News, Articles and Comment

Ed. Many leading Arctic nations are engaging programmes to build more icebreakers or to otherwise modernise or refit their icebreaking capability. China is an emerging polar nation with icebreakers and an overall presence in the Arctic only set to increase – and perhaps to overtake existing Russian Arctic dominance. A 20 minute read.

Ed. The author challenges the use of ‘seablindness’ in the sea power lexicon as negative and ineffectual, proposing instead that the RN should engage with an ‘ocean literacy’ framework to promote an understanding and awareness of why the seas are important. A 10 minute read.

Ed. The Arctic, containing vast mineral and energy resources and strategically located transoceanic sea routes, is situated to become a vital flank in renewed global great power competition. Is Britain’s strategy keeping up? A 10 minute read.

Ed. The author, BMT’s Global Head of Innovation and Research, argues that the robotics revolution has introduced new air defence and anti-submarine tactical options, with implications for platform survivability and systems economy – but only if naval planners act to fully integrate marine autonomy. A 5 minute read.

Ed. The author responds to Brock West’s recent article in the NR, examining the question of sea level rise for the Pacific islands.

Ed. Extreme weather events and climate change have increased the stakes for regional engagement in the South Pacific, with China and the US vying for strategic influence. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) will need renewed investment to continue tackling climate emergencies. A 35 minute read.

Ed. The fourth article in our series from BRNC Pellew Division officer cadets, here the author considers the potential implications for world trade as the Arctic sea routes become increasingly viable. The Royal Navy has a role to play, but faces strategic diversions that marginalize the development of a long-term Arctic strategy. A 10 minute read.

Ed. The author questions the ability of the Allies to successfully deter future Russian sub-threshold or hybrid operations, with narrow deterrence having failed both in Syria and Salisbury. The deniability of attacks on vulnerable undersea cables and infrastructure has been clearly demonstrated over the past two years. A 20 minute read.

Ed. The author notes the danger of assuming unimpeded access for the RFA’s Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ships (MROSS) to contested waters in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.