England’s Last Chance

The article below was written mainly for the information of persons such as MPs, Labour Leaders, and retired officers, because it seems possible that they alone can arouse the country in time. My article may be thought hardly to come within the scope of the subjects usually discussed in The Naval Review, but I have asked the Hon. Editor’s permission to print it for two reasons. One, the probability of war must be a matter of interest, if not concern, to all naval officers, and it seems obvious that the danger of war will remain so long as we dangle before the eyes of envious neighbours the temptation to take from us vast territories which they covet and may well think we are not able to defend. We must realize that our weak spots are known abroad probably better than they are in England. My second reason is that this article helps to show how many factors tend to affect or reduce the fighting efficiency of the Navy. If there is undue weakness in the Army, the Air Force, our munition factories, or anywhere else on the home front, we are bound to suffer for it, directly or indirectly, and to find that our plans and our strategy are gravely hampered. R. P.-E.-E.-Drax. 10.10.38.

It is now increasingly difficult and rapidly becoming impossible, for democracies such as France and England to compete in military preparations with dictator States like Germany and Italy. If these nations revert to the ways of peace and shut down their intensive production of armaments all is well: but Hitler has already said that he will not do so. If they continue at their present pace, with a view to continuing their triumphal policy of ‘Might is Right’, war and disaster become almost unavoidable. Nearly a hundred years ago that wise man, Abraham Lincoln, said “Tell the people the truth and the country is safe.” In the last 30 years our leaders have never followed that policy: we have been living in a fools’ paradise and, largely for that reason, it has not been much of a paradise.

It is urgently necessary, at the eleventh hour, that the people should be told the truth. At present, the ordinary man’s idea of the general situation in this country and in Europe and the Far East is little more than a travesty of the real truth. He has been continually told that all is well and he naturally believes it. Here are some of the things that the public should be told. Ever since 1912 the country has been in imminent danger of defeat in war. Before 1914, Lord Haldane and other members of the Government who knew the real facts took pains to conceal them in their public speeches so as not to alarm the public. When war came we found that the enemy’s preparations were immensely better than ours. Our Army was very short of machine guns and heavy artillery, our artillery was deplorably short of ammunition. True to its splendid traditions our Army “lost every battle except the last one” (how could it hope to do otherwise?), but when we finally achieved victory it had cost us a million lives.

Our Navy had been preparing unceasingly and ought to have been ready, but its material was as faulty as the Army’s. When we fired torpedoes they sometimes hit and failed to explode: often they failed to keep a correct depth and ran underneath the enemy ships. Our shells had faulty fuses and frequently broke up on the face of the enemy’s armour plates instead of penetrating. Our ships and magazines were so designed that on several occasions our battle cruisers and armoured cruisers, when hit by two or three enemy shells, blew up and sank. No German heavy ship was ever sunk by our gunfire. One, the Lutzow, was rendered incapable of steaming: she stood up to 20 or 30 hits with heavy shell and was ultimately sunk by her own officers. Before the war, in a moment of rare impartiality, the Kaiser told us that our wire-wound guns were much inferior to the guns in German ships. We made no change, but we found subsequently that he was quite right. In 1914 the German mines were very efficient: ours were most inefficient and had to be redesigned after the German model. These items show that even when we do prepare thoroughly we do not always get the best results. From 1920 to 1936 it has often been said by those who know: “If we have to fight a war now we shall be more unready for it than for any war in our history.” The danger has been acute for many years, but the people were not told. In November, 1934, our then Prime Minister said: “It is not the case that Germany is rapidly approaching equality with us. If Germany continues to execute her air programme without acceleration and if we continue to carry out ours at the present approved rate, we estimate that we shall have in a year’s time in Europe a margin – in Europe alone – of nearly 50 per cent.” That happy forecast has proved to be pitiably inaccurate.

In November, 1936, our then Prime Minister said he had not told the country “Germany is rearming and we must rearm,” because “I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.” As an excuse for this astounding statement he no doubt thought, and perhaps rightly, that in the hands of any other Government the country would be in even greater jeopardy. He added, “A democracy is always two years behind a dictator.” That statement is at present probably true. If we do not alter it we sign the death-warrant of the British Empire.

“Where there is no vision the people perish,” and our vision seems to be sadly at fault. Men who ought to know have constantly said to me: “The danger of war is greatly exaggerated.” American and other friends have come to me after a tour of Europe and said: “Everywhere I am told that war in Central Europe is steadily getting nearer, but when I come to England I am told that such reports should not be believed. For heaven’s sake, which is right?” We now know that the English view was totally wrong, but was there any excuse for such blindness?

The public should be told that the fighting power of France is deplorably low and is never likely to catch up, largely due to the 40-hour week, the nationalization of munition works and the grave state of their finances. The fighting power of England is horribly handicapped by the voluntary system, a system which can never catch up the conscription and compulsory labour corps of Germany. The cost in England of getting and maintaining 10,000 soldiers or of building and maintaining 1,000 aeroplanes is so immensely in excess of what it would cost in Germany that we are likely to be completely bankrupt before we have caught up – if we ever do catch up. Within a year or two our finances will be in a serious condition. Our Air Force this year needed 30,000 new men. After an intensive recruiting campaign lasting 14 weeks we had got 6,000. According to the latest data available (October, 1937) our Army, desperately small at the best, was 24,000 below strength and had been so for years. A large part of our Army at home consists of young men who are little more than children. I have been told of one battalion whose strength when turned out for drill or training was under 300 men. In such cases, if the officers are at full strength, they naturally complain bitterly that there is practically nothing for them to do.

According to the same report, the Territorial Army, small though it be, was some 45,000 below strength and had been so for years. Our Army Reserves were 35,000 below strength. In spite of all this it is said that our deficiencies in material are even more serious than the shortage of personnel. How can one hope to keep and defend a world-wide empire under such conditions? Our military commitments are colossal. We have to hold India, protect British interests all over China in face of a huge Japanese Army (which we are quite unable to do), provide garrisons for Hong Kong, Malta, Gibraltar, Egypt, the Sudan, etc., and we have a war in Palestine. In addition to all this we are guaranteeing the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia. One hopes we have already told them that our guarantee can be of no practical value to them.

Many people say, “Ah, but we have the Navy. That is always ready.” In, 1935 when we nearly fought Italy we had a large number of young men, but were seriously short of the older and highly trained men who are much more important. We had a number of ships with guns in them, but had we ammunition for the guns? The Navy’s fighting value was and is greatly reduced by the inadequate strength of our Army and Air Force. Operations against Japan would be gravely handicapped by the fact that we never have enough troops at Hong Kong to hold it against a Japanese attack. In the Mediterranean we are driven out of Malta due to the immense preponderance of the Italian Air Force over any air force that we could send from home. Our only alternative base is Alexandria, and there is no certainty that our Army could hold that port against the greatly superior forces that would attack it from Libya and from the air. It will be seen, therefore, that even the Navy cannot function efficiently if the Army and Air Force are below their proper strength.

In Air Raid Preparedness (A.R.P.) and all similar work the number of volunteers is utterly inadequate. We need a million Air Raid Wardens: in September last we had not got a quarter of that number. The L.C.C. needs 30,000 volunteers for emergency fire services. Before the crisis occurred they had got 4,200: after the crisis they had just over 10,000. They also required 5,000 ambulance drivers. Only 200 volunteered before the emergency and 1,200 after, a totally inadequate number. When a crisis has actually occurred the best of our young men will volunteer, too late of course to get any useful training; they will go out untrained and will be the first to get killed. Those that we can spare more easily will be the last to come up. Is this wise, or is it heading for national suicide? We often say to one another ‘A stitch in time saves nine’; but alas! we never learn the lesson that one year given voluntarily in peace will same nine lives in the day of battle.

In all our cities we have heard young men saying “The City Authorities ought to have made air raid shelters for us; where are they?” The City Fathers say “The expense is prohibitive: the Government ought to pay for them.” Both are wrong. The young men should have said: “Where do you want the air-raid shelters? Give us the tools and we will go out and dig them: and we don’t want to be paid for it.” Only that spirit can save the country. For too long we have been training young men to say “Whatever you want done, even if it be a matter of life and death to ourselves, you must pay us for it at the standard rates of wages: and if we do not choose to work, you must pay us for doing nothing.” It is like saying “My wife and children are dangerously ill: someone must pay me to go and fetch the doctor.” If a ship were sinking at sea should we have to say “Passengers are requested to man the lifeboats, and if we are not picked up within eight hours they will be paid overtime”? But that is not the spirit of the young men of England: they are perfectly sound at heart and are only waiting to be led. We must explain to them that the compulsory extraction of money from the taxpayer, even though it be a thousand millions a year, will never solve the problem. The more money we extract from that unfortunate section of the people the nearer we get to financial disaster. We must therefore have what one might call voluntary compulsion, i.e., not service for the State by decree of a dictator, as in Germany, or by decree of our Government, but compulsory service instituted by the Government because the people of England demand that they shall have it. I believe that any MP could go to his constituents and obtain their approval, but he would have to explain to them fully the whole situation and then say to them: “You young men are the guardians of all the civilization, justice and liberty that we have accumulated in a thousand years. You must choose to-day between two courses: either you continue as at present, getting ever nearer to the abyss, till finally war starts and everything goes down in ruins; or you must decide that you will offer your services freely to save the country and will demand from the Government that some form of compulsory service shall at once be instituted.” I feel little doubt that, if put in the right way, the response would be overwhelming. It is difficult to guess how much time is available, but it is certainly far less than we need for the purpose. As soon as we start to discuss German colonies we are liable to be presented with demands that our Government consider to be utterly unacceptable. We may then, perhaps early in 1939, have to choose quickly between totalitarian war and shameful surrender to a German ultimatum.

There remain two questions to discuss: What form of compulsory service should we have? What advantages should we get from it? The former is a matter for experts: very roughly I suggest something on the following lines: Every young man is required to come up for one year with a ‘National Labour Corps’ and one year’s military training, which need not be consecutive. He may put his name down for any two years he pleases, provided he does them both between the ages of 18 (or 17?) and 22. He will be given lodging, food, loan clothing in cases of necessity, and one shilling a week pocket money. While with the Labour Corps he will be employed on every kind of work connected with rearmament and A.R.P. that he is able to tackle. In addition there should be enough men to provide a large surplus for works of value or importance such as road improvements, recreation grounds, youth hostels, community swimming pools, reclamation of mudlands, clearing of slum areas, etc. The advantage of this work would be that we should enormously speed-up all the most desirable of the abovementioned works and the age-long cancer of unemployment would disappear. During the two years of service all men should be given good food and a maximum of healthy physical training, and as many as possible should be taught the rudiments of a useful trade.

The scheme should be welcomed both by the unemployed and the unemployable, and equally it would do immense good to the young peer and the idle rich. At both ends of the social scale idleness mould be eradicated, with great advantage to all concerned. Some will say that this organization would cost a lot of money. Barracks or buildings would be needed (with handsome profits for the contractors?): officers and organizers might expect large salaries. I admit these difficulties exist, but they have been overcome in Germany and they can be overcome here. Immense numbers of retired officers in England, who are constantly looking for jobs, would gladly volunteer their services in return for little more than their out-of-pocket expenses. It would certainly cost money to get the scheme going, but the ultimate gain to the State would be enormous, for we should have the continuous use of millions of men-hours of work at the lowest cost possible.

The year’s military training would be on lines worked out by the War Office. It is suggested that any man who undertakes that he will join the Navy, Army or RAF before reaching the age of 19 (or 20?) or volunteers for five years in the Territorial Army should, if passed fit, be exempted from the two years of national service. The above details, however, are no more than a vague general outline. It is to be hoped that the people of England would demand the adoption of the scheme immediately they have been told how necessary it is. If they saw fit to demand that no man should be entitled to a vote until he has done his two years’ service, well, so much the better.

One thing is certain. We have been hoping for the best for 20 years and taking very heavy risks. We dare not do it longer, and it has become an urgent necessity that the people should be told so. Certainly miracles may happen: Hitler and Mussolini might suddenly become pacifists, and we can always hope that God helps those who help themselves. But we must then face the searching question “Are we helping ourselves as much as we should to make sure of deserving and obtaining that aid?” I seriously doubt it. From the political point of view there is one remaining hope, and a good one. If the men of England listen to the appeal and turn it down, saying “We will not tolerate this interference with our freedom,” we then must turn to the women. The women voters outnumber the men and the ultimate decision lies in their hands. It would still be possible to say to the women something like this: “The men have decided that they will not surrender one atom of their present liberties. We are heading for a war which is by no means certain but not improbable, and time is terribly short. If war comes, liberty, justice and everything that makes life worth living will go up in smoke. Are you content that your menfolk should throw away your happiness and all that our civilization has brought us? If so, the end of the British Empire is drawing near. If not, every one of you must vote for the candidates who are prepared to assure you, on their word of honour, that only by some form of National Service is it possible to make the country safe.” Having no political experience I cannot say what would be the best way to put forward this appeal, but I am satisfied of two things: that it would succeed if presented in the right way, and that it is very necessary.