The Relations Between The Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy

It is with great interest that I have read the article in the last quarter’s Naval Review [19/3, p. 405] on the relations between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service. For the future welfare of the Empire this is a most important question. The present writer has had an extended experience in all three Services: the Merchant Service, the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Navy.

Before joining the Royal Navy in 1895 at 28 years of age I had about 15 years in the Merchant Service; during that period I had gone from apprentice in clipper ships to junior master in the largest shipping company in the world at that time; also during this period I had served for four years in the Royal Naval Reserve, including six months in the Excellent and Vernon and one year in a flagship on a foreign station. Joining the Royal Navy in 1895 I had various experiences until the outbreak of the war, when I was almost immediately promoted to acting captain. It will be seen from the above that my service afloat enables me to discuss this question from all points of view.

The writer is correct, I think, in his account of the Merchant Service, except in three points, and these are pensions, age of retirement and leave. Most large companies have a pension scheme for all officers, including engineers; also an age to retire. 46 years ago the company I was in had a non-contributory pension scheme, the age for retirement was 56, and six months leave was allowed every five years. Officers could also deposit savings with the Company which carried 5% interest.

Re. discipline in the Merchant Service; I have known it good and bad. In clipper ships it was very strict: stricter, in fact, than I have ever known it in the Royal Navy. I have never seen men jump at the word of command in the Royal Navy as I have seen them in the clippers; why, I do not know, except that those who gave words of command had a personality about them which compelled one to obey. I have not experienced the “fist and belaying pin” principle; this system, I think, must have had its sway in American clipper ships, certainly not in British ships. Discipline in merchant ships went rapidly down with the advent of steamers; why, it is unnecessary to go into in this article.

The writer is quite correct in his remarks regarding the Royal Navy being criticised by the Merchant Serviceman, but I have never yet met the Merchant Serviceman who would allow the British Royal Navy to be ‘run down’ by a foreigner. The position is somewhat analogous to that between a man and his wife: they will have their rows, but as an outsider do not interfere or you will be in trouble.

Coming to my own time in the RN, I have always received the greatest kindness and consideration from fully 95% of the officers I have come into contact with. From the first day I joined one of His Majesty’s ships in commission I carried out the ordinary duties of an officer of a battery, division, and watch keeping, and I think the writer of the article in question must be a little bit in error when he says that there is little in common between the two services. If there was not a great deal in common between them I could not possibly have stepped from the deck of a merchant ship to that of a flagship and there carried on the above duties. I had never served in a cadet ship, and I had no previous training in the routine of a man of war; consequently my knowledge must have come from my training in the Merchant Service. There were certainly differences in words of command, but this was quickly corrected – with probably a laugh or two on the part of both officers and men. In fact, there is a great deal in common between the two Services, though it may not be so obvious on the surface.

From the dawn of history mercantile seamen have fought their way over the oceans, though there has not been so much of this in later years; the first merchant ship I served in had a complete set of muskets, double-barrelled pistols, cutlasses and pikes ranged round the main cabin for all hands, and in the fore peak were stowed 12 nine-pounders and their truck carriages. Even at the present day steamers on the China coast and rivers are armed to resist attacks by pirates.

The Merchant Service has always been the reserve for the Royal Navy. During the Crimean War 60% of the seamen serving in Her Majesty’s ships were merchant seamen, and even during the threatened war with Russia in 1884 the writer entered as fourth officer of an Atlantic liner, taken up and armed as a cruiser. This entry of mercantile seamen during a national crisis has applied in the past more to men than to officers, and I have been shipmates with many seamen in clipper ships who had served in both the British and United States navies.

Taking it all round there is, during peace, very little connection between the Mercantile and Royal Navies, but immediately on the outbreak of a war they come together again. This is as might be expected; their occupations are on quite different lines, they do not frequent the same home ports, and abroad the mercantile officer’s stay in a port is, as a rule, of very short duration, and during that time his chances of leaving his ship are small.

A man of war ‘showing the flag’ – a most important part of her duties – visits a port for a few days and is fully occupied in entertaining and being entertained by the British community ashore; the merchant ship comes into harbour, starts discharging and taking in cargo, and is off again as soon as possible. In a foreign port that the writer has lately spent a few months in, a great number of cargo ships called, but only for a few days. Once a month a British mail ship arrived and stayed for 10 days, and the officers were to be met ashore playing golf, etc., and mixing with the British community, and when a British man of war was in port I often noticed officers of both Services fraternising. This was to be explained by the fact that in those mail steamers the senior officers, and most of the juniors, were holding commissions in the RNR. In fact, the Master of one ship was RNR ADC to His Majesty.

The writer is, in my opinion, quite correct when he puts forward the suggestion that the Royal Naval Reserve is the medium by which a greater connection can be forged between the Royal Navy and its stand-by, the Mercantile Marine. To enable this object to be attained the question arises: is the RNR, as at present constituted, on the right lines? If not, how can it be constituted to attain the object in view? Personally, I think the RNR, as at present constituted, is on entirely wrong lines and that it has first to be constituted into a real Service before it can attain its object.

At present the Royal Naval Reserve consists of some officers of the Executive, Engineering and Paymaster branches, and a few thousand seamen and firemen; they are not a Service in the real sense of the word, just a collection of men to supplement the Navy when the occasion arises. The officers practically never see their men; during my service as an RNR officer I practically never came into contact with men of the RNR. For a few weeks I did some drill in an RNR drill ship, and we had a few men drilling at the same time; and this was all.

Now, a real Naval Reserve would consist of all the ratings employed on board merchant ships who could be employed on board of a man of war, and in this connection a modern liner holds practically all those ratings. It would then consist of a solid body of men drilled and trained to fight a man of war, from the captain to signal boy.

The Territorial Army is constituted on those lines. A Territorial battalion is complete and is ready to take the field as a unit, from the colonel to the bugler boy, with the addition of an adjutant and quartermaster from the regular forces. In fact, on taking the field, there is no difference to be seen between a regular battalion and its Territorial ‘opposite number’, except, I think, the letter T. on the shoulder strap.

Now, why cannot this system apply to the RNR? The Naval Reserve could consist of all ranks and ratings that the Merchant Service can supply; and in addition, all officers and men of the Royal Navy who at present pass into Emergency Lists and Fleet Reserves could pass into the Royal Naval Reserve. The total number of officers and men in the Reserve should bear some relation to the numbers of active service officers and men, and of the ships to be commissioned on the outbreak of a war. For instance, if there were 100 ships to commission including all classes, 100 full crews would be required. In addition to this would be the number of merchant ships to be taken up as auxiliary cruisers. An allowance would have to be made for men absent on distant voyages; this could easily be worked out.

To enable a scheme of this description to be given full play an organisation would have to be worked up at one of the main dockyards. Now Rosyth is lying practically useless for naval purposes: it could become the headquarters of the Royal Naval Reserve. It is very central for the purpose, as the bulk of the officers and men come from parts north of Hull and Liverpool. In this port could be stationed all classes of ships (except battleships) that would be commissioned by the RNR in an emergency. One, two or three of these ships could be used to accommodate ratings up for drill. Regularly every month some of the ships could be commissioned by the RNR, all officers and men being RNR, and the only permanent officers being the warrant officers.

This is a most important part of an officer’s duties, viz. to commission and get a ship ready for sea. After the ship was commissioned she could proceed to sea for a few days; then return and pay off. The present scheme of having officers and men scattered about among different ships is good up to a certain point, as it lets them see the routine, etc., carried out in actual ships in commission, but the work of actually commissioning a ship and running her with his own men should be the completion of a Naval Reserve officer’s training. Put the responsibility of doing this upon the RNR officer.

During the annual fleet maneuvers, ships of the Reserve should join up fully manned by Reserve Crews, while one ship should be kept permanently in commission with the Mediterranean Fleet and one with the Atlantic Fleet, both ships being permanently manned by the RNR. The RNR officer should have the same chance of commanding his ships and men as have the officers serving in the Army. In connection with the entry of officers and men, this should be entirely done by the RNR officer, and the present Admiral commanding Reserves done away with, as should also the connection between the RNR and the Registrar General of Shipping and seamen.

The Admiral commanding the Reserve Fleet should do all the duties of an Admiral commanding a fleet, and committees of officers should be formed to enquire into, select and recommend Mercantile marine cadets and officers for entry into the RNR. It stands to reason that the RNR officers must be the best judge of the capabilities of mercantile marine candidates. In these times of financial stringency there is no use in putting forward schemes that will cause increases in the estimates, but the writer is certain that, for the money now spent on the RNR and Fleet Reserves, a scheme can be worked out on the foregoing lines that will cost no more, be more efficient, and make full use of the brains and energies of the RNR, both officers and men. The RNR is quite entitled to demand its own organisation ‘lock stock and barrel’. It has too long been a ‘paper force’, badly trained for its special duties in time of war, and relegated to an inferior position in peace time.