News, Articles and Comment

Ed. Persistent personnel and procurement challenges leads the author to question the viability of Continuous At Sea Deterrence and raise concern over the future of the SSN-AUKUS program.

Ed. The Royal Navy not only logistically enabled Wellington’s campaigns during the Peninsular War, but also acted as a force-multiplier during the critical operations at Cadiz, Lisbon and elsewhere. Originally published in 2010 [98/4, p. 385]. A 30 minute read.

Ed. The author expands on Lt Cdr Lester May’s research concerning the victualling of a Dreadnought-class warship at the beginning of the 20^th century. The proliferation of commodities supplied representing without doubt a vast logistical undertaking. A 25 minute read.

Ed. The author investigates the perhaps surprising legacy of early 20^th century warship provisioning. While the cornucopia of commodities required to provision a Dreadnought-class battleship is to be expected, the long duration and haphazard nature of the victualing system emphasizes historical continuity and institutional ossification in an otherwise transformative era. A 30 minute read.

Ed. Sixteen years ago, in response to a History Today article for the 66^th anniversary of the Battle of Britain, Rules of the Game author Andrew Gordon examined the question of the strategic significance of the air battle (in which FAA pilots took part), and emphasized the RN’s role in stopping the German invasion before it could begin. Republished here from NR 95/1 for the 83^rd anniversary of the Battle. A 15 minute read.

Ed. In July 1997 (NR 85/3, p. 202) Lt G D Franklin reviewed the experience of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) in the war against Japan, observing that, although the valuable combat lessons paid dividends in Korea, by the time of the Falklands conflict they had seemingly been forgotten. Republished here for the 78^th anniversary of VJ Day. A 25 minute read.

Ed. With a laudable desire for linguistic clarity worthy of David Watkin Waters, Dr Mark Barton considers the language barrier impacting the cultivation of Joint and Service-wide consensus of concept meaning in operational planning. A 10 minute read.

Ed. In his analysis of strategic lessons to be drawn from the Second World War [40/4. p. 432], Captain S. W. Roskill, RN, wrote, “It took much ‘sad experience’ to show that Malta could have been properly defended and could have been kept in use as a base.” Roger Plumtree reconsiders the Maltese narrow margin with the question in mind: was Roskill wrong? A 15 minute read.