Review of ‘Armed Bluejackets Ashore: US Navy Landing Guns 1850-1942’
Further to the publication of this book review online on 11 Oct 24 (https://www.naval-review.com/book-reviews/armed-bluejackets-ashore-us-navy-landing-guns-1850-1942/), a number of factual discrepancies have been identified, following a representation by the author. Those discrepancies, and relevant corrections are detailed below. The subject is niche and the experienced book reviewer felt that in comparison to the usual tomes the NR audience are informed about, this title and the cost of the publication did not warrant his recommendation. The reviewer also conveys his apologies for the factual errors. Members are, of course, at liberty to judge for themselves.
Corrections:
§ Third paragraph of review states, “Then follow two chapters about the Dahlgren boat howitzer, the USN’s first landing gun, how the gun was used, ashore, on boats and aboard ship, followed by a chapter on their howitzers during the Civil War”, implying three such chapters, when there are only two that cover this time span.
§ Fourth paragraph claims a naval landing party went ashore at Shinmiyangyo, Korea, in 1871. In fact, Shinmiyangyo was not a place, but an event, the disturbance in the Korean year Shinmi caused by the American naval landing. This term is clearly defined at the outset of the relevant chapter, page 69.
§ Fifth paragraph refers to the chapter, ‘American Imperial Adventures’, which describes naval landings in Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, China, and Samoa, “followed by a chapter detailing the development of new guns for use on the ships of America’s ‘New Navy’”. The period of such imperial episodes at the end of 1890s was followed by the first decade of the 20th century, by which time American ship design, steel production, and like considerations were on par with those of Europe. On the other hand, the New Navy as a concept was limited to the 1880s into the early 1890s, when industrialisation in America lagged behind that of Europe, and the US and its navy groped to catch up. Pages 86, 109, 113, 115, and 154 make that eminently clear.
§ Sixth paragraph alludes to the end of traditional landing parties with Operation TORCH, and lumps the attempts to land raiders from USS Dallas, Cole and Bernadou at Casablanca, HMS Walney and Hartland at Oran, and HMS Malcolm and Broke at Algiers as “largely unsuccessful”. Whereas the British warships given this task were indeed roughly handled, three of them being sunk, the three American destroyer-transports and their landing parties performed their tasks successfully at Casablanca. In fact, the American ships escaped unscathed the fire of French shore batteries. Pages 293–99.
§ Seventh paragraph quotes the author that certain aspects lie “beyond the scope of this work”, and adds “the phrase appears more than once”, leaving the reviewer feeling “the story was sometimes left incomplete”. The “beyond the scope” phrase in fact appears but twice in the book and refers to the much different wartime assaults on heavily defended beaches. The day of the traditional landing party and its dedicated landing guns had ended, with nothing left incomplete. Pages 207 and 299.
§ Eighth paragraph finds a distraction in the author’s habit, upon introducing a ship placed in service during and after the 1880s, of following her name with the main armament in brackets. The reviewer may legitimately object to this practice, but not to suggest that it was done for no other reason that the book is about guns. Pages 20–21 in the Introduction make it clear, viz. “Such specification is also useful in showing the escalation of main guns, in particular in battleships as the international race to build such capital ships progressed”.
