News, Articles and Comment

Ed. Did the Second World War begin on 18 September 1931, when the Japanese staged a false flag event known as the Mukden Incident, a fabricated pretext to justify their invasion of Manchuria? From 1931 to 1937, they engaged in skirmishes in mainland China, indeed, Japan achieved major victories capturing Beijing and Shanghai by 1937. Or did it begin with the advent of what is now known as the Second Sino-Japanese War after the first battle of the war – the Marco Polo Bridge incident on 7 July 1937? The Japanese and Chinese opened fire upon each other after a Japanese soldier went missing. This prompted a full-scale Japanese invasion of the rest of China. Or, as we in Europe prefer, with the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939?

BRE. The latest book review is now available. It considers a book examining the naval aspects of the campaign to liberate the Philippines following the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Ed. The third article from the NR archives in our series on Operation OVERLORD for the 80^th Anniversary. The author considered the development of combined operations, logistics and equipment as background on the OVERLORD planning process. Originally published in January 1961 [49/1, p. 18]. A 30 minute read.

As the 80th anniversary of D-Day approaches, and following on from Normandy, The Sailors’ Story, the review of which was published […]

Ed. From our archives for the 80^th Anniversary of D-Day, the Naval Review presents the first of a series of articles on Operation OVERLORD. This article, a retrospective on the preparations and naval bombardment from the perspective of Force E flagship HMS Belfast, was originally published in 1994 [82/2, p. 102], for the 50^th Anniversary. A 15 minute read.

Ed. Our correspondent considers some of the formidable challenges the PLAN would need to overcome to make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a realistic proposition, and the long-term hybrid warfare alternatives to which the PRC may turn. A 10 minute read.

Ed. The author criticises the Future Commando Force (FCF) concept as a narrow misreading of the Royal Marines’ traditional combined arms and amphibious roles. A 20 minute read.

Ed. The author considers explanations for the disparity in casualty figures between the Allied landing zones during Operation NEPTUNE. A combination of command over-confidence, improper use of specialized equipment, and ineffective fire support are all evident. A 5 minute read.

Ed. The author explores the PQ17 disaster, questioning First Sea Lord Dudley Pound’s decision to scatter the convoy in the face of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine threats. The principles of mission command should have left the decision to the convoy commanders. A 25 minute read.