The Development of Tactics

The development of tactics in the rowing navies was explained in War at Sea [1919] and in the steam navies in The Ship of the Line in Battle [1912] . This study deals with the sailing navies on similar lines and starts with the battles in the First Dutch War, which are of interest because in them can be traced the gradual growth of the art of bringing sailing fleets into action. Every change in the instructions issued to the fleet was the result of experience in battle and therefore it is important to show the inter-relation between each battle and the resulting change.

Ayscue and De Ruyter off Plymouth, 16^th – 26^th August, 1652

In this action the Dutch fleet and convoy under Commodore Michiel de Ruyter numbered about 90 sail, including 30 ships of war, six fireships and three galiots, the remainder being merchantmen.[1] As many of these last were armed and probably almost as heavily as ships of war,[2] his fighting force consisted of 50 to 60 armed ships, besides fireships and galiots, and 30 to 20 unarmed who are said to have left the fleet at the beginning of the engagement. De Ruyter was seconded by two flag officers a vice commodore and a rear commodore-and his ships of war are said to have been organised in three squadrons, each commanded by a flag officer and having attached a division of merchantmen. That such an organisation was in use by the Dutch at this time is shown by the Instructions issued by Tromp on 20^th (Julian) – 30^th (Gregorian) June, 1652, to the fleet under his command.[3]

Furthermore, an English report states that, “The enemy charged us one after another in order,”[4] which seems to indicate that the ships followed each other. On the other hand, the orders issued on the 29^th August – 8^th September by de Ruyter to the fleet when cruising are ambiguous. His words are: “All Captains… shall pay better heed to their seamanship and see that the fleet is drawn up more compactly of an evening, each ship closing up to that next to windward.”[5]

The English fleet under Admiral Sir George Ayscue numbered about 38 ships of war including armed hired merchant ships, besides four small craft and four fireships.[6] Two other flag officers – a vice admiral and a rear admiral – were also present, but no mention is made of any organisation in squadrons. No complete list of the English fleet is extant to compare with that of the Dutch.[7] The former was inferior in numbers, but superior in the fighting power of the individual ships, and notably so in the case of the flagships Rainbow of 52 guns and Vanguard of 56 guns as compared with the two largest Dutch ships of 40 guns. On 15^th – 25^th August, 1652, in the morning Ayscue put to sea from Plymouth with his whole force.[8] On the following day having received intelligence, when about 21 miles from Plymouth, that a Dutch fleet was proceeding down Channel he called a council of war and decided to stand across the Channel to intercept it.[9] Between 1 and 2 pm, de Ruyter reckoned that he was then about 10 miles from the French coast and on the meridian of Isle de Bas, i.e., nearly due south of Plymouth; his course was WSW with a light breeze from NE. At this time he sighted the English fleet to the northward, towards which he sailed forthwith.[10] This means that the Dutch fleet hauled to the wind on the starboard tack and headed about NNW. Ayscue also steered for the enemy. Thus, the two fleets approached each other, the English running free at a speed of say 4 knots, and bearing down on the weather bow of the close-hauled Dutch making perhaps 2 knots. These speeds are conjectural as none are mentioned in extant reports. About 4 o’clock the fleets met and the action began.

The diagram illustrates approximately the approach together with the subsequent movements, and shows Ayscue with six or seven ships (A) leading down followed by the rest of the English fleet (E). The presence of the vice admiral with Ayscue suggests that the fleet was in no particular ‘order’ and that the faster ships were leading followed by the slower ones straggling out in rear. De Ruyter’s despatch states that he himself with six or seven ships (R) was to windward and the rear commodore with the rest of the Dutch fleet (D) was to leeward, which suggests that the more weatherly ships were to windward and the more leewardly ones to leeward. Thus, in neither fleet were the ships drawn up in any particular ‘order’. Their relative positions were governed by their relative mobility rather than by military requirements. Ayscue’s fast ships, running free, came into contact with de Ruyter’s westerly ones, close hauled, at (X), charged through them and hauled to the wind at (Y), heading ESE. After passing through each other the ships with Ayscue and de Ruyter stood on until they reached some such positions as (Z) and (W), when they tacked and subsequently again passed through each other on opposite tacks. The Dutch ships to leeward seemingly did not get into action at all,[11] neither did the slow English ones at the first crossing, whether these were able to do so during the second crossing depends upon when they hauled their wind to follow Ayscue, as to which there is no information. Owing to the light wind and slow speed, by the time the ships engaged had passed through and cleared each other, night was closing in. The fleets, being on opposite tacks, then separated and the action ceased.

The casualties on either side were slight; those of the Dutch according to de Ruyter[12] being 90 to 110; those of the English are given with less authority[13] as 91. One or two ships on either side were badly damaged in their hulls and others in their masts and rigging. We are to note that the contemporary accounts show that the action was partial and indecisive: partial, because all the ships were not engaged, and indecisive, because those that came into action passed each other on opposite tacks. Furthermore, they give no indication that either fleet was worked in squadrons.

Blake and De With off the Kentish Knock, 28^th September – 8^th October, 1652.

On the 25^th September – 8^th October, 1652, the Dutch fleet of 62 ships sought shelter from a SSW gale under the North Foreland off which it anchored at a distance of about three sea miles.[14] On the same day the English fleet in somewhat greater numbers and force, was in the Downs, some 13 sea miles to the southward.[15] Both fleets were organised in squadrons;[16] the Dutch commanded by Vice Admiral Cornelisz de With, seconded by Commodore de Ruyter, de With and Cornelis Evertsen; the English by General Robert Blake with Sir William Penn as Vice Admiral and Major Nehemiah Rourse as Rear Admiral. The position and approximate strength of each fleet were known to the opposing Admiral. By the 28^th September – 8^th October the wind had veered to west and the gale had blown itself out. On that morning both fleets weighed, each Commander having three days before decided to fight.[17] De With was at a disadvantage, since he was to leeward and his ships much scattered, several having dragged their anchors during the gale, five being blown to sea and parting company.

About noon de With sighted the English fleet to the SSW bearing down on him. He hastened to collect his scattered ships and by about 3 pm had succeeded in bringing them together to the south east of the Kentish Knock, where they hove to on the port tack with the wind from the westward.[18] At this time General Blake in the Resolution with three other ships of his own squadron had come up and hove to on the same tack half a mile to windward. The Vice Admiral – Sir William Penn – with his squadron was near him, and now, “ran a fair berth ahead of the General to give room for my squadron between him and us,” the James, his flagship thus becoming the headmost ship. He also hove to. At this time the rest of the English ships were a league or two astern.[19] As soon as the Dutch fleet had been collected and hove to, de With transferred his flag from the Princess Louisa to the Prins Willem, then laying in the centre of the fleet, and immediately afterwards, “put about towards the enemy.” It was now probably about 4 o’clock and a considerable number of the English stragglers having come up, Blake filled and bore up to engage. Thus, the two fleets were standing in opposite directions, the Dutch to leeward and heading to the southward, the English to windward and standing to the northward.

Presently, the James, Penn’s flagship, and another ship, the Sovereign, touched on the Kentish Knock and put about to clear the shoal.[20] Whether the whole of his squadron followed the Vice Admiral is not known, but those that did so were on the same tack as the Dutch and continued to engage them until night fell. The Resolution, Blake’s flagship, also touched but stood on with the rest of the ships and ranged to windward past the whole length of the Dutch fleet until about 7 pm,[21] when the action ceased. It will be noted that the English leaders led their squadrons, that the organisation in squadrons was only partial by either side, and that as in the action between Ayscue and Ruyter, the fleets were only partially engaged, some English ships passing through the weathermost Dutch ships. But for the most part, the former seem to have kept the wind, while many of the latter held off to leeward, thus leaving unsupported de With and de Ruyter, who with those ships that kept their wind bore the brunt of the action.[22] Furthermore, de With complained bitterly that his ships to leeward fired over and through his flagship; “which in my opinion is a great brutality and outrage.”

The English losses are not exactly known but seem to have been small, e.g., the Resolution had 23 casualties and the James, eight. On the Dutch side the reports are equally vague, but de Ruyter states in his log that on the following day their numbers were only 49,[23] whereas they began the action with 57 ships and one had rejoined. The net difference of 9 includes some ships which had been taken or destroyed and others which had withdrawn and sailed home. The subsequent proceedings are of no tactical importance.

Dungeness 30^th November – 10^th December, 1652.

At daybreak on the 29^th November – 9^th December the English and Dutch fleets were at anchor within sight of each other; the former was in the Downs, the latter outside the Goodwins and to leeward.[24] The English ships were commanded by General Robert Blake and are said to have numbered 42. Nothing authentic is known of their organisation. The Dutch are believed to have had present about 80 ships, organised in four squadrons led respectively by Lieutenant Admiral Martin Tromp, who was in Chief Command, by Johan Evertsen, Michiel de Ruyter and Pieter Florissen. In these numbers neither fire ships nor small craft are included on either side.[25]

Between 11 and 12 am, both fleets weighed with the wind about WSW. The Dutch stood to the northward on the port tack until about 1 o’clock when they were put about by a sharp squall from NW, which subsequently freshened to a gale. The English, instead of falling back on their reinforcements in the Thames, steered to the southward close along the land and passed 2 1/2 to 3 miles to windward of the Dutch then standing to the WSW. After dark – say 5 o’clock – both fleets anchored more than two miles apart, the English in Dover Roads close under the high land west of the town and sheltered from the NW gale, the Dutch to leeward further out, in deeper water, more exposed and extending from Deal to about 14 sea miles of the South Foreland.[26] Tromp was now not only between Blake and the Thames but had penned him against the land, so that with the wind unchanged at NW he could neither withdraw to the Thames, nor get to windward, nor pass Dungeness to avoid battle with a greatly superior force. Blake had been completely out-manoeuvred and next day was forced to fight at a disadvantage. The gale continued throughout the night, but moderated somewhat in the morning.

At daybreak, say 8 am, Tromp made a signal to weigh, but as some ships had their lower yards and topmasts struck and a long scope of cable out, it was not until about 11 am on the rising tide[27] that the fleet made sail, the wind being still strong from the NW. The English weighed immediately afterward.[28] Both fleets stood to the westward on the starboard tack heading about WSW, the English, inshore with about 12 sea miles to go before reaching the land between Hythe and Dungeness, and pressed to windward by the Dutch. Neither fleet was in any regular order, each side seemingly falling into that usually brought about by a “general chase,” the faster and more weatherly ships leading or keeping to windward.[29] About 1 pm the weathermost Dutch ships opened fire,[30] indicating that the nearest ships were perhaps only half a sea mile apart. About 3 pm Tromp, whose flagship, the Brederode, appears to have been among the leading Dutch ships, was off Dungeness and so far advanced that he thought it possible to fetch Blake in the Triumph, one of the headmost English ships. The Brederode was tacked accordingly. Other ships followed her motions. She passed to leeward of the Triumph exchanging broadsides with her, and ran on board the ship on her lee quarter – the Garland – Bonaventure attacked the Brederode on the other side, and after an interval Evertsen in the Hollandia ranged up alongside the Bonaventure.[31] After nearly an hour’s fighting both the English ships were carried by boarding, but by that time night was falling – the sun set about 3.49. Meanwhile the Victory, Vanguard and other English ships were engaged with divers Dutch ships, among which seems to have been de Ruyter’s flagship. It was late before Blake noticed the dangerous position of the Garland and Bonaventure and gave orders to bear up and to support them. His intention could not be carried out by the Triumph as that ship suffered so much damage to her spars and rigging from gunfire as to become unmanageable.[32] At some uncertain time the English ships ran with the wind free for Dover and were probably only saved from serious losses or even total destruction by the want of daylight. After dark the Triumph, which at nightfall had been left almost alone, followed to the same anchorage. The Dutch do not seem to have pressed the pursuit with any vigour. The action was only partial, not more than half the English and a similar proportion of the Dutch being engaged, but if the English had remained to fight nothing could have prevented the whole Dutch fleet coming up and joining in the battle, had they wished to do so.

Blake complained in his despatch, “that there was much baseness of spirit not among the merchantmen only but many of the States’ ships.”[33] De Ruyter’s log also speaks of being unsupported and comments that, “the English then took to flight… and if we had had any assistance, indeed even 10 or 12 ships, we should have beaten their whole fleet; but the greater number of our ships could not come up with them.”[34] Whatever may have been the behaviour of Blake’s captains, his charges against them must be discounted, seeing that his defeat was mainly due to his own want of skill as a seaman. He conducted his fleet into a position where it was exposed at a disadvantage to attack by a greatly superior force. The duty of an Admiral is not to court defeat but to win victory.

Portland 18^th – 28^th February, 1652-3

On 10^th – 20^th February, 1652-3, the English Generals Blake, Monck and Deane issued instructions[35] to the fleet, of which the more important read: 2) “At sight of the said fleet the Vice Admiral, or he that commands in the second place, and his squadron, as also the Rear Admiral, or he that commands in the third place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the Admiral on each wing, giving a competent distance for the Admiral’s squadron if there be sea room.” Remark: This is substantially similar to Tromp’s order of 20^th – 30^th June, 1652, but does not necessarily nor probably derive from it. The problems and their solution were similar on either side. 3) “And as soon as they shall see the General engage and (he) shall make a signal… that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto them.” Remark: The words in italics are an advance on Tromp’s instructions, and are very important since they concentrate attention on attacking. 4) “If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged and distressed, the next squadron or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and assistance upon signal given…” Remark: This again is similar to Tromp’s order.

On 18^th – 28^th February, 1652-3, the Dutch fleet under Lieut Admiral Martin Tromp, numbering 70 ships of war with a convoy of 150 merchantmen homeward bound from the Isle of Re, met off Portland an English fleet about equal in numbers under Generals Robert Blake, Richard Deane and George Monck.[36]

No accurate list of the ships on either side has come down to us. The Dutch fleet was organised in four squadrons led respectively by Martin Tromp in the Brederode, Johan Evertsen in the Hollandia, Pieter Florissen in the Monnikendam and Michiel de Ruyter in the Lam. The English fleet was divided into three squadrons, the Red under Blake and Deane in the Triumph, the Blue under William Penn in the Speaker, and the White under Monck in the Vanguard. In both fleets a vice admiral and a rear admiral were attached to each squadron in addition to its leader or admiral, which suggests a further triple sub-division.

The wind being NW, the weather fair and sunrise about 7.12, Portland Bill was sighted by the Dutch fleet at day break to windward, i.e., about NW, at a distance variously estimated at 3 to 10 sea miles. The English fleet was to leeward heading WSW. on the starboard tack. Nearest to and about 4% sea miles from the Dutch were about 23 ships of the Red and Blue squadrons, including the Triumph; 3 sea miles or more further to leeward were the Vanguard and the White squadron; but many ships of each squadron were much astern and to leeward of their leaders. The above 23 ships are said to have been so disposed at this time that Penn in the Speaker with ships of his (blue) squadron was a little ahead of Blake and Deane in the Triumph, while Lawson, the Vice Admiral of the Red, in the Fairfax with ships of his division was seemingly but not certainly about one sea mile on their starboard quarter.[37]

The English General’s despatch reads that “the Dutch Admiral might probably (if he had pleased to have kept his wind) (have) gone away with his whole fleet and we had not been able to have reached him with our main body…” This dubious and hypothetical assertion is not borne out by their own facts (see plan). They give their own position, i.e., the Triumph’s, as 15 sea miles from the English shore, presumably Portland Bill and St. Alban’s Head, and that of the Dutch as 4 1/2 sea miles to windward, i.e., NW of them.[38] From another source we know that Portland Bill was NW of the Dutch.[39]

Thus, according to the Generals, the Dutch were about 10 sea miles SE[40] of Portland Bill, and therefore their best chance of passing without a battle was not to keep their wind on the port tack but to continue their course, E by N, up Channel, since every point steered nearer the wind would have made it more easy to prevent their withdrawal and to pin them against the land. But even on an E by N course they could have been intercepted, if the English had tacked on sighting the enemy and steered NE. To save the convoy, Tromp had no alternative but to fight a delaying action which he did.[41] To continue heading WSW on the starboard tack, as the English did, was to open a passage for the Dutch. It is evident that the English generals were on the wrong tack.

Obliged to fight, Tromp placed his convoy to windward, ordered it to stay there, and bore dohn to the attack, the squadrons of Florissen and Tromp to starboard, Evertsen in the centre and presumably Ruyter to port. As soon as the Dutch were seen to bear down the Triumph was hove to, whether the ships near her, including those with Penn and Lawson followed motions is not stated. Tromp with Florissen attacked where “Admiral Blake and the largest ships were,” the latter claiming to have been first in action about 8 am. Evertsen engaged an hour later.[42] The number of Dutch ships thus brought into the fight is said to have been about 30, of which seven attacked the Triumph. When this Dutch concentration was seen Penn put the English van about and stood back on the port tack to the support of the centre, while Lawson with his division came up on the starboard tack. By l0 am some of the ships to leeward had also worked up and the English ships engaged seem to have numbered about 30.[43] But the Dutch were also reinforced as de Ruyter states that he began to engage about this time.[44] The result was a confused meele lasting four to six hours, the ships in general heading about WSW, the single ones tacking from time to time as circumstances required.[45]

During this time some Dutch ships seem to have held off, but probably additional ships on both sides came into action. Monck and some of the White squadron certainly did so; others stretched so far ahead on the starboard tack that they were able to weather the greatest part of the Dutch fleet and to threaten the convoy. On seeing this about 4 pm, Tromp tacked to the northward and drew out of action, the Dutch fleet following his motions. After withdrawing Tromp discussed with Evertsen and Ruyter the question whether they should again attack, or should retreat up Channel with the convoy. To attack meant to leave the convoy without an escort, as the fleet could not be divided. Furthermore, ammunition was beginning to run short and victory doubtful. Seemingly for some such reasons it was decided not to renew the attack.

After the council, the fleet and convoy were collected and continued their course up Channel, the merchant ships ahead of and covered by the ships of war. The wind was still NW but dropped to a calm in the evening.[46] The English did not pursue, but started to repair their losses which were extensive in both men and material, as the fighting had been severe. Six ships were so much injured that one was sunk by her own captain and five parted company to proceed into port. The Dutch accounts admit the loss of seven or eight ships, including three or four sunk, one blown up, and three taken.

Gabbard, 2^nd – 12^th June, 1653

On 29^th March – 8^th April, 1653, Generals Blake, Monck and Deane issued amended instructions[47] to the fleet. The more important read: 2) “At sight of the said fleet the Vice Admiral, or he that commands in chief in the second place, and his squadron, as also the Rear Admiral, or he that commands in the third place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the Admiral on each wing, the Vice Admiral on the right wing and the Rear Admiral on the left wing, giving a competent distance for the Admira’s squadron if the wind will permit and there be sea room enough.” Remark: The amendment is seen in the italics which definitely station the three squadrons, as did Tromp’s order of June 1652. 3) “As soon as they shall see the General engage, or make a signal… that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto them; and in order thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a line with their Chief unless the Chief of his squadron shall be lamed or otherwise disabled… then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to get in line with the Admiral or he that commands in chief next to him and nearest the enemy.” Remark: The amendment is seen in the italics which direct the ships of each squadron to fight in line. It is to be noted that the direction to engage comes before the order to keep in line, which latter was probably the result of the experience gained in the battle of Portland. 7) “In case the Admiral should have the wind of the enemy, and that other ships of the fleet are to windward of the Admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag… every such ship is to bear up into his wake or grayne upon pain of the severest punishment. If in case the Admiral be to leeward of the enemy and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ship to leeward may come into a line with the Admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up but to keep his or their luff thereby to gain his wake or grayne.” Remark: The article is an addition and was probably drawn to prevent ships remaining out of action, as had been common on both sides in every previous action of the war owing to the want of definite instructions, or of skill, or of knowledge, or of will. 8) “If the Admiral will have any of the ships to endeavour by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy he will put abroad a Red flag…” Remark: This article is an addition. 9) “If we put out a Red flag on the mizen shrouds… we will have all the flag ships to come up in the grayne or wake of us.” Remark: This article is an addition, and is in principle similar to the modern order for the guides of columns to take station on a bearing.

In this battle the Dutch had 98 warships and 6[48] fireships. As no list of the ships engaged has come down to us the number of men and guns carried is not known. The fleet was organised in five squadrons under Martin Tromp, who was in chief command, Jan Evertsen, Cornelis de With, Michiel de Ruyter, and Pieter Florissen, each of whom was supported by a vice admiral and a rear admiral,[49] which suggests three divisions in each squadron. The English had about 100 warships and 5 fireships manned by 16,269 men and carrying 3,840 guns and their largest ships were more powerful than those of the Dutch. The fleet was divided into three squadrons, the Red under Generals Richard Deane and George Monck, the White under William Penn, and the Blue under John Lawson; also each squadron into three divisions.[50]

On Tuesday 31^st May – 10^th June the Dutch anchored with the North Foreland bearing SW distant about four sea miles.[51] Tromp’s latest intelligence was that the English fleet had been off the Texel and two days before had been sighted off the Dutch coast further south and steering west.[52] On the same day the English anchored in Southwold Bay off Dunwich.[53] The General’s latest intelligence was that the Dutch fleet had been off the Long Sand Head the night before, which was incorrect. The respective anchorages were nearly 60 sea miles apart.

On Wednesday 1^st – 11^th June about 6 or 7 am both fleets weighed. The Dutch passed close under the North Foreland and then stood NE by E and ENE with a stiff breeze from N by W and N until the evening when they tacked off the sand banks – Hinder shoal probably – and stood WNW throughout the night.[54] The English steered to the southward and anchored off the shipway; presently their lookout frigates reported a fleet in sight to leeward; whereupon the fleet weighed, chased and sighted the enemy about 12 sea miles (?) to leeward. When the lee tide made in the evening the English fleet anchored about two sea miles inside the south head of the Gabbard Shoal.[55]

At day break, say 4 am, Thursday and 2^nd – 12^th June, the wind being light and in direction given variously as NNW or N by E, the two fleets sighted each other, the English to windward and about 6 sea miles N by E from the Dutch. The former immediately weighed and bore down on the latter, who headed for their opponents on the port tack, keeping their wind.[56] The Dutch squadrons, being on a wind, were probably disposed astern with Ruyter’s leading.[57] The English bore down in three squadrons disposed abeam,[58] the Red being in the centre, the White to starboard, and the Blue to port with Jordan’s division on the outside wing. As the wind was light, the ships of each squadron in both fleets cannot have been in any exact formation. Between 11 am and noon the English Blue squadron, followed later by the Red and White squadrons began to haul to the wind on the port tack, probably as at the Kentish Knock out of gunshot, to windward of the Dutch but not simultaneously.[59] Doubtless each ship hauled up independently and came into line with its squadron Commander, in accordance with the Fighting Instructions dated March 1653.[60] The Dutch squadrons may also have been in somewhat similar formation (see plan).[61]

Finally, the English came into action at a distance, according to Jordan,[62] or just within shot, according to Tromp.[63] About 3 pm the wind, which had fallen to a calm during the long range cannonade, came from the eastward and the English van (Blue) having forged ahead and become separated from their centre (Red) the Dutch stood together to the northward on the starboard tack and tried to cut it off. A confused close action followed and lasted until about sunset when the two fleets drew apart, the English to the northward and the Dutch to the southward.[64] The result of the day’s work was that the Dutch lost three or four ships and were left so short of ammunition that Tromp reported himself unable to continue the fight next day.[65] The English lost no ships but General Deane was killed and the greater part of their ammunition was expended.[66]

Calms arid light airs during the night were followed by a light breeze from SW at daybreak on Friday 3^rd – 13^th June. The two fleets were then about one sea mile apart, the English being about WNW from, and to windward of, the Dutch, who stood to the southward, keeping their wind, and followed by the English. Neither the order nor the formation of either fleet is known. Probably both were scattered and unformed but grouped in squadrons. About 10 am, the Flemish coast being then distant about 4 sea miles, the Dutch tacked to the northward to weather the English, but failed to do so. Whereupon the English, taking advantage of their position to windward, bore down and attacked between 11 am and noon.[67]

After an action of about four hours the wind freshened to a gale at SW and the Dutch, being very short of ammunition, bore up ENE pursued by the English until shortly after sunset, when the latter hauled off, stood to the northward and anchored about 10 pm outside the shoals off Ostend.[68] The Dutch anchored about midnight within sight of the same place.[69] During the two days’ battle the Dutch seem to have lost about 20 ships sunk or captured, while the English had no ships captured or sunk, but about 12 were sent into port for repairs.

Scheveningen, 29^th – 31^st July – 8^th – 10^th August, 1654

On 28^th July – 7^th August, 1653, the Dutch fleet under Admiral Martin Tromp passed Scheveningen about sunset – say 8 pm – standing to the northward with the wind at SW.[70] About the same time the English fleet under General George Monck weighed from a position nine sea miles off the entrance to the Helder and stood all night to the northward with the wind WSW.[71] Tromp had with him about 81 warships, four fire ships and some merchant ships,[72] and in the Helder were 27 warships and four fire ships under De With.[73] Monck’s strength seems to have been about 110 warships, of which 8 or 10 were first rates and more powerful than corresponding ships in the Dutch fleet.[74] There is no evidence to show that the respective organisations had been changed since the battle off the Gabbard, when the Dutch were in five squadrons and the English in three.[75]

About 8 am on 29^th July – 8^th August Tromp was close to Egmont, or about 19 sea miles from the entrance to the Helder.[76] The order of the fleet is a matter for conjecture, but as the wind was westerly, the course northerly, and the enemy known to be near, the squadrons were probably disposed ahead and astern of each other, the distance from van to rear being perhaps four sea miles or more. The squadrons seem to have been ranged in the order de Ruyter, Jan Evertsen, Tromp, Florissen, but it is not certain which was leading. About the same time Monck, who seems to have tacked about 6 am,[77] was somewhat to the northward of the Helder standing to the southward. The order of the English fleet at this time is not known. About 9 am the lookout ships on either side reported an enemy. Two hours later the two fleets sighted each other and the wind veered to NW, which gave the English the weather gauge.[78] They bore down to the attack, while the Dutch kept their wind on the port tack until about 1 pm[79] when they wore, probably squadron leaders together, the remainder in succession, and stood to the SSW to draw the enemy off shore and thus to allow De With to put to sea from the Helder and join Tromp.[80]

After this movement Florissen’s squadron was certainly in the van and de Ruyter’s in the rear. The English followed in chase, but it was not until about 4.30 pm that their leading fast ships came into action with the slow Dutch ones in the rear. To support these Tromp now shortened sail, and waited for the enemy to come up.[81] By 7 pm Monck in the Resolution and about thirty English ships were in action, seemingly at a distance, with the ships of Evertsen and De Ruyter.[82] At dusk – about 8.30 – the fighting ceased. Both fleets stood on, the English to windward, with the wind at NW, and up to 2 am were near each other.[83] At some uncertain time between that hour and daylight – about 4.20 am – on 30^th July – 9^th August the Dutch fleet stood to the northward on the port tack and by daybreak were well to windward, to the northward and eastward of the English, who presently put about and followed in the Dutch wake.[84] Tromp had interposed between Monck and the Helder and was free to join De With. That officer put to sea at daylight 30^th July – 9^th August, sighted Tromp about 2 pm and joined him about 6 pm.

At this time both fleets seem to have been standing about NNE, the English being to windward of the Dutch wake, i.e., on their weather quarter, and the two fleets only about one and a half sea miles apart.[85] The wind throughout the day had been blowing hard from WNW or NW with thick dirty weather.[86] Immediately after the junction the Dutch fleet tacked or wore, whether together or in succession is uncertain, and bore down to the attack, but the English declined battle and also put about on the same starboards tack.[87]

During the night the weather moderated and both fleets stood to the WSW with the wind about NW. With the morning – 31^st July – 10^th August – came fine weather and a light wind from the southward. Both fleets were now on the port tack and probably were each extended over a distance of four or five miles from van to rear and very irregularly formed as the wind had shifted from NW to SSW and fallen light.[88] The Dutch were about half a sea mile to windward and seem to have been somewhat in advance of the English. The order in which the squadrons were placed in either fleet is not explicitly given, but can be inferred from the reports (Fig. 1).

Since the Blue squadron did not tack until sometime after the Red and did not engage until about an hour after that squadron,[89] it may be accepted that the order of the English fleet from van to rear was White (Penn), Red (Monck), and Blue (Lawson). The Dutch fleet seem to have been ranged from van to rear in the order De Ruyter, Jan Evertsen, Tromp, Florissen, De With,[90] that is to say, the order was the same as in the action on the evening of the 29^th July – 8^th August but inverted, with the addition of De With who says explicitly that his squadron was one of those in rear of the centre.[91] Between 4.30 pm on the 29^th and the shift of wind on the 31^st, both fleets had put about twice. It is not known on which occasion the order was inverted.

At some uncertain time after sunrise the Red squadron led by Monck in the Resolution tacked in succession and about 7 am sailed through the Dutch fleet.[92] In accordance with the 3rd Fighting Instruction Penn in the James would at the same time have tacked “to engage the enemy next to him,” and led the White squadron through somewhere in the Dutch centre, not being able to fetch higher.[93] Lawson, who led the Blue squadron in the George, being in the rear and not able to fetch any part of the Dutch fleet naturally stood on until about 7 am, when he also tacked[94] (Fig. 2). The diagram shows the opening phase of the battle on the assumption that Monck, Penn and Lawson led their respective squadrons.[95] Fig. 1 represents the relative positions when Monck and Penn tacked; Fig. 2 those about 7 am when they sailed through the Dutch fleet. Penn is seen to be passing through Tromp’s squadron, and Monck through that of Florissen, while Lawson is about to tack. We are to picture streams of ships, perhaps 200 yards broad and irregularly formed, sailing through each other on opposite tacks.

As soon as Monck’s threat to the rear was seen de Ruyter probably tacked and led his squadron to its support, as shown in Fig. 2. He was always eager for battle and was heavily engaged as shown by his 78 casualties and loss of masts. Between 7 am and 1 pm the fleets sailed through each other four times on opposite tacks, which means that the Dutch tacked three times D1, D2, D3, and the English four times E1, E2, E3, E4, Fig. 3 (not drawn to scale). The English tacked a fifth time, but the Dutch refused further battle. Such of their ships as remained to windward stood for home on their then south-easterly course,[96] while the remainder made off to leeward pursued by the English. It will be observed that the English delivered their attack on the Dutch rear and that they tacked in succession by squadrons, but that there is nothing to indicate whether the Dutch did so, or followed de Ruyter and tacked in succession after him.

In sailing through each other the advantage evidently lay with the more closely ordered fleet, which seems to have been the English, seeing that the Dutch ships weathered on were scattered.[97] Each successive board cut off additional Dutch ships,[98] forcing them to leeward, but crossing on opposite tacks made the battle less decisive. The final result was that some 84 ships, including the flag ships of Tromp and De With reached the Texel to leeward, while de Ruyter and Jan Evertsen with some 12 ships fetched the Meuse or Goree Gat to windward,[99] thus confirming the assumed Dutch order of battle which placed these two officers in the van. The unmeasured abuse by De With of the Dutch captains who were cut off, scattered and forced to leeward must be accepted with reserve as their action was largely the result of the English tactics and their defence has not come down to us. The Dutch seem to have lost 13 or 14 ships, sunk or burnt, the English one or two, but such was the damage sustained by Monck’s ships that the whole fleet proceeded to England after the battle and it was not until three weeks later that a detachment returned to the coast of Holland.

References

[1] Letters and Papers relating to the First Dutch War, Vol. II, ed., Gardiner, S. R., Naval Records Society (1899), documents. 342, 358, 382, 383.

[2] doc. 371

[3] “Each Captain is expressly ordered… to keep near the Flag Officer under whom he serves… The squadron under Vice Admiral Jan Evertsen is to lie or sail immediately ahead of the Admiral. Further, Captain Pieter Floriszoon (who provisionally carries his flag at the Mizen as Rear Admiral) is always to remain with his squadron close astern of the Admiral; and the Admiral Tromp is to take station between both with his squadron. The said superior officers and Captains are to stand by one another with all fidelity; and each squadron when another is vigorously attacked, shall second and free the other, using therein all the qualities of a soldier and seaman…” Ibid., doc. 176. (The three squadrons had each a divisional Vice Admiral and Rear Admiral besides the Admiral in Command.)

[4] doc. 358

[5] 380

[6] 358

[7] 382

[8] 342

[9] 358

[10] 381, 418

[11] 408

[12] 381

[13] 389

[14] 463

[15] 451

[16] In October, 1652, de With issued an order somewhat similar to that of Tromp, dated 20/30 June, 1652. See de Jonghe Geschiedens van het Nederlandische Zeewesen, Vol. II., Pt. II., p. 311.

[17] Ibid., p. 262, 355

[18] De With’s log.

[19] docs. 452-453

[20] 453

[21] 451, 452

[22] De With’s log, 463

[23] 463

[24] 598

[25] 569, 581, 598, 650

[26] 580, 598, 649, 650, 651

[27] High water at Dover 6.17 am and 6.42 pm

[28] 580, 598, 649, 650, 651

[29] 619

[30] 598

[31] 598

[32] 580

[33] 580

[34] 651

[35] 818

[36] 877

[37] I, 907

[38] 907

[39] 917

[40] See plan. The bearings and courses are true, since the variation of the compass was then nearly zero in that area.

[41] Cp. IV., 6, where the point was missed.

[42] 916, 917

[43] 854, 917

[44] 918

[45] 845, 877, 916

[46] 877

[47] 945

[48] 1053

[49] Ruyter’s Journal

[50] Penn’s Life. Vol. I, p. 491

[51] Ruyter’s Journal

[52] 1045

[53] 1048

[54] Ruyter’s Journal

[55] 1055 and Jordan’s Journal

[56] 1055, Jordan’s and Ruyter’s Journals.

[57] 1062

[58] Vol. V, p. 21

[59] Jordan’s Journal

[60] 945, 1080

[61] 1071

[62] Jordan’s Journal

[63] Vol. V, p. 21

[64] Vol. V, p. 21

[65] 1053

[66] 1055

[67] Vol. V, App II; 1056; Ruyter’s Journal

[68] 1061, Ruyter’s Journal

[69] Vol. V, App. II

[70] 1169, 1172

[71] 1174

[72] 1160

[73] 1178

[74] 1181, 1157

[75] p. 620

[76] 1172

[77] 1182

[78] 1172, 1174

[79] Ruyter’s Journal

[80] 1172

[81] 1172

[82] 1174, 1182, Ruyter’s Journal

[83] 1172

[84] 1174, Ruyter’s Journal

[85] 1178

[86] 1174

[87] Ruyter’s Journal

[88] 1178, Lawson’s Journal

[89] Lawson’s Journal, 1174, 1188

[90] Ruyter’s Journal

[91] 1178

[92] 1174, 1178

[93] 1178

[94] Lawson’s Journal

[95] No. 1174; Jordan’s Journal, “About seven in the morn my General tacking to meet them, each division followed.”

[96] 1178, 1181, Ruyter’s Journal

[97] Jordan’s Journal

[98] 1178, 1181

[99] Ruyter’s Journal