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The Review

Volume 111, Number 2, Spring 2023

The founding of the Naval Review and its raison d’etre – then and now

By Bruce Pascoe

Message from the Editor

A serious investigation into the origins of the Naval Review and the controversial but critical eyes that were concerned enough about early 20th century military norms to go to work on the underlying complacent assumptions. A 30 minute read.

As many members of the Naval Review know, the journal began on 27 October 1912 when several officers met at the home of Captain Herbert Richmond to discuss the starting of a “Correspondence Society for the Propagation of Sea-Military Knowledge.”¹ This Knowledge, as it were, focused on strategy, tactics and principles.² Richmond wrote in his papers, “What I hope to develop is the mental habit of reasoning things out, getting at the bottom of things, evolving principles & spreading interest in the higher side of our work. I wonder what the authorities will say when it reaches their ears!”³

The goal of the Naval Review was proudly posted on the cover of its jubilee issue in 1963:

“THE NAVAL REVIEW, by providing a vehicle for the expression of personal opinions on matters of naval interest, aims to stimulate thought and discussion on such matters among naval officers and others connected with the Navies of the Commonwealth. The views of junior officers are especially welcome. Technical details, such as are more appropriate to text books, should be omitted from contributions.”⁴

Note the words “personal opinions.” This reference meant that the NR was not to be a strictly academic journal relying on strenuous research of a wide range of sources. Officers could use their own experiences – if you like it, their personal primary research – to develop and disseminate ideas. Of course, healthy reading was also encouraged. It is vital to realize that this does not weaken the journal in any way. Strict scrutiny is given to articles first by the editors, and then by the scrutiny of other officers. This strengthens the journal as it frees it up for wider, healthy, professional debate. All can contribute and discuss from their own experiences and/or their research. The original invitation to members was that they should, “Write papers with the object of getting at the truth in view; no one poses as a teacher, all are learners.”⁵

Some aspects of the state of the Royal Navy before the First World War

To Arthur Marder, in the early years of the 20th century, “Pride in the Navy, the savior of peace with honour, overflowed into unlimited confidence… Though numerically a very imposing force, it was in certain respects a drowsy, inefficient, moth-eaten organism.”⁶ While there is much truth in this claim, it does overlook those aspects in which the Royal Navy did well. Churchill is fairer in his assessment:

“We had competent administrators, brilliant experts of every description, unequalled navigators, good disciplinarians, fine sea-officers, brave and devoted hearts: but at the outset of the conflict we had more captains of ships than captains of war.”⁷

Marder acknowledges these positive points, and also puts forward another important positive aspect of the Navy at the time: that the morale of sailors was unexpectedly high, in spite of the poor conditions in which they lived.⁸

The focus of this article is on the birth and importance of the Naval Review. Many other changes that were affecting the Navy at the same time – for example the Fisher reforms and the birth of a Naval Staff – are not examined, though many of these issues are interrelated. I will focus on Churchill’s claim that there were more “captains of ships than captains of war” – a claim based on the opinion that, while the Navy had many fine seamen and experts in materiel, there was a great lack of officers with knowledge of strategy and tactics – in terms of critical thinking about the way of war and how to win one. Compounding this were the huge technological changes that were happening at the time. How might these factors impact on the tactics and strategies used in the past?

The era before the First World War was dominated by spit and polish in the Royal Navy. The smartness of the officer’s ship was his guarantee of promotion in the RN at the time, not any applied knowledge of the art of war.⁹ Those who climbed the ranks in the service did their allotted work quickly and precisely, and exactly as required by their captain and as laid down in established procedures.¹⁰ One admiral, Sir Algernon ‘Pompo’ Heneage, even judged the efficiency of a ship by the state of his white kid-gloves at the conclusion of his inspection.¹¹ Far from being an asset to enhance an officer’s career, independent and critical thought could have been detrimental to his promotion.¹²

Before appearing to judge the Navy too harshly, it must be remembered that the RN had been largely at peace since Trafalgar and, of course, Britannia still ruled the waves. It was also an innately conservative institution, an issue which is interwoven with the long- term Victorian peace.¹³ These issues are, however, obviously not conducive to independent or innovative thought.

One problem was the Navy’s extreme emphasis on obeying

orders. The most infamous example of this is the loss of HMS Victoria in 1893. The sinking of the Victoria, the flagship of the C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet, Vice Admiral Tryon, resulted in the death of 385 of her crew, including Tryon.¹⁴ HMS Camperdown, the flagship of the fleet’s second in command, Rear Admiral Markham, rammed the Victoria. At the time Markham was obeying an order that he – and the rest of the fleet apart from Tryon – believed to be impossible. Full blame was placed on Tryon, and all other officers concerned were exonerated. The Admiralty chose not to use this tragedy to question the role played in the disaster by the Royal Navy’s method of strict conformity and unquestioned obedience to orders.¹⁵ Instead it chose to issue regulations that “under special circumstances, and particularly when there is risk of collision, doors, hatches, etc., shall be kept closed as far as possible, and men stationed at any that are necessarily left open.”¹⁶ It was, to say the least, difficult to encourage independent critical thinking skills in such a culture of absolute obedience to orders.

Another issue was that Admirals were often considered infallible – as Sir Peter Gretton wrote, “The Admiral must be right” – and that officers below the rank of Admiral were not considered worthy of creative thought.¹⁷ This, of course, raises the question of where Admirals learnt their knowledge of strategy and tactics and the critical thinking skills to apply this knowledge.¹⁸ One could be cynical and wonder if every Admiral had a sudden epiphany on tactics and strategy at the same time he received his promotion. Prince Louis of Battenburg was well aware of this challenge regarding tactics, writing to Fisher in 1902 that, “In view of the few opportunities afforded our Admirals in gaining practical experience in this (tactics), is it right to leave a new Admiral a completely free hand and to ignore the results of the patient labours of others who have gone before?”¹⁹ In 1902, Lord Charles Beresford reportedly stated that, though he was 56 years old, in all of his life he had only commanded three ships tactically for a total of five hours.²⁰

In 1915, Lord Esher, Chairman of the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID), complained to Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the CID for 26 years, that, apart probably from Churchill, no one had read Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, and that “Statesmen and warriors pick their way through the dust.”²¹

Sir Frederick Richards and Sir Arthur Wilson provide two examples of the conservative thinking of Admirals. Richards objected to abolishing masted-ship training in 1900. His reasoning? “You have got an established system and a time- honoured one, so why alter it?”²²

Referring to members of the proposed Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson wrote:

“The Service would have the most supreme contempt for any body of officers who professed to be specially trained to think. There is no service where there is more thinking done, but officers are judged by what they can do when afloat. The whole spirit and training of the Navy is to make officers, whatever their position, do their thinking for themselves, and to keep themselves ready to act instantly in all emergencies.”²³

The problem here is that critical thinking and the principles of war require serious training, just as seamanship does. A few words alone very rarely result in influencing behavior. It takes training and critical thinking about the issues involved to gain this result. It is therefore difficult to see how officers could acquire such skills while at sea. Wilson is famous for his statement that: “Submariners are nothing more than tradesmen and submarines are underhand, unfair, and damned un-English. They’ll never be any use in war.” We are, however, all capable of being blindfolded when it comes to certain issues. It is important to remember that Wilson was, in other ways, a fine officer.

Fleet drills were another issue of challenge to any independent thinker. To Dewar, “Fleet drills took the form of quadrille-like movements carried out at equal speed in accordance with geometrical diagrams in the signal book.”²⁴ The focus was on ship competing against ship, rather than any practical war value. While one must be careful of Dewar’s comments – which can be biased – one of Beatty’s senior captains later noted that: “He (the captain) knew ‘nothing, absolutely, of Fleet Tactics, or of handling a Fleet, and that in eighteen months with the Grand Fleet (1917–19) all the Tactics called for at sea were practically embraced in turn together four Points to Port, and, ten minutes later, Turn together four Points to Starboard’.”²⁵

While railing to Dewar about those officers who opposed the existence and growth of the Review in its early years, Richmond wrote to him: “What some of them will do in war when they have to disobey orders I don’t know.”²⁶

One example of an answer to Richmond’s question came at the Battle of the Dogger Bank in January 1915. Watching from his crippled ship, HMS Lion, the commander of the Royal Navy’s battle cruiser squadron, Admiral David Beatty was “reduced to something like despair”²⁷ while his four undamaged battle cruisers misinterpreted an order by Beatty that was botched by his flag lieutenant, and chose the conservative action of finishing off the damaged Blücher rather than chase and engage the fleeing German battle cruisers. Beatty was highly critical of his subordinate captains for following orders rather than obeying “the higher doctrine of ensuring the destruction of the enemy.”²⁸ However, as Lambert pointed out, Beatty’s captains had served their entire naval careers in a Navy where strict control and strict obedience were both paramount. As Richmond could have predicted, the flag officer concerned, Rear Admiral Moore, chose to take the safe alternative and follow his interpretation of the orders, preventing what might have been a great victory. How far the wheel had turned from the days of Nelson, where decentralization was a key of victory, and all captains were aware of the tactical expectations Nelson had for them.²⁹

A compounding issue was that tactics and gunnery were not coordinated. Tactics were under the sway of the Flag Officer; while gunnery was mainly looked after by the Admiralty, the Inspector of Target Practice, and the gunnery school (HMS Excellent). Flag Officers assumed that gunnery would correctly respond to their tactical plans, while gunnery focused on competitions designed by the Admiralty.³⁰

In its early years, the Naval Review was therefore understandably on shaky ground, with many senior officers wishing to see it disappear. Fortunately the Review’s first editor was the highly effective Admiral Sir William Henderson. Henderson edited the Review for 18 years, and “To him, more than anyone, must go credit for the evolution of the Naval Review and for its survival.”³¹ One important thing that Henderson did was to contact the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenburg, about the Review. Prince Louis then discussed the Review with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, who also quickly became a major supporter of the Naval Review. The two discussed how they could help spread the Review, and even assist it financially.³² Churchill ordered that the Admiralty “take the journal in.”³³ In spite of this, members of the Admiralty, not including Prince Louis, continued to attempt to hamper the development of the Review, much to Richmond’s chagrin.³⁴ Sir Peter Gretton wrote that the Review “might well have been throttled at birth by the objections of the bureaucrats, but for the determination of the First Lord.”³⁵

There are those who would argue that I have overemphasized the importance of the above issues. For example, Roskill disagrees with Churchill’s claim that, throughout his career, a naval officer was neither “obliged” to read a book on naval war, nor pass an exam in naval history. Roskill’s main rebuttal is that history was already being taught and examined at Osborne and Dartmouth Colleges.³⁶ In contrast, Dewar naturally claimed that the study of history was frowned upon.³⁷ Roskill’s other rebuttal point was to incorrectly interpret “not obliged” as “not allowed to.”³⁸ While Dewar might again be accused of bias, in education a major key to successful learning (including application of the principles learnt) is the importance placed on the subject by both institution and students, and, especially in professional military education, its impact on and value to learners. The evidence is that the importance of history was not only not acknowledged at the time, but that such knowledge could even be detrimental to an ambitious officer’s future career. It is therefore unsurprising that, generally, learning of these issues was ineffective. This of course does not include the direct impact of men like Corbett and Richmond himself. It is unsurprising therefore when Marder wrote that, “The faulty, obsolete system of education, with its stress on out-moded subjects and discouragement of independent thought produced few admirals of conspicuous ability.”³⁹

Roskill does usefully point out that Churchill was incorrect in claiming that, “The Royal Navy had made no important contribution to Naval literature.”⁴⁰ Admiral Philip Colomb and Sir John Colomb both wrote important works on naval theory. Predating Mahan, Philip Colomb independently came to the same conclusions that Mahan later became famous for.⁴¹ He also used historical study as a means to develop strategic thinking.⁴² Unfortunately, such men were the exception rather than the rule, and they had little impact apart from those they directly worked with.

Seligmann argues that: “The culture of leadership was not beset by systematic and in-built rigidity. On the contrary, the Royal Navy’s senior admirals were strategically aware, and open to, even pushing for, flexibility in fulfilling battlefield roles.”⁴³

One of Seligmann’s claims is that much of the evidence of the Navy’s innate conservatism and failure to embrace advances in strategy derives from the likes of Richmond and Dewar and other reformers. In order to legitimize their own credentials as reformers, the reformers themselves often publicized the ways in which the Navy’s attitudes were ingrained and resistant to change. Seligmann argues that Richmond persuaded Marder to accept Richmond’s version of the Navy’s “innate aversion to innovation.”⁴⁴ One counter to this is that, although Marder comes under criticism now,⁴⁵he was an accomplished historian, and the reason that he was convinced is most likely that the evidence he found supported this conclusion. While it is wise to examine the claims of these reformers for bias, the evidence shows that in the areas of training in strategy and tactics and in developing independent thinking skills, the reformers were basically spot on.

Seligmann also states that, prior to the First World War, there was a policy in the Home Fleet of “defined command flexibility,”⁴⁶ a policy of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet at the time, Admiral (later Admiral of the Fleet) Sir George Callaghan, a policy which had the Admiralty’s endorsement. Callaghan wrote that his intention was to control the Fleet until deployment, but thereafter he would only directly command the Fleet’s sections in his immediate vicinity. Control of those sections outside Callaghan’s immediate vicinity would be delegated to their respective commanders.⁴⁷

Seligmann then provides as further evidence of the Navy’s flexibility that Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney wanted a clear definition of, when:

“In an action with a large fleet, fast divisions, cruisers and destroyer flotillas, numerous cases will arise for individual action on the part of divisional commanders…. To what extent and under what circumstances junior flag officers should take the initiative, without waiting for orders or signals from the Commander-in-Chief.”⁴⁸

The reader might now be falling asleep and wondering what relevance all this can have to the founding of the Naval Review. My argument is that this is precisely one of the examples of the need for the Review. Even if these two Admirals were not just a very small minority who shared this thinking, clearly these ideas were not reflected in the actions of subordinate flag officers at either the Battle of the Dogger Bank or the Battle of Jutland. Note also that there is no reference to such independence being allowed to captains or other commanders of ships. As I have already pointed out, ideas need more than to be supported by a few words if they are to be evidenced in a person’s behavior.

Before the Battle of the Dogger Bank, Beatty, in Nelsonian-like language, told his captains that, “it could never be wrong to go for the enemy when you saw him.”⁴⁹ Clearly the captains involved did not follow this edict. In the conservative environment of the pre-First World War Navy, this is hardly surprising – but this type of failure is relevant to any time. In tense situations, especially in war, people don’t act according to a few inspiring words – they act according to their learned patterns of behaviors. Nelson painstakingly worked with his captains before the Battle of the Nile and the Battle of Trafalgar. Most of his captains instinctively believed in Nelson’s methods, but a lot of work was still spent in internalizing these methods so that they became part of the captains’ normal behavior – behavior that would be emulated in the chaos of warfare.⁵⁰

The essential point here is that it is not important that some Admirals espoused flexibility and independent action. The important point is that there was little evidence in the First World War of British naval commanders acting flexibly or independently. As Dr. Nitobé Inazo wrote in “Bushido – the Soul of Japan” “knowledge becomes really such only when it is assimilated in the mind of the learner and shows in his character.”⁵¹

Why is this relevant to the impact of the Naval Review? Precisely because, at that time, the Naval Review was the primary vehicle for disseminating ideas and encouraging creative thinking about issues such as tactics and training and positive criticism about them. Official vehicles to do this were also evolving at this time. However, they had flaws and were only slowly overcoming these. For example, one of the reasons for the lack of success of the Staff College during its early years was that, as Dewar fairly wrote, “We had the opportunity but not the intellectual capital to float a staff.”⁵² There were not enough suitably trained instructors available in the Navy at that time. Therefore, since methods to directly train officers in these areas were not available, the Naval Review provided at the least an important first step for officers to really think about and internalize concepts of Naval strategy and tactics.

It is, therefore, impossible to measure any direct impact the Review had. There are, however, strong indications that the growth of the Naval Review in its first few years (see Table 1) also reflect its impact. This assumes that its readers intuited, thought about, and hopefully also discussed its articles with others. This is a reasonable assumption, since many senior Naval officers disliked the Review and would liked to have seen it stopped (more about this later), and therefore most officers were likely to read the Review because they were interested, rather than because it might help their hopes of promotion. Others would also have read it seeking to find flaws in it or even reasons to have the publication stopped – though perhaps there might have even been some shift in their ideas after reading the articles (and perhaps this is mere wishful thinking). At worst it would have forced these officers to actually think about strategy and tactics.

I am well aware that I have just made the academic error of not directly linking cause and effect. In this case I believe it is warranted, but I am prepared for criticism on this issue. If I have sparked debate I will be happy – even if I am shown to be wrong. After all, this was, and is, a goal of the Review. This was, and still is, one of the reasons that the Naval Review is just as important today as it was at its foundation. Personally, it is also one of the most important reasons that I enjoy both reading and writing for the Review. This is why the Review eschews the strait-jacketed (but necessary) requirements of an academic journal. This allows the Review the freedom to publish controversial issues that challenge others to dig deeper into the matter, perhaps based on personal opinions or in other ways that lack the strenuous requirements of an academic work (but backed up by personal experience, vetted by editors [certainly! – Ed.] and challenged by peers).

The Navy no longer faces the same challenges that the founders of the Review sought to overcome. It faces new challenges – such as the current war in Ukraine, for example, demonstrate. I will challenge others to take up the banner here. It is not the focus of this article. Because of the type of journal it is, the Review provides just as important a channel in which to discuss and challenge issues today as it did 60 years ago. I will finish this section by quoting Agag, who wrote in 1963 on the 50th anniversary of the Review’s founding:

“There are greater facilities for learning and for discussing things than there were fifty years ago. But the need for the Review has not gone, it has only altered: the requirement is a more demanding one. There must always be a forum in which the more enthusiastic minds meet, outside and above their normal duties, and in it anyone with a genuine interest, however slight or remote, must be helped to feel at home…. It is time we reminded ourselves of the original invitation to members that they should: ‘Write papers with the object of getting at the truth in view; no one poses as a teacher, all are learners.’”⁵³

Conclusion

Given the naturally conservative position of the majority of senior officers in the Navy at the time, and their hindrance to the development of, and even the very existence of, the Naval Review, it is hardly surprising that Richmond wrote: “I wonder what the authorities will say when it reaches their ears!”⁵⁴ These same challenges no longer face the Naval Review – but they have been replaced by new ones that mean the Review is just as important today as it was 60 years ago.

Footnotes

1
Richmond, H. in Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press
Cambridge MA 89
2
Richmond H. in Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 89
3
Richmond, H. in Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 89, Author’s emphasis
4
The Naval Review Vol 51, No. I January, 1963 cover
5
Agag (1963) “A Note on the first Fifty Years of the Naval Review” The Naval Review Vol LI No I January, 1963 8-21 21
6
Marder, A. J. (1961) “From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904-1919 Volume 1 The Road to War 1904-1914” Naval Institute Press Anapolis Kindle Edition 47
7
Churchill, W. S (1923) “The World Crisis, Volume 1” Macmillan Toronto 93 retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59794
8
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 51
9
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 49
10
Crossley, J. (2020) “Churchill’s Admiral in Two World Wars: Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover GCB KCVO CMG DSO” Pen and Sword Books Barnsley Yorkshire 62
11
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 50; Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game, (London: John Murray, 2005), p. 175
12
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 53
13
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 52
14
JSee for example Pascoe B. (2018). “The Fate of HMS Victoria” The Naval Review Volume CVI Issue 2 195-202
15
Macintyre, D. (1977). The ‘Victoria’ and ‘Camperdown’ catastrophe. British history illustrated (Vol. 3). London, UK: Historical Times.
16
Thursfield, J. B. (1894). The loss of the Victoria, In T. A. Brassey (Ed.), The Naval Annual 1984 (pp. 164–178). Portsmouth, UK: J. Griffin and Co.
17
Gretton, P. (1968) “Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy”
Sapere Books Kindle Edition 59 and Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 52
18
Gretton, P. (1968) “Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy” Sapere Books Kindle Edition 59
19
Cited in Gretton, P. (1968) “Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy” Sapere Books Kindle Edition 65
20
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 49
21
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond”
Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 572
22
Cited in Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 52; Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 1 (Barnsley, Pend & Sword Books, Ltd, 2013 [1961]) p. 11
23
Bradford, E. E. (1923) “Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson” John Murray London 235
24
Cited in Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 49
25
Sumida, J. T. (2003). “A matter of timing: The Royal Navy and the tactics of decisive battle, 1912–1916. “The Journal of Military History, 67,
85–136 121 fn
26
Hunt, B. D. “Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 1871-1946” Wilfred LaurierUniversity Press 1982 Waterloo Canada 36
27
Roskill, S. (2018). “Admiral of the fleet Earl Beatty: The last naval hero.” Barnsley, UK: Seaforth 113
28
Lambert, A. (2009). Ruthless bounder: David Beatty (1871-1936) In A. Lambert (Ed.), Admirals: The naval commanders who made Britain great (pp. 335–378). London, UK: Faber and Faber. 354
29
See for example Pascoe, B. (2020). “Leader–Follower Synergies: Lessons From Nelson and His Captains”. In M. Hurwitz & R. Thompson (Eds.). (2020). New Directions for Student Leadership: No. 167. Followership education. pp. 99-110. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
30
Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond”
Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 568
31
Goldrick, J. (1992) “The Irresistible Force and the Immovable Object: The Naval Review, the Young Turks, and the Royal Navy, 1911-1931” 83-102 in Goldrick, J. and Hattendorf, J. B. (1993) “Mahan is not enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond” Naval War College Historical Monograph Series No. 10 Naval War College Press Newport Ri 88
32
Hunt, B. D. “Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 1871-1946” Wilfred Laurier University Press 1982 Waterloo Canada 35 and Master Ned. (1979) “Naval Review Controversy by ‘Master Ned’” Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Volume 5 May 1979 Number 2 22-28, 23-26
33
Richmond, H. quoted in Hunt, B. D. “Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond
1871-1946” Wilfred Laurier University Press 1982 Waterloo Canada 36
34
See Hunt, B. D. “Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 1871-1946” Wilfred Laurier University Press 1982 Waterloo Canada 36
35
Gretton, P. (1968) “Former Naval Person:
Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy” Sapere Books Kindle Edition 102
36
Roskill, S. (2004) “Churchill and the Admirals” Pen and Sword Military Classics Barnsley 30
37
Gretton, P. (1968) “Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy” Sapere Books Kindle Edition 59
38
Roskill, S. (2004) “Churchill and the Admirals” Pen and Sword Military Classics Barnsley 30
39
Marder, A. J. (1961) “From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904-1919 Volume 1 The Road to War 1904-1914” Naval Institute Press Anapolis Kindle Edition 50
40
Churchill, W. S (1923) “The World Crisis, Volume 1” Macmillan Toronto 93 retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59794 93
41
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Philip-Howard-Colomb retrieved 15/3/2023
42
Roskill, S. (2004) “Churchill and the Admirals” Pen and Sword Military Classics Barnsley 30
43
Seligmann, M. S. (2018) “A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914” English Historical Review Vol. The founding of the Naval Review and its raison d’etre – then and now 83 CXXXIII No. 560 ps. 98-122 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/133/560/98/4876922 121
44
Seligmann, M. S. (2018) “A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy
in July 1914” English Historical Review Vol. CXXXIII No. 560 ps. 98-122 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/133/560/98/4876922 100-101
45
See for example Matthew S. Seligmann (2016) A Great American Scholar of the Royal Navy? The Disputed Legacy of Arthur Marder Revisited, The International
History Review, 38:5,1040-1054, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2016.1144628 https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1144628, N. Lambert, ‘Righting the Scholarship: TheBattle Cruiser in History and Historiography’, Historical Journal lviii (2015), 275_307., and. T. Sumida, ‘Demythologizing the Fisher Era:the Role of Change in Historical Method’,Milit€argeschichtliche Zeitschrift, lix (2000),171- 181
46
Seligmann, M. S. (2018) “A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914” English Historical Review Vol.CXXXIII No. 560 ps. 98-122 Downloaded
from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/133/560/98/4876922 110
47
Seligmann, M. S. (2018) “A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914” English Historical Review Vol.CXXXIII No. 560 ps. 98-122 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/133/560/98/4876922 109
48
Seligmann, M. S. (2018) “A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914” English Historical Review Vol. CXXXIII No. 560 ps. 98-122 Downloaded
from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/133/560/98/4876922 110
49
Young, F. (2015).With the battle cruisers
(Amazon Kindle edition). London, UK: Endeavour Compass 83
50
Pascoe, B. (2020). “Leader–Follower Synergies: Lessons From Nelson and His Captains”. In M. Hurwitz & R. Thompson (Eds.). (2020). New Directions for
Student Leadership: No. 167. Followership education. pp. 99-110. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
51
Nitobe I. (2004), “Bushido, the Soul of Japan” http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12096 Validated 12/9/2015
52
Cited in Marder, A. J. (1961) “From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904-1919 Volume 1 The
Road to War 1904-1914” Naval Institute Press Anapolis Kindle Edition 397
53
Agag (1963) “A Note on the first Fifty Years of the Naval Review” The Naval Review Vol LI No I January, 1963 8-21 21
54
Richmond, H. in Marder, A. J. (1952) “Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir
Herbert Richmond” Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 89

The Naval Brigades, Part 3: Armageddon – The Anglo-Zulu War

The Remarkable Story of Commander Charles Lightoller DSC & Bar RNR

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The founding of the Naval Review and its raison d’etre – then and now

Some aspects of the state of the Royal Navy before the First World War

Conclusion

Footnotes

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