What does the French ‘Jeune Ecole’ theory teach us to help set up a winning Hybrid Navy?

The Jeune École (‘Young’ or ‘New School’) was a late 19th-century French naval strategy that challenged traditional naval doctrines, mainly elaborated by admiral Théophile Aube (1826-1890).[1] His advocates argued for a shift away from large battleships and fleet engagements, focusing instead on asymmetric warfare and commerce raiding. Ultimately Struggling to achieve its strategic objectives, the Jeune École left some useful legacies which paved the way to the large scale innovations during the First World War.

The Jeune École emerged in response to French limited resources compared to Britain’s dominant Royal Navy, following French defeat by Prussia (1871) when priority was given to prepare the ‘revenge’ on the newly united German empire. It is cyclic in French modern history: naval doctrine must adapt when the continental threat raises and drives budget to the Army. Marshal Vauban already thought similarly in the late 17^th century when using corsairs in a kind of terrorist precursor strategy,[2] targeting enemy trade, when the French Navy was not strong enough to counter the Anglo-Dutch alliance.

This ‘new school’ prioritised offensive tactics, aiming to weaken an opponent’s economy and morale rather than seeking decisive naval battles. Today, many navies are also struggling to adapt to limited resources and to address high-end weapons’ proliferation. Lessons from the Jeune École could be a good case study to prepare the RN in its shift to a hybrid design.

Political and societal context 

This theory emerged just after the adoption of the law on press freedom in 1881, of which one of the consequences was to allow non-specialist writers to argue on every topic, and notably on naval strategy. Admiral Aube was heavily supported by a significant number of journalists providing a large array of dedicated articles. The public, and even members of parliament, quickly embraced simplistic arguments that portrayed the torpedo boats as the new silver bullet to counter the Royal Navy. Moreover, the new parliamentarian regime of the Third Republic was keen to dispossess the Admiralty, supposedly conservative and monarchist, of the fleet design.

Factors of success

• This disruptive and simplistic approach easily resonated in this era of industrial revolution and positivist thinking. It allowed a refresh of doctrinal thinking and widening of contributors.
• It was presented as ‘open by design’ to new technologies and for ‘spiral development’ at pace. The French Navy effectively developed her first operational electric powered submarines at this time (Gymnote – 1889) and mine warfare was also later incorporated into the strategy as technological advancements emerged.
• It enabled the mobilization of widely dispersed small shipyards all along the coasts, which appealed to local elected officials and stimulated regional economies and growth. It was also seen by budget deciders as a cheaper solution for greater effects.
• By including use of smaller, faster, ships such as torpedo boats to attack larger enemy vessels, gave an appealing broader command perspective for junior officers. Success gained by such small vessels in the Franch-China War for Vietnam (1884-5) may have fuelled this feeling.[3]

However, there were shortcomings

• Relying on all-out war and civilian targeting, this shift was considered counterproductive and drew public criticism.
• Early implementation faced several technical hurdles, especially for submarines, and meanwhile, the Royal Navy adapted to the new threat by developing rapid-fire destroyers, laying protection nets in harbours, etc.
• But the major issue was the inability of small torpedo boats – still the backbone of this strategy – to operate sustainably in high seas. The difficulty of cohering the command of such a disparate fleet also contributed to discredit it at the beginning of the 20^th
• Counterexamples provided by the battles of Cuba (1898) and Tsushima (1905) also showcased that large battleships were decisive, highlighting with concrete evidence Mahan’s doctrine of sea power, and the importance it gives to fleet cohesion and sea control.
• And lastly, at a time marked by a resurgent global competition and challenges around overseas’ interests, the shortcomings of coastal defence vessels proved to be detrimental.

Torpedo boats harboured in Saint Malo port in 1900. Hundreds of these kinds of USV ancestors were homebased all-around French coasts before admiralty decided to commit to a fully Mahanian posture by 1910.

In the event, French naval deciders forgot to upkeep strategic thinking at the root of the new fleet design and fell for the sirens of the ‘material school’ by overly focusing on the means – against the ‘historical school’ with its focus instead on timeless principles.

A mitigated legacy

For the French Navy, the Jeune École thinking resulted in a multiplicity of prototype assets with limited practical application. After the Fashoda crisis (1898), the foreign minister Théophile Delcassé observed that “France does not have the Navy to meet her diplomacy requirements,”[4] echoing the role given to large and powerful battleships today.[5] Nonetheless, the Jeune École focus on asymmetric tactics and economic warfare foreshadowed elements of future components of naval warfare. Thus, among many examples, it inspired admiral Fisher in the concept of battlecruisers (“speed is armour”), or Germany to commit to all-out submarine warfare.

Lessons for a modern naval power

First, this case study shows it could be wrong to be right too soon. Admiral Aube was right to some extent, especially about the potential of torpedoes, submarines and the use aviation in the naval domain. But these concepts were not mature enough to be scaled up and widely incorporated in the naval strategy at that time. It highlights that, in the naval realm, technology should be integrated step by step, always balancing agility and risk management. Some decades after Aube’s theories’ emergence, big TGs around capital ships were not axed, but WWII saw them organised around carriers and aviation groups mainly fitted with torpedoes and including submarines in scouting and attack missions – all assets called for by the advocates of the ‘new school’ a few years prior.

That leads to the second point: there is a form of inevitability about genuine innovation as a future direction of travel. Yesterday, it was about torpedoes, aircraft and submarines, today about autonomous systems and AI, responding to the same logic of bringing mass and lethality to the battle groups regardless of their format. But considering that “when we talk about the Navy, we talk about continuity, time and determination,” [6] this novel technologies’ implementation should avoid any radical change in doctrine and design so as not to squander an already costly legacy by conciliating: (i) high-end technology and simplicity, (ii) synergy and autonomy, (iii) specialisation and homogeneity.

Lastly, it highlights the everlasting complex relationship between technological innovation and naval strategy,[7] advocating for a doctrine always relying both on history, experience[8] and innovation to avoid the trap of technological fascination and the risk of only preparing for yesterday’s war, and failing to understand tomorrow’s.

Conclusion

Similarly, today’s challenges for European Navies remain to blend old, new and newer together, while avoiding a hard shift which could compromise naval power but accepting risk to foster it. Being bold but not reckless means to ensure today that open architectures will drive more autonomy and therefore agility into existing fleet and task groups, enhancing operational effects and posing dilemmas to adversaries.

Indeed, today’s new technological pace requires navies to be able to rapidly integrate the flow of innovation into platforms that do not evolve at the same pace. This forces us to rethink what strategic resilience means. Perhaps a concept aimed towards ability to adopt, produce and integrate timely, rather than to stockpile capacity, highlighted recently by the supply disruptions and medical innovations during the Covid crisis.

References

[1] In La guerre maritime et les ports militaires de la France, Admiral Théophile Aube, Paris, 1882.

[2] Mémoire concernant la course, Sébastien Le Prestre, marquis de Vauban, Nov. 1693.

[3] Admiral Courbet won the battle of Fuzhou in August 1884 by the decisive use of two torpedo boats which sank the Chinese fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Yang-Ou.

[4] 1852-1923, future architect of the Entente Cordiale.

[5] Henry Kissinger about aircraft carriers, “100,000 tonnes of diplomacy”.

[6] Adolphe Thiers (1796-1877), former French President, founder of the Third Republic.

[7] Fully described by Capt Francois-Olivier Coman in Innovation et stratégie navale, 2021, Nuvis editions.

[8] Today, principal naval warfare lessons stem from closed maritime theatres in the Red, Black and Baltic seas, and therefore should be considered as only partially conclusive.