Russian Navy Submarine Force in 2026

Independent open-source research. The assessments and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not represent any government, defence organisation or other institution.

Important analytical qualification

No authoritative public source identified in this study provides a comprehensive, real-time, hull-by-hull readiness roster for the Russian submarine force. The figures presented here are therefore open-source analytical assessments rather than claims to classified or official readiness knowledge. “Deployable” indicates that credible affirmative public evidence supports a submarine’s operational availability as of the assessment date and that no stronger evidence has been identified indicating major overhaul, reserve status, severe damage, decommissioning or another condition incompatible with near-term deployment. Operational status and evidentiary confidence are assessed separately. The resulting figures should therefore be interpreted as a conservative, date-specific analytical snapshot rather than a definitive statement of Russian Navy readiness.

Executive assessment

Assessed deployable combat submarines: 36 out of a 57-hull commissioned/on-roll combat cohort. A further 12 hulls are classified as limited/uncertain and 9 as not currently deployable.

After source audit and a final methodological consistency check, the 57-hull combat cohort is assessed at 36 D / 12 L / 9. Contested or post-refit cases are placed in L when the public record is insufficient to justify either D or N, and confidence is reduced where a positive judgement rests primarily on specialist chronology rather than convergent high-quality sources.

Status and confidence coding

Source hierarchy and verification rule

Tier 1 – official and institutional sources: NATO/Allied government and intelligence publications, Russian presidential records, official naval/shipyard/design-bureau releases (including Sevmash and Rubin), and other directly attributable government material. These are strongest for formal events, declared programmes and national assessments, but are not treated as neutral on contested wartime outcomes.

Tier 2 – peer-reviewed scholarship, established specialist analysis and high-quality independent reporting: peer-reviewed nuclear-force studies, Sea Power Centre analysis, RUSI, Reuters, Janes, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and specialist regional defence reporting. These sources are used for triangulation, chronology and contested cases.

Tier 3 – named OSINT/fleet chronologies: Deepstorm and similar compilations are used only where higher-tier hull-level evidence is unavailable. Anonymous “fleet synthesis” references have been removed. RussianShips.info is retained only as a broad inventory cross-check because its list explicitly mixes active, reserve and under-construction entries; it is not used as decisive readiness evidence.

Relationship to existing assessments

Existing open-source studies provide important but partial baselines for assessing Russian submarine capability. Muraviev offers a detailed formation- and hull-level assessment of the Pacific Fleet; Kjellén examines the organisation and force structure of the Baltic Fleet; Kristensen et al. provide a broad open-source assessment of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces; and Kaushal et al. examine the capabilities and development of the Yasen-M force. Taken together, these studies do not themselves provide the same cross-fleet combat-submarine, date-specific product developed here: a single hull-level assessment across the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic Fleets in which assessed deployability is explicitly separated from evidentiary confidence. The present report builds on these partial baselines by applying one transparent status-and-confidence framework across the commissioned/on-roll combat cohort.^[1]

Northern Fleet

Northern Fleet submarine formations are concentrated on the Kola Peninsula. The key strategic formation is the 31st Submarine Division at Gadzhievo; multirole nuclear boats are assigned principally to the 11th and 24th divisions, while the 7th Division holds legacy attack submarines and the 161st Brigade operates conventional boats. Norwegian Intelligence assesses that maintenance backlog constrains fleet-wide combat power while the newest submarines retain high operational tempo.^[2]

Fleet subtotal: 28 combat hulls analysed – 15 D / 7 L / 6 N.

Pacific Fleet

The Australian Sea Power Centre identifies two nuclear submarine divisions at Vilyuchinsk – the 25th strategic division and 10th multirole division – and the 19th conventional submarine brigade at Malyy Ulyss Bay, Vladivostok. Its detailed study provides the strongest publicly available formation-level baseline for the Pacific Fleet and distinguishes boats in refit from operational force structure.^[31]

Fleet subtotal: 20 combat hulls analysed — 16 D / 2 L / 2 N.

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea submarine arm remains the 4th Independent Submarine Brigade. Turkish Straits constraints and Ukrainian strikes have fragmented the force geographically. Battle-damage claims are treated as belligerent-source assertions unless independently corroborated; the December 2025 submarine strike at Novorossiysk is therefore retained as a lower-confidence case.^[52]

Fleet subtotal: 7 combat hulls analysed – 3 D / 3 L / 1 N.

Baltic Fleet

The Baltic Fleet’s indigenous submarine force is small and centred on the 123rd Submarine Brigade at Kronstadt. Transiting Black Sea and Pacific Fleet submarines are not treated as Baltic Fleet assignments. The two assigned boats are assessed separately from temporary cross-fleet presence.

Fleet subtotal: 2 combat hulls analysed – 2 D / 0 L / 0 N.

Class and capability reference

Figures below are public approximate class-level characteristics. Exact load-outs, acoustic performance, reactor parameters and wartime weapon mixes are not reliably public. Where a class has undergone modernisation, the fitted weapon suite may vary by hull.

Illustrative publicly reported special-purpose / GUGI platforms – excluded from the 36 combat-readiness figure

Special-purpose deep-sea and test submarines are deliberately separated from ordinary SSBN/SSGN/SSN/SSK readiness. Norwegian Intelligence assesses that GUGI operates vessels tailored to mapping Western undersea infrastructure and submarines purpose-built for deep-sea operations/attack functions, with the specialised submarine capability concentrated on the Kola Peninsula. The UK Ministry of Defence has also publicly attributed operational activity near critical underwater infrastructure to Russian special-purpose submarines. The platform list below is illustrative: individual operational status is not independently verified, and readiness is substantially more opaque than for fleet combat submarines.^[72]

Not yet commissioned – significant submarine programmes as of 9 August 2026

Methodological notes, source conflict and confidence limits

Administrative assignment is distinguished from physical location. A submarine may remain assigned to the Pacific or Black Sea Fleet while temporarily operating in the Baltic, Mediterranean or Northern test area. Assignment therefore does not by itself establish deployability.

Commissioning is a formal service-entry event, not a synonym for combat readiness. A newly commissioned boat may still require work-up or post-delivery correction. For new-generation boats, recent commissioning after completed trials can support D when no contrary evidence exists; for legacy boats, D normally requires affirmative operational evidence rather than mere absence of a reported fault.

D means credible deployability within the public evidence base; it does not mean ‘at sea now’. L captures genuine uncertainty and is the default when evidence is too stale or contradictory to support either D or N. N requires affirmative evidence inconsistent with immediate deployment, such as overhaul, reserve/lay-up, disposal or serious battle damage.

Confidence is independent of status. High confidence reflects current official/hull-specific evidence or convergent strong sources; Medium reflects one credible current source or triangulated specialist evidence; Low reflects disputed, stale or inferential evidence. A Low-confidence N or D should be treated as provisional rather than categorical.

When sources conflict, the report gives priority to the most current and hull-specific evidence for readiness, while using official sources primarily for formal events and declared programmes. This rule explains the revised K-560 Severodvinsk judgement: Norwegian Intelligence’s annual class-level forecast and Sevmash’s formal on-roll description are important context, but the more current hull-specific July 2026 report that Severodvinsk is in a mid-life overhaul is more probative for immediate deployability on 9 August.^[85]

Negative evidence is treated cautiously. Silence in public reporting can support L when combined with age or maintenance indicators, but it does not prove N. The 57-hull cohort remains a practical 2026 combat-order-of-battle set rather than a reproduction of broader online inventories that mix active, reserve, special-purpose, test, construction and deeply inactive hulls.

Analytical findings

Gross fleet totals should therefore be reported together with status confidence, evidence date and source quality. The practical value of the dataset is not a claim to exact real-time readiness, but a reproducible public-source method that shows which judgements are strong, which are provisional, and why.

The Black Sea has the highest conflict-related uncertainty. Rostov-on-Don is N at High confidence because severe damage is well documented in Ukrainian official reporting, while Kolpino is L at Low confidence because the December 2025 underwater-drone strike, target identity and damage level remain disputed. Novorossiysk is L because a reported technical problem was denied, illustrating why contested wartime claims should not be converted into categorical readiness judgements.

The Pacific Fleet is the best-supported formation-level case in the dataset: 16 of 20 assessed deployable. This judgement rests mainly on the Australian Sea Power Centre’s detailed, government-hosted formation and deployment study, supplemented by official commissioning records. Its evidence base is materially stronger than that available for many legacy Northern boats.

The Northern Fleet remains the largest and most uncertain cohort: 28 boats, assessed 15 D / 7 L / 6 N. Its modern Borei-A/Yasen-M core remains strategically significant, while multiple legacy Akula, Sierra and Kilo cases depend on lower-tier hull chronologies. Leopard’s June 2026 sea trials demonstrate why post-refit work-up is better represented by L than N, while the current overhaul of K-560 Severodvinsk demonstrates why class-level annual forecasts cannot substitute for dated hull-level evidence.

The final source audit leaves the assessed deployable total at 36 but increases the explicit uncertainty band: the cohort is 36 D / 12 L / 9 N, compared with 36 D / 9 L / 12 N in the original assessment. This is analytically significant because a stricter treatment of contested and post-refit cases moves uncertainty out of categorical non-deployable judgements without inflating the deployable total.

Source quality and verification audit

Quality is assessed for the specific use made of each source, not as a blanket judgement on the institution. Official sources are strongest for formal events and declared policy; intelligence publications are authoritative assessments but do not reveal classified sourcing; belligerent claims require corroboration; specialist OSINT is valuable for chronology but should not determine high-confidence readiness alone.

HIGH – Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026. Official national-intelligence assessment; strongest for Northern Fleet strategic trends, maintenance constraints, advanced-submarine tempo and GUGI. Limitation: not a real-time hull-by-hull readiness return.

HIGH for formal events – Kremlin / President of Russia. Authoritative for commissioning ceremonies and declared programme milestones. Limitation: State messaging is not independent evidence of day-to-day readiness or performance.

HIGH for formal events – Rubin / Admiralty Shipyards / Sevmash. Authoritative for commissioning, trials and industrial milestones. Limitation: industry sources are not independent performance assessments.

HIGH–MEDIUM  – Australian Sea Power Centre. Detailed government-hosted expert study with formation, deployment and refit data; primary baseline for the Pacific Fleet. Limitation: analytical publication, not formal Australian government policy, and principally an early/mid-2025 snapshot.

HIGH–MEDIUM for strategic nuclear-force context; MEDIUM for current hull chronology — Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook. Scholarly and authoritative for aggregate nuclear-force analysis, but because some hull-level chronology and assignment claims conflict with later primary-source reporting, current commissioning, fleet-assignment and readiness claims are cross-checked against later primary or hull-specific sources.

MEDIUM–HIGH – Reuters, Janes, RUSI, The Barents Observer and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Established specialist and news sources used for triangulation, source conflict and current-event chronology.

MEDIUM – Defence Viewpoints / UK Defence Forum. Current named Black Sea synthesis with explicit confidence labels and a disclosed source mix; useful as corroborating analysis, but not peer reviewed and not equivalent to official observation.

MEDIUM–LOW – Deepstorm. Named, detailed Russian submarine chronology with source lists and valuable hull histories; useful where official evidence is absent, but not sufficient by itself to justify High confidence.

LOW for readiness – RussianShips.info. Broad inventory cross-check only because its list mixes active, reserve and under-construction entries and contains visible date/status inconsistencies.

EXCLUDED – Anonymous open-source fleet compilation/synthesis entries from the previous version. Removed because readers could not independently identify or reproduce the underlying evidence.

ENTIRE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE FLEET – SCHEMATIC ORDER OF BATTLE

Combat submarine cohort assessed in this report, 9 August 2026

Schematic interpretation: D = assessed deployable; L = limited/uncertain; N = not currently deployable. Confidence is reported at hull level in the detailed fleet tables. The schematic reflects administrative assignment and the public operating/base picture described above.

Fleet architecture at a glance

Combat submarine cohort by class

Special-purpose/GUGI platforms and submarines still under construction or trials remain outside the 57-hull combat cohort. After final source audit and consistency review, the combat cohort is assessed at 36 D / 12 L / 9 N. Hull-level source and confidence judgements are retained in the detailed tables and Chicago footnotes.

Updated 11 August 2026

References

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[2] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026 (Oslo: Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2026), chap. 3, https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/focus/focus2026_contents/Focus26_chapter3 (accessed August 10, 2026).

[3] President of Russia, “Flag Raising Ceremony on Knyaz Pozharsky Nuclear-Powered Cruiser,” July 24, 2025, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77561 (accessed August 10, 2026).

[4] President of Russia, “Meeting on Developing the Navy’s Submarine Forces,” July 24, 2025, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77562 (accessed August 10, 2026). Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 13, 2026, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2026.2659527.

[5] Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, “Navy” archive, entry “Yuri Dolgorikiy Enters Overhaul,” December 23, 2023, https://russianforces.org/blog/navy/ (accessed August 10, 2026). Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026.”

[6] Pavel Podvig, “Karelia Project 667BDRM/Delta IV Submarine Is Preparing to Resume Service,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, March 19, 2026, https://russianforces.org/blog/2026/03/karelia_project_667bdrmdelta_i.shtml (accessed August 10, 2026). Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026.”

[7] Podvig, “Karelia Project 667BDRM/Delta IV.” Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026.”

[8] Podvig, “Karelia Project 667BDRM/Delta IV.”

[9] Podvig, “Karelia Project 667BDRM/Delta IV.” President of Russia, “Reports by Fleet Commanders on the Security Landscape and Navy Development,” July 26, 2026, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/80339 (accessed August 10, 2026).

[10] Podvig, “Karelia Project 667BDRM/Delta IV.” Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026.”

[11] Nilsen, “Sevmash Launches Ulyanovsk.” Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3.

[12] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. Sidharth Kaushal, James Byrne, Joe Byrne, and Gary Somerville, “The Yasen-M and the Future of Russian Submarine Forces,” RUSI Defence Systems, May 28, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/yasen-m-and-future-russian-submarine-forces (accessed August 10, 2026).

[13] President of Russia, “Vladimir Putin Visited Arkhangelsk Nuclear-Powered Cruiser Submarine,” March 27, 2025, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76557 (accessed August 10, 2026). Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3.

[14] Svetlana Tsygankova, “Podlodka ‘Orel’ na ucheniiakh VMF Rossii gotova k udaru po ‘protivniku’” [Submarine Orel Is Ready to Strike the ‘Enemy’ in Russian Navy Exercises], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 25, 2025, https://rg.ru/2025/07/25/reg-szfo/podlodka-orel-na-ucheniiah-vmf-rossii-gotova-k-udaru-po-protivniku.html (accessed August 10, 2026). Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnyi kreiser K-266 ‘Orel,’ proekt 949A” [Submarine Cruiser K-266 Orel, Project 949A], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/on_1992/949a/K-266/K-266.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[15] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnyi kreiser K-410 ‘Smolensk,’ proekt 949A” [Submarine Cruiser K-410 Smolensk, Project 949A], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nsrs/949A/K-410/K-410.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[16] Nikolaev, “Proekt 971 ‘Shchuka-B’.”

[17] Nikolaev, “Proekt 971 ‘Shchuka-B’.”

[18] Nikolaev, “Proekt 971 ‘Shchuka-B’.” President of Russia, “Reports by Fleet Commanders.” Ilya Maksimov, “Atomnaia podlodka K-328 ‘Leopard’ vyshla na ispytaniia posle modernizatsii” [Nuclear Submarine K-328 Leopard Entered Trials after Modernisation], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 10, 2026, https://rg.ru/2026/06/10/atomnaia-podlodka-k-328-leopard-vyshla-na-ispytaniia-posle-modernizacii.html (accessed August 11, 2026).

[19] Nikolaev, “Proekt 971 ‘Shchuka-B’.”

[20] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka K-157 ‘Vepr,’ proekt 971” [Submarine K-157 Vepr, Project 971], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/971/K-157/K-157.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[21] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka K-335 ‘Gepard,’ proekt 971” [Submarine K-335 Gepard, Project 971], Deepstorm: Encyclopedia of the Russian Submarine Fleet, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/971/K-335/K-335.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[22] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka B-534 ‘Nizhnii Novgorod,’ proekt 945A” [Submarine B-534 Nizhny Novgorod, Project 945A], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/945A/K-534/K-534.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[23] Nikolaev, “B-336 ‘Pskov’.” Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Proekt 945A ‘Kondor’” [Project 945A Kondor], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/945A/list.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[24] Admiralty Shipyards, “Anniversary of Submarine Obninsk.” Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Proekt 671RTMK” [Project 671RTMK], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/671RTM/list.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[25] Admiralty Shipyards, “Anniversary of Submarine Obninsk.” Nikolaev, “Proekt 671RTMK.”

[26] Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, “The Second Lada Class Submarine Is Commissioned by the Russian Navy,” January 31, 2024, https://ckb-rubin.ru/en/mediacentr/novosti_i_sobytija/signle_news/news/detail/News/the_second_lada_class_submarine_is_commissioned_by_the_russian_navy/ (accessed August 10, 2026).

[27] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka B-800 ‘Kaluga,’ proekt 877LPMB” [Submarine B-800 Kaluga, Project 877LPMB], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dts/877/B-800/B-800.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[28] Nikolaev, “B-459 ‘Vladikavkaz’.”

[29] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka B-471 ‘Magnitogorsk,’ proekt 877” [Submarine B-471 Magnitogorsk, Project 877], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dts/877/B-471/B-471.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[30] Gorod48.ru, “Utilizatsiia podvodnoi lodki ‘Lipetsk’.” Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Proekt 877” [Project 877], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dts/877/list.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[31] Alexey D. Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident: The Submarine Arm of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Early 2025 to 2030,” Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2025, https://seapower.navy.gov.au/publications-and-research/moscows-pacific-trident-submarine-arm-russian-pacific-fleet-early-2025-2030 (accessed August 10, 2026).

[32] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[33] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[34] President of Russia, “Underwater Missile Cruisers Knyaz Oleg and Novosibirsk Join the Navy,” December 21, 2021, https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67410 (accessed August 10, 2026). Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[35] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[36] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[37] President of Russia, “Knyaz Oleg and Novosibirsk Join the Navy.” Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[38] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[39] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[40] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[41] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[42] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[43] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[44] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.” Nikolaev, “Proekt 971 ‘Shchuka-B’.”

[45] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[46] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[47] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[48] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[49] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[50] Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, “Submarine Yakutsk Inducted into the Russian Navy,” June 11, 2025, https://ckb-rubin.ru/en/mediacentr/novosti_i_sobytija/signle_news/news/detail/News/submarine_yakutsk_inducted_into_the_russian_navy/ (accessed August 10, 2026). Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[51] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[52] Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “A Sinking Fleet: Russia’s Largest Losses in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov during the War,” April 17, 2026, https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/a-sinking-fleet-russia-s-largest-losses-in-the-black-sea-and-the-sea-of-azov-during-the-war (accessed August 10, 2026). Reuters, “Ukraine Says Underwater Drones Hit Submarine, but Moscow Denies Damage,” December 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-hits-russian-submarine-first-underwater-drone-attack-2025-12-15/ (accessed August 10, 2026).

[53] Janes, “Russian Navy Kilo Submarine Alrosa Prepares to Start Post-Refit Trials,” May 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/sea/russian-navy-kilo-submarine-alrosa-prepares-to-start-post-refit-trials (accessed August 10, 2026). Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka B-871 ‘Alrosa,’ proekt 877V” [Submarine B-871 Alrosa, Project 877V], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dts/877/B-871/B-871.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[54] Royal Navy, “Royal Navy Tracks Russian Submarine in UK Waters,” July 2, 2025, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2025/july/02/20250702-russian-submarine-tracked-by-royal-navy-helicopters-and-warship (accessed August 10, 2026). Reuters, “Russia Denies Malfunction on Submarine That Surfaced off France,” October 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-denies-malfunction-submarine-that-surfaced-off-france-2025-10-13/ (accessed August 10, 2026).

[55] Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “A Sinking Fleet.”

[56] Robin Ashby, “Russia’s Black Sea Fleet – From Regional Power to Constrained Force – Part 1,” Defence Viewpoints / UK Defence Forum, 2026, https://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/defence-news/russias-black-sea-fleet-part-1 (accessed August 10, 2026).

[57] Royal Navy, “Royal Navy Completes Ten Days of Intensive Monitoring Operations as Russian Submarine and Warships Enter UK Waters,” April 9, 2026, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2026/april/09/20260409-royal-navy-monitors-russian-warships-and-submarine-in-uk-waters (accessed August 10, 2026).

[58] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka B-268 ‘Velikii Novgorod,’ proekt 06363” [Submarine B-268 Veliky Novgorod, Project 06363], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/on_1992/636/B-268/B-268.htm (accessed August 10, 2026). Ashby, “Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.”

[59] Reuters, “Ukraine Says Underwater Drones Hit Submarine.” Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “A Sinking Fleet.”

[60] Andrey S. Nikolaev, “Podvodnaia lodka B-806 ‘Dmitrov,’ proekt 877EKM” [Submarine B-806 Dmitrov, Project 877EKM], Deepstorm, https://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dts/877/B-806/B-806.htm (accessed August 10, 2026).

[61] Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, “The Third Lada Submarine Velikiye Luki Has Joined the Russian Navy,” December 16, 2025, https://ckb-rubin.ru/en/mediacentr/novosti_i_sobytija/signle_news/news/detail/News/the_third_lada_submarine_velikiye_luki_has_joined_the_russian_navy/ (accessed August 10, 2026).

[62] Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026.” President of Russia, “Meeting on Developing the Navy’s Submarine Forces.”

[63] Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2026.” Podvig, “Karelia Project 667BDRM/Delta IV.”

[64] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. Nilsen, “Sevmash Launches Ulyanovsk.” Kaushal et al., “The Yasen-M.”

[65] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.” Nikolaev, “K-266 ‘Orel’.” Nikolaev, “K-410 ‘Smolensk’.”

[66] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. Nikolaev, “Proekt 971 ‘Shchuka-B’.”

[67] Nikolaev, “Proekt 945A ‘Kondor’.” Nikolaev, “B-534 ‘Nizhnii Novgorod’.” Nikolaev, “B-336 ‘Pskov’.”

[68] Admiralty Shipyards, “Anniversary of Submarine Obninsk.” Nikolaev, “Proekt 671RTMK.”

[69] Nikolaev, “Proekt 877.” Nikolaev, “B-459 ‘Vladikavkaz’.” Gorod48.ru, “Utilizatsiia podvodnoi lodki ‘Lipetsk’.”

[70] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.” Reuters, “Ukraine Says Underwater Drones Hit Submarine.”

[71] Rubin, “The Second Lada Class Submarine Is Commissioned.” Rubin, “Velikiye Luki Has Joined the Russian Navy.”

[72] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. UK Ministry of Defence, “UK Exposes Covert Russian Submarine Operation in and around UK Waters,” April 9, 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-covert-russian-submarine-operation-in-and-around-uk-waters (accessed August 10, 2026).

[73] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[74] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. RussianShips.info, “Russian Navy 2026.”

[75] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. RussianShips.info, “Russian Navy 2026.”

[76] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3.

[77] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. RussianShips.info, “Russian Navy 2026.”

[78] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. RussianShips.info, “Russian Navy 2026.”

[79] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. RussianShips.info, “Russian Navy 2026.”

[80] President of Russia, “Reports by Fleet Commanders.”

[81] Nilsen, “Sevmash Launches Ulyanovsk.”

[82] Sevmash, “Atomnyi podvodnyi kreiser ‘Ulianovsk’ vyveden iz ellinga predpriiatiia OSK Sevmash” [Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cruiser Ulyanovsk Rolled Out from the Sevmash Building Hall], July 28, 2026, https://sevmash.ru/rus/news/3856-2026-07-28-15-35-54.html (accessed August 10, 2026).

[83] Nilsen, “Sevmash Launches Ulyanovsk.”

[84] Muraviev, “Moscow’s Pacific Trident.”

[85] Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2026, chap. 3. Sevmash, “Ulianovsk vyveden iz ellinga.” Nilsen, “Sevmash Launches Ulyanovsk.”