Destroyers – A Review

In this article an attempt is made to review the performance of destroyers since their introduction, with particular regard to their main function as fighting units in a fleet. The destroyer has become so versatile and her uses for every naval purpose from minesweeping to troop transport (alas, as often as not for evacuation) so widespread that any consideration of subsidiary uses has had to be omitted. The first torpedo boat was produced in 1877 and was Thorneycroft No. 1 or Lightning, a boat of 27 tons, 84 ft long, but Cusack Smith, writing in ‘Our Warships’ published in 1886 says, “Whether travelling torpedoes will be found to possess their anticipated value and to admit of successful employment in actual warfare remains for the present a matter of opinion… Nor can it be said that the torpedo boat filling the required conditions has yet an existence.”

The torpedo boat was originally designed for torpedo attack on enemy ships, possibly or preferably in harbour, by night. This was, of course, due to the indifferent technical performance, by modern standards, of the torpedo and, moreover, the necessary close approach in face of gunfire was considered to be impracticable. A development of the torpedo boat was the torpedo gunboat, also called ‘a torpedo catcher’. These ships were really intended to be seagoing destroyers, hence their size and the high forecastles of the later ships. Rattlesnake, Sharpshooter and Harrier-classes were typical of the type, displacing 525-1,070 tons with speeds of 18-19 kts, and armed with 4-inch or 4.7-inch guns and three to five 14-in. or 18-in. tubes. Actually, the French ‘Bombe’ was the first of this type, but much less heavily armed. These vessels were too large for use as torpedo boats and not large or fast enough for defensive purposes. By 1895, in the torpedo boat category, there were 82 ships of various types and classes.

The first true torpedo boat destroyer, Havock, was produced by Yarrow in 1893, as a defence against the torpedo boat, and was of 240 tons, 27 kts and 180 ft long. It was soon realized that the TBD herself could assume the function of the torpedo boat if she carried torpedoes and from this time the destroyer’s function was tending to become primarily that of torpedo attack on an enemy fleet and, secondarily, defence against enemy torpedo-carrying craft. Finally, after 1914, escorting functions were also added so that the destroyer became the most versatile and useful vessel in the fleet. This parentage of the destroyer has had its disadvantages, as the requirement to provide the guns for the counter-offensive armament leads to the limitation of the equipment of torpedoes and tubes to carry out its main function. An interesting parallel which may be mentioned is that of the Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) and Motor Gun Boat (MGB) which appeared in World War I1 to go through much the same process with the same discussions regarding the relative requirements of gun and torpedo armaments and their combination.

Night attacks remained the primary form of offensive action till World War I, but by the outbreak of war the daylight flotilla attack had been made possible by the increased range and speed of torpedoes. Eventually the daylight attack came to be considered less chancy than the night attack with its attendant difficulties of finding the enemy and communicating the position to other attacking forces. Night attacks remained as a possible form of action, but to be undertaken rather when opportunity offered than one which was sought, though, as will be seen later, there was a tendency by the British to keep the destroyer for defensive purposes by day and rely on the gunpower of the fleet for the destruction of the enemy battle fleet. Admiral Beatty’s views in 1913, which were believed to be in accord with those of Admiral Callaghan, then C-in-C, were published in the Naval Review in the form of a letter [38/4, p. 400] and may be summarised as: (a) the proper vessels to counterattack enemy destroyers and torpedo boats were light cruisers, not destroyers; (b) the primary use for destroyers was to deliver a concentrated torpedo attack on enemy battleships if possible before enemy destroyers did the same thing.

The destroyer developed rapidly during World War I and the bulk built during the war were of the Admiralty M-class, with two sets of twin tubes, three 4-in. guns and 34 kts speed. Later the V and W-classes were produced with two sets of triple tubes and four 4-in. and later 4.7-in. guns and about 32 kts speed. While the flotilla attack was still the major task of destroyers in a fleet action, their day-to-day duties were those of A/S escorts and for this purpose they were armed with depth charges. No adequate hydrophone or asdic was developed and the A/S control arrangements were primitive; indeed, in the latter part of the war, some destroyers carried kite balloons for look-out purposes.

At the beginning of World War I destroyers made torpedo attacks in the Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1914 and, later, at Jutland. In the former battle, torpedoes were fired at cruisers, no hits were obtained but the destroyers sank one enemy destroyer by gunfire. At Jutland the first destroyer attacks were made by the Battle Cruiser Fleet’s destroyers, which attacked about 4 pm when ordered by Admiral Beatty. Owing to a long period of steaming at high speed the flotillas were in some confusion and were met by the German destroyers, also trying to attack. The British destroyers were more heavily armed with guns than the German ships and got the better of the destroyer action, sinking two German destroyers; but their attack on the German Fleet, though carried out, was ineffective. Four attacks in all were made.

A German attack on flotilla scale was launched on the Grand Fleet at 7.10 pm. This caused the British Fleet to turn away; about 20 torpedoes are reported to have crossed the line but no hits were obtained. This attack had a considerable effect on the battle and in spite of its lack of material success it was one of the circumstances which enabled the German Fleet to break off the action. In all, the Germans made seven daylight attacks. During the night five attacks were made by Grand Fleet flotillas on the German Fleet, but as its position was largely unknown these attacks were more in the nature of chance encounters. The situation was generally very confused, but 45 torpedoes were fired and an old battleship (Pommern) was sunk with one hit.

The contrasting use of destroyers made by the British and German Fleets at Jutland is interesting. Apart from the Battle Cruiser Fleet’s flotillas the Grand Fleet flotillas were not launched on a daylight attack, though whether they were deliberately kept for counter-attacking is not clear. Lord Jellicoe in a speech after being relieved as C-in-C in 1917 said: “The torpedo as fired from surface vessels is effective certainly up to 10,000 yards range; and this requires that a ship shall keep beyond that distance to fight his (own) guns.” There certainly seems to have been a difference in policy between the handling of the Battle Cruiser Fleet’s flotillas, which were launched in accordance with Admiral Beatty’s views of 1913 already quoted, and the apparently defensive role which they played during daylight under Admiral Jellicoe. As the total casualties due to torpedoes, presumably fired by destroyers, in the battle were, on the German side, Pommern and Rostock sunk and on the British side Marlborough hit and Shark sunk, Lord Jellicoe’s words seem unduly flattering to the destroyers. The absence of material damage to the British Fleet is remarkable, especially as the German torpedo boats were more heavily armed with torpedoes than the British destroyers. This may possibly be attributed to the fact that the tracks were very visible (one account says 2 1/2 miles), and the relatively low speed of the torpedoes by modern standards.

In casualties to destroyers the British suffered more than the Germans with seven against four sunk and seven against one out of action. This was due to the damage inflicted by the German battle line on our destroyers in the night action. The principal achievement of the destroyer at Jutland was the great tactical success brought about by the German destroyer attack at 7 pm, in causing the British Fleet to turn away. In spite of the lack of hits, the consequences of this attack may have had a great part in denying us victory in the greatest sea battle since Trafalgar. In the period between the wars, particularly in the 1920s, the massed flotilla attack in which three flotillas attacked the enemy battle fleet from different positions on the bow, was a much-practised form of battle. It presupposed an enemy battle fleet committed to a gun action and, as it was not possible to cover all courses of action open to the enemy, the torpedoes could be avoided by a very drastic alteration or reversal of course. The forcing of such an action, however, was considered to constitute a considerable tactical advantage, as indeed had been demonstrated at Jutland.

While the necessity of firing a very large number of torpedoes for success in these long-range attacks was accepted in principle, the majority of destroyers carried only six torpedoes and it was not till later that quadruple and quintuple tubes were introduced. By this time improvements in gunnery had made it necessary to fire torpedoes from a longer range, so the increases produced little or no increased density of torpedoes through the target line. The A/S side was developed continuously after the advent of the asdic and the depth charge armament correspondingly increased. The gun armament also improved and in the 1930s, with the introduction of adequate fire control, became for the first time a formidable weapon, particularly as it rendered the control largely independent of movements of one’s own ship.

As the Germans had no battle fleet on the lines of that in World War I the massed destroyer attack, while still in theory available as a form of battle, had largely fallen into disuse before World War II and by the outbreak of war the emphasis for the destroyer had shifted to her escort functions. At first the A/S escort role was very adequately performed, but the same cannot be said of AA duties, in which respect our ships proved lamentably deficient in that they could not protect themselves, still less a convoy. The destroyer was, of course, constantly used for every possible naval duty but, undoubtedly, the primary one was that of anti-submarine escort. No massed attacks as practised between the wars were attempted, because there was no enemy battle fleet.

The first important night attacks on a major unit in World War II were carried out by Cossack (Capt Vian) with Maori, Sikh, Zulu and Piorun (the latter apparently did not attack) on Bismarck. Sixteen torpedoes were fired at ranges varying from 4,000-9,000 yards. Two hits were credited at the time, but it is now believed none were obtained. The weather and radar-controlled gunfire from Bismarck prevented the co-ordinated attack as planned coming off and, in consequence, torpedoes were fired in groups of two to four, which is not a sufficiently large salvo to ensure success at these ranges. The shadowing work performed by these destroyers was, however, very valuable. A daylight destroyer attack by Worcester (Commander Pizey) and five other old destroyers was made on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, but the main armament of the enemy not being otherwise engaged the destroyers came under heavy fire. They were also subject to air attack.

Although hits were claimed, it seems doubtful if these were in fact obtained and the attack, though carried out with great gallantry and determination, cannot be classed as effective. The destroyers were much handicapped by lack of speed and were not heavily armed with torpedoes. A remarkable action in which Capt Sherbrooke in Onslow, with four more destroyers, held off Hipper and Lutzow with six German destroyers from a Russian convoy occurred in December 1942, and is a very fine example of the handling of destroyers against a superior enemy. Captain Sherbrooke alternately threatened the enemy with an attack and then drew him away from the convoy and was thus able to divert his attention and hold him off sufficiently long for help to arrive from the 6-in. cruisers.

In December 1943, Saumarez, Savage, Scorpion and Stord carried out a series of attacks on Scharnhorst after she had been damaged by gunfire. Again, the destroyers were unable to be supported by cruisers or battleships and they faced the enemy’s main armament but, in spite of this, closed to close range. In this attack three hits were obtained and were instrumental in slowing the ship, which was finished off by a torpedoes from Jamaica after further gun damage by Duke of York. In December 1941, Sikh (Commander Stokes) with Maori, Legion and the Netherland destroyer Isaac Sweers with co-operating aircraft encountered and sank two Italian cruisers, one being hit by four torpedoes and one by one. In addition, one torpedo boat was sunk and one damaged. This was a remarkably quick and successful action and one of the best of its type.

In May 1945, possibly the most technically advanced and completely successful night attack of the war was made by Captain Power in Saumarez who, with four other destroyers, attacked and destroyed the 8-in. Japanese cruiser Haguro off Penang. Our destroyers were equipped with radar in this action, which may be taken as the culminating point of the lessons learnt in the night destroyer actions of the war. It was, of course, made possible by our superior equipment, which enabled the destroyers to surround the enemy and attack simultaneously from all directions. In our hands destroyers played a part in the destruction of Scharnhorst, but the type did not demonstrate its superiority as it did in the case of Commander Stokes’ and Captain Power’s actions. If destroyers had been able to obtain a few more hits, Bismarck and Gneisenau might have been sunk in their attacks. Space has precluded the mention of the details of the actions of destroyers in attacks on convoys in the Mediterranean where, in company with cruisers, they were very successful.

The Japanese paid great attention to their destroyer (and torpedo) design and accorded them a higher place in the striking power of the fleet than was given to them by other countries. Some of their destroyers were indeed amongst the largest and most powerful afloat [40/1, p. 53] and their 24-in. oxygen torpedo was probably the best of its type in the world and, carried in cruisers and the bigger destroyers, was used at times with devastating results. Evidence of the importance which they attached to destroyers is to be found in their organisation; each flotilla of 12 ships was commanded by a rear-admiral in a cruiser, whose duty lay in directing without necessarily taking part in the attack. The Asashio–Kagero group and the Takanami-class of fleet destroyers, built between 1939 and 1944 were a fine class. They carried six 5-in. guns in turrets and eight 21-in. tubes in enclosed shields. The Japanese also produced specialised AA destroyers and the Terutsuki-class, a cheap ‘Dido’-class, with eight 4-in. high-angle high velocity guns, four 24-in. torpedoes with a speed of 33 kts at 3,500 tons. The high point of Japanese destroyer building was achieved in the experimental Shimakaze laid down in April,1941 and completed in 1943. On 2,600 tons she mounted three twin 5-in. and three sets of 24-in. quintuple tubes with a speed of 39 1/2 knots. This was the heaviest torpedo armament ever fitted to a destroyer. Certain Japanese destroyers carried reload torpedoes and these proved, at least on one occasion, to be a very unpleasant surprise in destroyers returning to deliver a second attack. We have never carried reload torpedoes in our ships, though in World War I a spare torpedo was carried in destroyers and was occasionally reloaded. By 1941, threequarters of the 105 Japanese destroyers in service were five- or six-gun boats firing six to nine torpedoes. The Americans had eight-gun destroyers, thus more heavily armed, but only a few, most being four-gun types. The Americans had a few 16-tube destroyers, but no nation had torpedoes to match the Japanese.[1]

At the beginning of the war with Japan it was a most unpleasant surprise for the Allies to find such excellence in sea warfare which resulted in the earlier successes the Japanese achieved. These successes were most pronounced in the field of night fighting and the combination of cruisers and destroyers acting together; the torpedo in Japanese hands was a particularly potent weapon. The Japanese ships never had radar, though later they had radar search receivers which they turned to good account as this apparatus gave warning of, and probably a rough bearing on, our forces using radar. The first shock of the war in this direction was in the Battle of the Java Seas (February 1942), when the Allies under Admiral Doorman were defeated and Exeter with other ships was sunk. Here Japanese torpedo fire from destroyers supported by the gun fire from cruisers was the principal cause of sinking. Morison[2] says, referring to this defeat, “The main factors, any of which doomed him (Admiral Doorman) to defeat, were his almost complete lack of air power… and the enemy’s vast superiority in torpedo material and tactics.”

This success was repeated at the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942, when the US and Australian forces covering the landing at Guadalcanal under Rear-Admiral Crutchley, were surprised at night by a Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers.[3] Radar failed to detect the Japanese, primarily due to land echoes, but also due to its somewhat primitive state. We lost three cruisers, including Canberra, but it is not clear exactly what part was due to destroyers and their torpedoes. The Japanese torpedoes were, however, very effective. At Kula Gulf on the 5^th of July, fortune started to move in our favour, and the Japanese with nine destroyers were, in turn, surprised by Helena, two other cruisers and four destroyers. The action developed into a duel between American gunfire versus Japanese torpedoes. After gaining an initial advantage, Helena was sunk and St. Louis was lucky to be hit by a torpedo which did not explode. American destroyers fired 24 torpedoes and two Japanese destroyers were sunk and five damaged, but the exact part played by the American destroyers is not known.

At Kolombangara on the 12^th of July, the new pattern of destroyer night action was beginning to be shaped towards its ultimate great improvement, though in this action the Japanese were helped by radar search receivers. O’Bannion, a US destroyer, Leander and other ships fired torpedoes and guns first, sinking the Japanese cruiser Jintu and damaging four destroyers, but again the Japanese were successful with torpedo damage to Honolulu, St. Louis and Leander. In this action our radar was beginning to be effectively used, but we had not yet got the measure of the enemy destroyers and their torpedoes, but at Vella Lavella on the 6^th of August, six US destroyers under Commander Moosbrugger, fired 24 torpedoes on a radar sighting and waited for the run before opening fire with guns, thus sinking three enemy destroyers. In November 1942, US destroyers at Tassafaronga again fired torpedoes but only waited one minute before disclosing their presence to an enemy force of six destroyers and six transports. The enemy altered course and avoided the torpedoes, but fired in return and sank the Northampton and inflicted serious damage on three other cruisers, again showing the Japanese destroyer tactics to advantage. The US object was, however, achieved on this occasion as the Japanese transports withdrew.

This effort by the Japanese, in which they were apparently surprised, avoided the torpedoes and returned to attack and torpedo their enemy, can only be regarded with admiration. In all in these actions they sank and torpedoed nine Allied cruisers and seven or eight destroyers for a cost of one light cruiser and nine destroyers of their own. In tonnage they sank 33,000 tons of American and Allied warships and damaged 85,000 tons in exchange for 16,000 tons of cruisers and destroyers sunk and a similar tonnage damaged.

Although the Japanese were eventually defeated by US air, radar, gunnery and numbers, it must be admitted by any impartial observer that their ships and tactics were extraordinarily successful and it is worth while giving some consideration to the reasons. Their training must have been magnificent and their look-outs really first-class (to think that some of us thought they might be bad at night). Their torpedoes were probably the best in the world and they had, and this is very important, plenty of them. These reasons are sufficient to account for their successes.

Fortunately for us their successes were not maintained. Whole classes and flotillas of destroyers were lost in various operations. They were often misused as transports and the ships and crews replacing them were not up to the former standard and in the Battle of Leyte Gulf they were relatively ineffective. Japanese destroyers never played a very successful or prominent part in daylight actions, mainly because these actions were dominated by aircraft and aircraft carriers. Allied supremacy over the Japanese destroyer force was finally achieved later, mainly by American radar-controlled gunnery and, of course, air power. During the Pacific War the use of aircraft from carriers on a large scale, first by the Japanese in their Pearl Harbour attack and then by the Americans, revolutionised the application of sea power. This revolution has been carried further by the development of radar which not only increases the range of visibility by day and night but has also tremendously increased the accuracy of gunfire. Thus, the general pattern of the use of destroyers in World War II was primarily for escort and miscellaneous functions. Attacks on major units were carried out on a divisional rather than a flotilla scale with generally only limited success. Exception to this rule must be made for the Japanese.

Up till World War II the primary function of the destroyer was always stated to be “the attack of the enemy battlefleet with torpedoes.” It is now clear that the function of dealing with an enemy battlefleet has passed to the aircraft and that the day of a destroyer as a torpedo carrier is over. This appears to be the official view as it is generally accepted that the Darings are to be the last of the destroyers as we know them. Admiral Cunningham in ‘A Naval Odyssey’ referring to his tenure of office as First Sea Lord, says in 1943: “I thought and still think destroyers were much too large, carriers of radar and ratings, and though they could detect the appearance of every type of enemy on the sea, under the sea and in the air, they could do very little about it when in range because of their lack of gunpower… In justice it must be said that the destroyers were good ships for the abnormal sort of war that was being fought in the Pacific campaign, carrying an air war to enemy territory in aircraft carriers, with battleships and cruisers providing anti-aircraft protection for the carriers and destroyers and cruisers as the outer ring fence against aircraft and submarines.”

The Darings are really light cruisers, with six 4.7-in. guns and ten torpedoes and can be compared with the old C-class light cruisers of the 1914 war. The firepower of the guns is greater than is indicated by the mere statement of the figures because, since they are mounted in turrets, the rate of fire due to mechanical aids is greatly increased and the control much more accurate. The likelihood of a Daring being able to approach an enemy battleship (if there was one) by day or night seems remote when the experience of our destroyers against Bismarck and Japanese destroyers against American cruisers in the later stages of the Pacific war is recalled. Further, it is doubtful if such a ship really carries a sufficient number of torpedoes to make an attack effective from a range it might be possible to reach. It is, however, possible, though perhaps not likely, that the increased gunpower of the Daring-class, coupled with the radar equipped control might damage the control systems of an enemy battleship and allow a much closer approach than would normally be expected. It is not believed that there is any experience of an action in which a small vessel with first-class fire control equipment tackled a larger, therefore it is not possible to judge the likely outcome. As an A/S escort the Darings must be large, even bearing in mind the requirement for an excess of speed over the 25 knot S/M. As an A/A escort the ship should be valuable if expensive, but it may well be that it is impossible to produce a satisfactory AA escort unless guided missiles could be carried. For low angle and bombardment work the ship should perform the function of a small cruiser very well.

There remains the task of dealing with the commerce raider, which in any future war will have to be undertaken by a task force of carriers and cruisers or destroyers. The torpedo armament of a destroyer is unlikely to be of any great value in this role and therefore if the Daring-class were so employed it would be primarily for the duties of a small cruiser. It will probably be most desirable to have a ship of this or similar type without torpedoes for such duties and to take advantage of the numerous opportunities of combined attack on an enemy’s flank.

Looking back on the development of the torpedo boat into the Daring and Shimakaze it is noteworthy that the torpedo boat was designed with one object, the launching of torpedoes against an enemy fleet. This object was also clearly apparent in the Shimakaze with her fifteen torpedoes, but in the intervening classes over the years it has been the subject of a somewhat uneasy compromise. There has been the necessity of gunpower for use in counter-attack and the requirement to carry equipment for A/S and A/A escort duties, all of which has militated against fitting a torpedo armament which would really enable the destroyer to perform its main function and attack enemy capital ships with success. This lack of adequate numbers of torpedoes has been accentuated with every improvement in gunnery which has increased the range to which destroyers can penetrate by night and day. The British never seem to have really realised the necessity for numbers of torpedoes in a surface torpedo-carrying ship, a lesson which other nations, the Germans in World War I and the Japanese in World War II, had learnt.

Night has now been turned into day by radar and it seems to be quite unlikely that destroyers will ever get into a position to deliver a torpedo attack by night or day except by chance. It may be worthwhile carrying torpedoes for use as weapons of opportunity, but clearly the main function of a destroyer is no longer the destruction of TBs or the attack on battleships and aircraft carriers, but that of a destroyer of submarines and aircraft. In fact, Admiral Cunningham’s “abnormal” war has become normal. If this is accepted then we have seen the rise of the destroyer from a TB and its final change into an escort vessel, but it is interesting to speculate whether, if we had built our ships more in accordance with their avowed object and given them very much heavier torpedo armaments, they would have had a more decisive influence on naval tactics and battles. It can hardly be disputed that in spite of several notable successes by destroyers in sinking enemy units, their performance has been disappointing when compared, for example, with Japanese results. The fact that the gun in World War II also proved most disappointing as a means of sinking enemy capital ships (both Bismarck and Scharnhorst had to be finished off with torpedoes) does not alter this, yet the torpedo itself has been the most destructive weapon (not excepting the mine) used at sea. Perhaps we should have faced the issues more squarely and built torpedo-carrying destroyers lightly armed with guns with 12 or 16 tubes. Could we have had reloads by a revolutionary re-design keeping the torpedoes in some sort of magazine low down in the ship? Other destroyers would also have been required to be more heavily armed with guns, but with fewer tubes. By this means we might have added to our chances of successful attacks because we should have fired more torpedoes in one attack, but the requirements of general duties have always militated against specialised types.

There has also been a natural reluctance to place too much faith in a ‘one shot’ weapon carried in a surface ship so that in spite of the potentialities of the torpedo as a sinking weapon (one may reflect on our capital ship and aircraft carrier losses to see how effective it is) it has never been considered practicable to exploit them to the full. The deplorable habit of firing one or two torpedoes and keeping the remainder for a better opportunity may also have been responsible for some lack of success. Whether the main function of the destroyer has really been torpedo attack on enemy units or not, it seems as though the type in British hands has been too much of a compromise to be outstandingly successful in this role. The very name destroyer really refers to its secondary function of counterattack and destruction of TBs.

The torpedo offensive of the destroyer has now, as previously stated, clearly passed to the submarine, aircraft and MTB, the modem version of the torpedo boat. It is questionable if the future escort vessel, at present called a frigate, should inherit the title of destroyer by virtue of its function as a destroyer of submarines and aircraft. Its form may or may not be very different: we tend to regard frigates as small vessels of low speed and light armament, but if carriers are still to be given high speeds and operate at 30 kts and over the escorts will not look very different from destroyers.

It is doubtful if such speeds are necessary as the requirement for speed in a carrier seems primarily a tactical or operational one rather than a strategical necessity. New arrester gear and catapults should obviate the necessity for high speeds and an all-round reduction of speed starting with the carrier would be a tremendous boon to the service. Carriers might become a manageable size and escorts might be of the frigate type. It must of course not be forgotten that an excess of speed by the escort over that of the submarine is required, but the gas turbine offers the possibility of producing such speeds, perhaps at present for short periods and not very economically, but on very small tonnage. The present tendency is for specialised escorts for A/S, A/A and Anti-Aircraft Direction in order to keep the hull dimensions down to a reasonable size. The main gunnery and bombardment functions, hitherto carried out by destroyers, will have to be shared between the cruisers and the destroyer’s successors, the frigate type escorts. For bombardment duties the cruisers will of course be suitable, if available, but it is idle to hide the fact that the destroyers will be sadly missed if they are not there. If the suggestions made above are in any way correct and the destroyer as a type has passed the zenith of its usefulness, then this article must end on a note of regret that a type which has probably done more varied work of sterling value than any other should pass away. Regret too that it is passing with the feeling that, in spite of all its successes, it might have done better and that it should have been left to the Japanese to give such as disastrous practical demonstration of this fact; and, finally, regret at the eventual passing of types of ships which gave better training to naval officers than any other and which inspired in most naval officers an affection ranging from a sentimental attachment to passionate devotion.

References

[1] USNI Proceedings, January 1952, p. 51

[2] ‘The Rising Sun in the Pacific’, p. 358

[3] USNI Proceedings, January 1952, ‘Battle Report Pacific Middle Phase.’ Karig and Purdon, p. 96