News & Views
The latest news and views in the UK Military Maritime Arena.
Ed. The author criticises the Future Commando Force (FCF) concept as a narrow misreading of the Royal Marines’ traditional combined arms and amphibious roles. A 20 minute read.
Ed. Our correspondent, an expert on the fate of Force Z, responds to Bruce Pascoe’s analysis of Admiral Tom Phillips’ decision-making during the Malay oki kaisen.
Ed. The author considers explanations for the disparity in casualty figures between the Allied landing zones during Operation NEPTUNE. A combination of command over-confidence, improper use of specialized equipment, and ineffective fire support are all evident. A 5 minute read.
Ed. The author examines the importance of cultivating clear strategy and deploying balanced fleets in the Baltic operations of the Crimean War and Russian Civil War. In both cases the Royal Navy was engaged blockading enemy ports and striking at their harbours, frequently without direct orders from London, and with profound consequences for the national consciousness of the region. The parallels for today’s littoral operations in the Baltic and Black Sea are obvious. A 40 minute read.
Ed. The author questions how the MoD organises strategic direction and employs the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ): The MoD has an institutional tendency to be overly centralised and does not use its Joint commander effectively. Force structures should flow from defined operational objectives and not the other way around. A 10 minute read.
Ed. ‘NIHL RHYFEL’
In Spring 2023, Lt Col Cripsin Black’s book Too Thin for a Shroud was published. In it he defends robustly 5 Bde’s C2 and the Welsh Guards’ who were still on board the LSLs RFA Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram on 8 June 1982 when they were attacked by the Argentinian Air Force during the Falklands conflict. Over 40 years after the event the opportunity for many, both Green and Navy Blue involved in these events no longer exists, however, the authors of the following article layout the reasons why they seriously disagree with the book’s suggestions. The Naval Review is an ideal place to hold this rebuttal on record for the benefit of those that wish to study Operation CORPORATE, Amphibious Operations and the fog of war (nihl rhyfel). The following is a review essay dissecting Black’s claims. A 50 minute read.
Ed. The Royal Navy not only logistically enabled Wellington’s campaigns during the Peninsular War, but also acted as a force-multiplier during the critical operations at Cadiz, Lisbon and elsewhere. Originally published in 2010 [98/4, p. 385]. A 30 minute read.
Ed. In 2012 [100/2, p. 154] the author considered the history of the Japanese attack on Darwin of 19 February 1942 as a comparison for possible Chinese air operations in the 21st century. As was the case with Pearl Harbor, a surprise attack by long-range air assets raised questions about the security of bases in the region. A 20 minute read.
Ed. The Battle of Taranto of 11-12 November 1940 was an epoch defining event in the history of naval aviation and a decisive moment for the Fleet Air Arm. With the 83rd anniversary of the battle in mind, we reproduce here an American perspective on the Royal Navy’s pioneering development of aircraft carriers and the lessons for naval doctrine this history demonstrates. Originally published in July 1994 [82/3, p. 260]. A 30 minute read.