and it is very difficult to believe that the United States would relish any European nation beginning a nuclear exchange.

This last thought also occurred to the distinguished US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara and was shared in a remarkable commencement address he made at the University of Michigan on 16 June 1962 [McNamara’s famous ‘No Cities’ speech advocating counterforce doctrine – Ed.]:

“… given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for any enemy… as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made highly unlikely. Second, and equally important, the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place… nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis… We must hope all sides will understand this danger, and refrain from steps that even raise the possibility of such a mutually disastrous misunderstanding… The US has come to the conclusion that… principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s forces, not of his civilian population… relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. If a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre- emptive first strike against it… the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide… the creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all its attendant dangers. In short limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent…”²³

The implications of McNamara’s speech are, in this author’s long held view, clear and remain valid. The US had then, has now, and is likely to continue in the future to have more than sufficient strategic nuclear capability and would wish to retain control over the manner of any use of it. This is hardly surprising.

However, this is a tough pill to swallow. It is, of course, easy to say either that things have changed since that speech, or that the US might at some point no longer be relied upon to provide this nuclear umbrella to NATO and that an independent strategic nuclear capability provides insurance against these possibilities. But this is to cast doubt on the raison d’etre of NATO and its ability to function and is a whole new ball game. If we believe that this is a possibility, the costs of compensating for it would be astronomic and not only in the nuclear field. It is not, and it is difficult to see how it could ever be, in the US interest to fail its treaty obligations in such a way. Should it ever occur, it would demand an immediate massive increase in the conventional force capabilities of European NATO countries, as well as a reconsideration of European nuclear capability. This would be a very lengthy and expensive task. It is difficult to imagine any European government being willing, or even able, to contemplate such an undertaking. It is, therefore, far more important to make sure that the US remains persuaded that Europe is prepared to provide a credible and effective conventional deterrent to prevent war breaking out in the first place and to contain it if it does, effectively strengthening the credibility of the US strategic deterrent in Europe.

This, self-evidently, means a more robust and visibly capable conventional force than that in place on 24 February 2022, or than we can generate at any time in the near future. For the UK, unless substantial additional defence funding is made available, the choice seems to be between continuing with the current SSBN successor programme, and other related expenditure, or making a substantial increase in conventional force strength. This would not necessarily invalidate continuing the building of the Dreadnought-class submarines which could be diverted to the Fleet Submarine role, or configured as missile firing submarines (SSGNs), thus usefully increasing the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet. A significant increase in conventional force levels might also make the Integrated Review’s aspiration for wider global deployments more realistic than it is at present, if it is still desired to make them.

To pretend that this is a simple choice would be mistaken. Equally mistaken would be to deny that, unless much greater funding were available, there is a choice to be made, with critical consequences for our future security. It demands serious strategic thought, courageous and honest recognition of our national circumstances, an end to self- delusion and a careful assessment of all the risks involved. In a word, it demands statesmanship of a high order, something of a rarity today. It is a highly contentious issue, arousing strong emotions and opinions. Since Russia understands only strength, the best solution is a substantial, sustained defence budget increase. Given the likely mid-term economic outlook, procuring a new generation of a strategic nuclear deterrent, together with the restoration of a genuinely credible conventional force will require considerable financial sacrifice. Sadly, promising the fruits of economic growth is not the same thing as achieving them.

If we are to retain credible deterrent capabilities, a difficult and courageous choice must be made. The urgent question facing our defence planning is this: Have we the political vision, honesty and courage to make a realistic strategic choice, construct a credible deterrent framework and match our military and industrial resources with a stable budget sufficient to implement the choice we make? Or will we follow the dangerous but well-beaten track, and continue to fudge the issue?

Pictured are Commando Forces skiing through the trees during their Cold Weather Winter Warfare Course at Malselv. Royal Marines have deployed to Northern Norway to carry out their traditional winter deployment in the Arctic Circle. Commandos will refresh skills in surviving, moving, and fighting across the ice. This year, Royal Navy ships will join Royal Marines for the large-scale Norwegian-led exercise COLD RESPONSE.

Footnotes

1
It must be made very clear that, in this paper, the word ‘conventional’ is taken to
mean all forms of conventional warfare and all the various forms of hybrid warfare in both military and civil arenas which do not involve nuclear weapon use.
2
Reported on Sky News on 30 January 2023, cf < https://news.sky.com/story/us-general-warns-british-armyno-longer-top-level-fighting-forcedefence-sources-reveal-12798365> (accessed 31 January 2023)
3
<https://www.wandsworthguardian.co.uk/news/national/23287098.british-army-in-urgent-needrecapitalisation-defence-minister-admits/> (accessed on 31 January 2023)
4
After much thought and involvement with the concept of sub-strategic use of Trident, the author finds the concept incredible. Since both superpowers have the capability to launch a retaliatory strike on detection of any incoming ballistic weapon, it seems impossible to claim that sub-strategic use of Trident is viable.
5
For a most useful detailed discussion of 64 Articles: Shaping the Future escalation and its dangers see Strategy, Freedman l., OUP 2016, chapter 13
6
Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, Command Paper 403, 16 March 2021
7
One obvious example is that we have very little defence against some of the missiles which the Russians have deployed in Ukraine.
8
Including local authority spending.
9
< https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/
brief-guides-and-explainers/publicfinances/> (accessed 30 January 2023)
10
UK Defence Policy; from aspiration to reality
HL Paper 124, published 12 January 2023
11
IRDC report Op Cit pp 20-1
12
News reports on 30 January suggest that the UK Army cannot maintain one fully capable division in the field.
13
IRDC report Op it pp 74-75, paras 369-371
14
This despite the statement that “The UK remains committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons,” cf Government Fact Sheet The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent; What you need to know, 17 February 2022
15
IRDC report Op Cit. p45
16
The costs of this do not yet appear to be in the public domain.
17
I have in mind such things as the long delays to the refit of HMS Vanguard, the problems of the Army’s Ajax programme, the defect issues that have affected new ship building, problems with pilot training, low stocks of some weapons and ammunition with little capacity to surge production. Most notably the Type 32 frigate announced in the IR as the key to maintaining the
shipbuilding industry appears to have disappeared with no explanation.
18
Cf Minister Armed Forces statement on 30 January 2023, noted above.
19
Cf IRDC report Op Cit, pp82-83, paras 61-64
20
IRDC Report, Op cit, p6, my emphasis
21
Cf recent reports of poor engineering work standards during the refit of HMS Vanguard
22
< https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/01/31/world-economicoutlook-update-january-2023 >(accessed 31 January 2023)
23
Extracts from his Commencement address, University of Michigan 16 June
1962 < https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/deterrence/no-cities-speech.html > (accessed 25 January 2023), my emphasis. See also;<https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2011/June%202011/0611keeperfull.pdf > ; < https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/deterrence/no-cities-speech.html >

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