Editorial: Naval Review 114/2

Many have noticed comparisons to the 1956 military and diplomatic debacle where the United States was unwilling to support the British, French and Israeli intervention in Egypt leading to a swift end to the Suez crisis. This US master stroke proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the rapidly fading British Empire, emaciated after the Second World War, the rejection of British adventurism by the US ultimately led to sterling losing its status as the global petro-currency to the US Dollar. The decline of empire has many milestones, but have we just witnessed an American one in the continued decline of US hegemony – there is a clear risk that the dollar may not survive as the global petro-currency and it may well be China’s opportunity quietly to claim the prize. We may never be privy to the intelligence that persuaded the Trump administration that notwithstanding the 12 day military intervention in 2025, Iran was apparently getting perilously close to creating viable nuclear weapons. But, as we all know, ‘no plan survives contact with the enemy’ and notwithstanding the bewildering mixed messages from the US President, the Iranian leadership, IRGC resilience and ingenuity will not be defeated by bombs alone. Naval intervention and boots on the ground will come with a ‘butcher’s bill’ at a price that the US public would be most unlikely to support. If Russia has been fighting NATO capabilities by proxy in Ukraine, the US appears to have been fighting Russian and Chinese capabilities by proxy in Iran. All sides, indeed the whole world, have been identifying lessons, not least how ill-prepared the UK – not just defence – is for dealing with global shocks.

From intervention to influence we have generally been found wanting. Ironically, the media furore around the deployment of HMS Dragon, whose preparations were actually achieved with overall support from all involved with professionalism and pace, may serve as a catalyst for the public to realise just how ill-prepared UK defence and security has become. Like Cassandra, this Journal has for many years sounded that warning. The default of all governments appears to be to blame their predecessors, and there is a long history of short-term disinvestment which will be somebody else’s problem to solve.

Going forward, there are some useful models from other European nations we should explore. Just because defence is rarely an election issue, it does not mean it is not an important one. As I write, it appears that the MoD remains firmly at war with the traditional enemy, no not the French, the Treasury. The much-fabled delta of £28m over the next four years is smoke the department is unable to swallow. It seems that without this resolution, which is impossible to achieve without cutting programmes which are essential to the future of defence, then the Defence Investment Plan continues to fester. The SDR was late, the money to implement it currently nowhere to be seen. Meanwhile, many other NATO Allies have had those uncomfortable conversations with their electorates, and have found the funding and are getting on with investing in urgent requirements across the board. As our Defence Secretary continues a one-way dialogue with Mr Putin, perhaps he might like to put a word in for him to wait for the UK to get its act together?

In other news, the Naval Review is delighted to welcome articles by the First Sea Lord, outlining his plan for his time at the helm, as well as the British Ports Group and ABP – serious dialogue is the precursor to much needed action on sorting out our many issues around wider resilience. Much great work is underway, but the investment must follow.

This editorial was written on 15 April 2026, and the next three weeks will be pivotal in the future of the Gulf region, the implications and consequences of events to date could fill the rest of the Review! I will however invite you to join the debate in these pages and on the website with your thoughts, not mine. Please indulge me some additional takeaways, beyond no plan survives contact with the enemy. China, inscrutable as ever, will conclude Taiwan needs to be totally overwhelmed in hours, not days, if they are to succeed in a forcible solution. Sea Lines of Communication in the littoral in the age of the UAV will not be able to be protected until a cheap, incredibly efficient and effective antidote is developed. Laser weapons may provide that key. However, sea denial by the mere threat of mine warfare and other underwater means remain as cheap and effective as ever. Having spent over 500 years evolving recognised laws of the sea, tearing them up to solve one crisis here will give others the incentive to apply similar logic, more brazenly than is already the case, in other contested waters. Finally, may I thank our chairman, Rear Admiral Simon Ancona for his 12 years as a Trustee including the last two as Chairman and wish him and his family ‘fair winds’ for all his future endeavours. And, of course, welcome to our incoming Chairman Rear Admiral Tim Henry OBE.